Namibia sustainable development depends on the country's rich natural capital. Thus, nature tourism is thought to be a tool to reconcile apparently opposite objectives of conservation and poverty alleviation in communal lands. Tourism in Namibian communal lands is based on natural resources and amenities that can be considered as impure public goods. Rivalness and zero-exclusion conditions lead to rent dissipating externalities and threaten sustainability of the resource-system. Multiple actors compete to capture rent from natural resources-flows. Land use conflicts increase transaction and governance costs. This paper aims at analysing institutions that emerge in Namibian rural areas to regulate what is said to be the "tourism commons". Supply of governance structures is made through devolution of new property rights to local communities that register as conservancies (CBNRM programme). We analyse the emergence of such local institutions by referring to Williamson's (2000) four level model of institutions. Institutional arrangements are put in place, based on community social capital, peer-control, community participation and state facilitative strategy and new legal framework. Formal and real capacity of local communities is here questioned in order to evaluate effective  Namibian local institutions' efficiency to reduce transaction costs by lowering conflicts and enhancing collective action. Keywords: Common pool resources, nature tourism, property rights, institutional analysis, social capital, community, Namibia.