

The Importance of Good Governance for Community-Based Natural Resource Management

Evidence from Conservancies in the Zambezi Region, Namibia

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II. List of Acronyms

AGM – Annual General Meeting
CBNRM – Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CC – Conservancy
CF – Community Forest
DoF – Department of Forestry
GEF – Global Environmental Facility
GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GOPA – GOPA Worldwide Consultants
HWC – Human-Wildlife Conflict
IRDNC – Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation
JV – Joint Venture
KAZA TFCA – Kavango/Zambezi Trans-Frontier Conservation Area
KfW – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MAWF – Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry
MC – Management Committee
MET – Ministry of Environment and Tourism
MLR – Ministry of Land Reform
MNC – The Mudumu North Complex
MSC – The Mudumu South Complex
NamParks – Namibian National Parks Programme
NGO – Non-governmental Organization
NP – National Park
RC – Regional Council
TA – Traditional Authority
WWF – World Wide Fund For Nature

1. Introduction

'The Conservancy principle is going to implode on itself, the way it is going. We are gonna lose it, because its gonna tumble down on itself. Because of the corruption and people just not interested to solve actual problems' (Interview with a professional hunter)

Namibia is often perceived by the public as the prototype and success model of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Namibia was also the first country in Africa to include biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources in its constitution for the benefit of its population:

“the State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the (...) maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and future (...)” (Republic of Namibia 1990: 46).

The CBNRM system was established in the 1990s and showed immediate success in the recovery of wildlife numbers, which had suffered greatly from poaching, habitat loss and the tragedy of the commons. The CBNRM system and its Conservancies had been established based on OSTROM's **design principles for the management of common goods** with nature conservation and the benefit for the local population as its two central goals. In contrast to the number of wild animals, no sustainable and significant success has been achieved in establishing economically flourishing Conservancies that do not depend on external support. Many of the Conservancies do not generate profits, experience corruption and management changes, lack of participation and resistance from established institutions. So, it seems that OSTROM's design principles cannot be seen as a silver bullet for the CBNRM system and a one-size-fits-all solution for the tragedy of the commons. New approaches in the CBNRM field are therefore needed to re-examine and evaluate the current situation and governance processes in the Conservancies. The concept of **Good Governance**, originally applied on nation states, includes more specific guidelines on administration and management than OSTROM's design principles. Therefore, Good Governance could act as a suitable framework to analyze the processes in Conservancies. In Namibia, however, this analysis concept has scarcely been applied to CBNRM by the scientific community. Furthermore, just recently there has been a rethinking in the NGO scene and instead of focusing on pure wildlife and profit figures for Conservancies, the principle of Good Governance is now also being addressed. Yet, it was not until June 2018 that a large-scale workshop on governance was held under the auspices of the WWF. Looking at the above quote from a hunter, it becomes clear that the satisfaction of the local population, and thus the commitment, must be increased in order to stabilize and advance the CBNRM principle. Good Governance could be the key to achieving this goal. Therefore, this paper will deal with the importance of Good Governance for Conservancies. Firstly, Chapter 2 will present the conceptual framework. Secondly, Chapter 3 explains the status quo and the framework conditions of CBNRM in Namibia as well as the research area and Chapter 4 discusses the research design. Building on this, an analysis of the main actors in CBNRM is carried out in Chapter 5, before a quantitative analysis of Good Governance indicators in Conservancies is carried out in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, these findings are qualitatively substantiated by the findings of the 31 interviews carried out for this study. Chapter 8 provides the key recommendations that can be derived from these results. A final conclusion is drawn in Chapter 9. The questionnaires in English and Silozi, an example of interview guidelines as well as a list of interviews conducted can be found in the Annex in Chapter 10.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the theory of the tragedy of the commons and the principles of sustainable governance of common goods lead to the theoretical background of this work: Good Governance as an extension of OSTROM's approaches, CBNRM as a concept and the main points of criticism of CBNRM. Subsequently, the state of research on CBNRM in Namibia will be presented. At the end of this chapter, a research question is derived from the presented theoretical framework and the state of research.

2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons

The biologist and ecologist Garret HARDIN decisively influenced the theory of the tragedy of the commons by publishing his version of this phenomenon in an essay titled "The Tragedy of the Commons" in 1968. The tragedy of the commons states that in the use of public goods, each individual focusses on his or her own maximization of benefits, while ignoring the benefit or harm of this activity to society as a whole. A shepherd, for instance, will add more cattle to a public grazing land without restriction, as he will benefit maximally from an increase in his production. However, the damage caused by overuse of the common pasture area is distributed among all users of this area, so that each individual benefits from selfishness until the carrying capacity of the area is exceeded. The damage to the common good does not become visible until the system collapses (HARDIN 1968: 1244). HARDIN describes this as *"Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a common brings ruin to all"* (HARDIN 1968: 1244). Basically, the more the population exceeds the carrying capacity in a certain area, the more personal freedoms and access to commons must be restricted (HARDIN 1998: 682f.).

2.2 Governing the Commons

The scientist Elinor OSTROM searched for solutions for the tragedy of the commons by examining numerous case studies of the communal use of small-scale public goods (e.g. communal use of forests, fish, land or irrigation systems) for success factors and similarities. She published her results in 1990 in the book "Governing the Commons". In the synthesis of the case studies, OSTROM presented eight principles that have a decisive influence on the success of the management of public goods (after OSTROM 1990: 88ff.):

1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
3. Collective-choice arrangements
4. Monitoring
5. Graduated Sanctions
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
8. Nested enterprises and embedded institutions

These factors were revised, reviewed and questioned several times by various authors and by OSTROM herself, but the general messages remained similar and comparable for the majority of publications. However, some publications criticize the claim of universality of the principles and subsequently, many other factors for the success of a sustainable management of public goods were developed. For example, there are social variables that explain why management works in

some communities and not in others (COX/ARNOLD/TOMAS 2010: 12f.). It is not only size, homogeneity or clear boundaries that determine success, but above all social mechanisms such as trust, transparency and legitimacy among the population have a strong influence on a successful governance (HARKES 2006: 250f.). Especially the scalability to larger resource systems is questioned, as OSTROM's investigations have mostly been limited to small, local, clearly defined areas and resources, which are characterized by a certain homogeneity and manageability (COX/ARNOLD/TOMAS 2010: 13).

2.3 Good Governance

Some of the above-mentioned criticisms of the criteria formulated by OSTROM are countered in this paper by extending the analytical approach for a sustainable management of natural resources to the principles of Good Governance. Especially the criticism by HARKES, who declares social and political mechanisms, such as transparency and legitimacy, to be the actual success criteria of a management system are accounted for. In 1992, the World Bank published its definition of governance as *"the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development"* (World Bank 1992: 1). In its publication *"Governance for sustainable human development: A UNDP policy document"* of 1997, the UNDP further developed the definition of the World Bank of 1992 and understood governance as *"the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences"* (UNDP 1997: 55). The stronger focus on political and social factors is clearly discernible here and becomes evident in the nine criteria of Good Governance on which this work is largely based (UNDP 1997: 14f.):

- (1) Participation: All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.
- (2) Rule of law: Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.
- (3) Transparency: Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.
- (4) Responsiveness: Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.
- (5) Consensus orientation: Good Governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.
- (6) Equity: All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.
- (7) Effectiveness and efficiency: Processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.
- (8) Accountability: Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders.
- (9) Strategic vision: Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on Good Governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development.

Although the Good Governance approach was developed in the context of nation states, it can be applied to any scale and form of administration, since the defining nine criteria are very universally formulated and characterize policy processes in general. Good Governance - in

contrast to OSTROM's eight criteria that can be seen more as basic prerequisites for the management of public goods - therefore describes in far more detail the processes and mechanisms in an administration, be it national government or local management of natural resources. Good Governance has already been applied very frequently in science and has been used, among other things, to examine the management processes of natural resources, public goods and protected areas (see e.g. EHLER 2003, HANNA/CLARK/SLOCOMBE 2007, LOCKWOOD 2010, GRUBER 2011 and EAGLES et al. 2012).

2.4 CBNRM

CBNRM *“seeks to encourage better resource management outcomes with the full participation of communities and resource users in decision-making activities, and the incorporation of local institutions, customary practices, and knowledge systems in management, regulatory, and enforcement processes”*(ARMITAGE 2005: 703). Natural (public) resources are at the centre of the management system. These resources can vary in their nature, occurrence, dimension and scale. In CBNRM, these resources are always managed by a collective local institution with the aim of increasing local benefits. The quality of resource management is to be improved through the participation of the community, i.e. the resource users, in decision-making. It is also important to involve local institutions, practices and knowledge. Furthermore, ARMITAGE describes CBNRM as *“a mechanism to address both environmental and social-economic goals and to balance the exploitation and conservation of valued ecosystem components. It requires some degree of devolution of decision-making power and authority over natural resources to communities and community-based organizations”* (ARMITAGE 2005: 704). Here, the concept of local benefits is extended into two dimensions: nature conservation on the one hand and socio-economic benefits on the other. A natural resource should not be exploited until exhaustion (see Tragedy of the Commons, Chapter 2.1), but should be preserved through sustainable use and collective management. This requires the devolution of decision-making powers and rights to these resources. MURPHREE describes devolution as *“the creation of relatively autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and entitlement, with a primary accountability to their own constituencies”* (MURPHREE 2000: 6). Devolution in the context of CBNRM therefore means that the rights to resources are transferred to autonomous, decentralized entities or administrative units, which are mainly accountable to the population in their area of responsibility. Moreover, they are controlled by the members of the community and in some cases elected by them. This accountability of an entity to its members can be described as downward accountability and is essential for the principle of CBNRM (BÉNÉ/NEILAND 2006: 32 f.). Furthermore, CBNRM is based on the assumption that this involvement of a community - a locally limited and relatively homogeneous population - in participatory decisions and formalization into local institutions has a positive effect on the sustainability of the management of the respective natural resource. In contrast to larger state or private actors, the local population should have a greater interest in conserving this resource, as it is utilized locally, and all community members benefit from it. In addition, local communities should be closer to ecological processes, since the yearlong relationship with the resource generates local knowledge accumulated over several generations (BROSIOUS/LOWENHAUPT/ZERNER 1998: 158).

2.5 Criticism of CBNRM

Many CBNRM projects were unable to meet the high expectations associated with their implementation and the devolution of natural resource rights. SHAKLETON et al. (2002) attribute the failures of CBNRM to a number of specific factors in several case studies. The first reason given is that in many cases there is no real devolution of rights. The outlined approaches are too rarely followed by legal steps and the actual legal control over the resources remains with central institutions. Decentralized entities sometimes only receive rights of use and lack control. Furthermore, the distribution of benefits within the local population is often not fair. Occasionally it can happen that, in order to protect the natural resource, the distribution of benefits may be regulated. This limitation of use of the resource is a disadvantage for many sections of the population. If this disadvantage is not offset by joint commercialization and fair distribution of the generated resources, CBNRM projects have a negative impact on parts of the population. SHAKLETON et al. (2002) identified the balance of power in the community as the last factor. Elites repeatedly try to influence devolution in a way that benefits them. They are often involved in decision-making processes or have veto rights on land issues, interaction with the private sector or other investments (SHAKLETON et al. 2002: 1f.) (on the role of *traditional authorities* see chapter 5.3.2). This influence of elites can also be described as *elite capture*. DUTTA (2009) defines elite capture as a phenomenon "*where resources transferred for the benefit of the masses are usurped by a few, usually politically and/or economically powerful groups, at the expense of the less economically and/or politically influential groups*" (DUTTA 2009: 3). This absorption of rents and benefits and the degree of elite capture depend to a large extent on the power relations in the community, the degree of local political participation and awareness, land ownership, the heterogeneity of the population and the organization of interest groups. The weaker the whole participation system, the easier elite capture becomes (DUTTA 2009: 5f.). These factors depend heavily on Good Governance practices in CBNRM areas (see Chapter 7). In a meta-analysis of almost 500 development projects, MANSURI and RAO (2013) found that in most cases of CBNRM the richer, better educated and people with a higher social status were clearly over-represented in participatory processes and democratic structures. This enables these groups of people to use the natural resources to their own advantage and to significantly influence decisions that further improve their socio-economic situation in the *community* (MANSURI/RAO 2013: 5ff.).

Further criticism can be found among others in BLAIKIE (2006) and AGRAWAL/GIBSON (1999). BLAIKIE argues that the majority of CBNRM projects do not provide the predicted benefits for nature and society and lists three main points of criticism in his essay. First, he argues that the entire CBNRM approach is based on a normative, constructed interpretation of *community*. The term *community* represents a myth that constructs a homogeneous community of interests with the same goals and no intra-societal conflicts (BLAIKIE 2006: 1944). CANNON (2014) dedicates an entire chapter to the myth of the *community* in the World Disaster Report 2014. He describes, that the mere use of the term *community* suggests a closed unity and a willingness to collaborate and cooperate. An idealized form of living together is thus created (CANNON 2014: 101). According to CANNON (2008), the exact opposite is the case: "*Communities are places where normal everyday inequality, exploitation, oppression and maliciousness are woven into the fabric of relationships*" (CANNON 2008: 12). The use of this term and the assumptions associated with it form the basis for many failed CBNRM projects because "*this vision fails to attend to differences within communities, and ignores how these differences affect resource management outcomes, local politics, and strategic interactions within communities, as well as the possibility of layered alliances that can span multiple levels of politics*" (AGRAWAL/GIBSON 1999: 633). Secondly, BLAIKIE argues that when using the terms *community* and *sustainable management of natural resources*, it is implied that a *community* is inherently suitable for managing natural resources. The *community* as an actor is

portrayed in such a way that it represents the conceivably best way to guarantee sustainable management through its homogeneous structure, its confined space, harmony with nature and through its traditional or indigenous knowledge. At the same time, this community is supposed to pursue externally constructed goals, the formulation of which has rarely included them. These externally formulated goals, which are based on the nature conservation ideals of international NGOs and scientists, lack a focus on the actual socio-economic development of communities. Quantifiable targets are often limited to an increased number of wild animals, afforested areas or rehabilitated soils, so that conservation seems to be the primary objective of CBNRM. The inclusion and development of communities are mostly regarded as means to an end (BLAIKIE 2006: 1945).

2.6 Literature Review on CBNRM in Namibia

The establishment of CBNRM has been accompanied and empirically investigated by science since the founding of the first Conservancies in the 1990s. The first publications on CBNRM mainly dealt with the potential and already realized economic benefits of CBNRM for the local population. ASHLEY, BARNES and HEALY (1994) investigated the economic potential of wildlife in Namibia - before the establishment of CBNRM - and came to the conclusion that the benefits from wildlife were very unevenly distributed at that time and proposed to transfer the rights to use wildlife resources to the local population through devolution, while at that time many benefits were generated in private game reserves. To ensure sustainable management of natural resources, they advocated the establishment of CBNRM and improved land-use planning. This was a prerequisite for the compatibility of wildlife and other forms of land-use (ASHLEY/BARNES/HEALY 1994: 1ff.). BANDYOPADHYAY et al. (2004) examined households in seven Conservancies in order to discuss whether their participation in the Conservancies had a positive effect on their income. They found that only about one third of all households participated in the activities of the Conservancies. Only 12% of households stated that they benefited in monetary terms from the Conservancy, while at least one fifth of households received non-monetary benefits such as the distribution of game meat. However, more than half of the households also reported damage to livestock and agriculture by wildlife. Overall, however, the authors found a positive effect on households. No differences were found in the benefits for households with higher education or greater participation. The authors concluded that at that time Conservancies were not dominated by elites (BANDYOPADHYAY et al. 2004: 19ff.). A similar group of researchers around BANDYOPADHYAY (2010) came to a different conclusion six years later. They found a positive effect on the income of households that actively participated in Conservancy activities. An even stronger effect was observed between households belonging to the Conservancy and households outside the Conservancy area (BANDYOPADHYAY et al. 2010: 4). SILVA and MOSIMANE (2013) used a mixed-method approach to determine that households in Conservancies benefited from direct economic payments (cash benefits), but that the indirect benefits of Conservancies, which were intended to raise the standard of living for the entire local population, cannot be determined. The authors attribute the general dissatisfaction and lack of participation of the local population in Conservancies to this fact (SILVA / MOSIMANE 2013: 25f.). A quantitative study by RIEHL/ZERRIFFI/NAIDOO (2015) found no positive economic effect on Conservancy members as opposed to non-members, but a positive effect on some health indicators (RIEHL/ZERRIFFI/NAIDOO 2015: 1f.).

Another focus of research in CBNRM is the devolution of rights and its implications. LAPEYRE (2008) found deficiencies in the devolution of rights to Conservancies. On the one hand, Conservancies are forced to outsource the exploitation of game resources to the private sector for capacity reasons. On the other hand, international donors and local NGOs continue to drive the CBNRM

approach and influence its policy and governance. These two factors and a fundamental rivalry between different actors prevent local ownership and genuine devolution, which are necessary for maximum benefit to the local population (LAPEYRE 2008: 26f.). BOUDREAU (2010) as well as BOUDREAU and NELSON (2011) examined the effects of devolution on the empowerment of poor populations and recognized that devolution gave the rural population ownership rights over resources for the first time. This transfer has successfully provided incentives to protect wildlife and their habitats. The authors noted a positive effect of the Conservancies on the general attitude of the Namibian population towards conservation and sustainable management of natural resources. However, devolution is still not complete, the Conservancies have no land rights and must continue to deal with traditional authorities on land issues (BOUDREAU 2010: 21; BOUDREAU/NELSON 2011: 22f.). BOLLIG and SCHWIEGER (2014) concur with this criticism and deplore the fragmented devolution to Conservancies, which transfers only parts of rights and complicates the governance processes of property rights (especially land rights). Unclear responsibilities of different institutions pose another problem (BOLLIG / SCHWIEGER 2014: 167f.). Moreover, BOLLIG's analysis of power structures in Conservancies in northwestern Namibia revealed no systematic elite capture, but rather tendencies towards nepotism, in which committee members were more likely to provide jobs or monetary/non-monetary benefits to their relatives rather than to systematically capture rents and benefits. BOLLIG also observed an attempt by the state to disempower the traditional authorities, who were not allowed to hold posts in the Conservancies. However, these traditional authorities still have a great influence on the activities and decisions in the Conservancies (BOLLIG 2016: 783ff).

The publications on Conservancy governance in Namibia are closely connected to the research on devolution and are particularly relevant for this work. Governance research started later than benefit research but became increasingly relevant and is therefore the main focus of this study. JONES (1999) identified comprehensive challenges and potentials of the Namibian Conservancies in the field of governance for the first time. He already pointed out the difficulties in defining a community and a jurisdiction of a Conservancy. He also identified various interest groups within the Conservancies that competed for benefits, access to natural resources and, above all, influence on governance in the Conservancies. He also noted the unclear distribution of responsibilities between Conservancies, traditional authorities and local governments, which led to conflicts between the individual institutions. However, it was still too early in 1999 to evaluate the success of Conservancies (JONES 1999: 3ff.). Another study by JONES (2012) also advanced governance research by identifying financial management and transparent decision-making processes in Conservancies as essential to the effectiveness of Conservancies. In addition, JONES stated that the increasing numbers of wild animals - an objective success of CBNRM in Namibia - had led to a massive increase in human-animal conflicts. The resulting damage has the potential to relativize all benefits and acceptance of Conservancies (JONES 2012: 3ff.). COLLOMB et al. (2008 and 2010) produced two of the first major studies on the relationship between governance, socio-economic indicators and the success of Conservancies in the Zambezi region. They used horizontal accountability as an indicator of Good Governance and access to water and the degree of food security as socio-economic indicators. As early as 2008, they noted that accountability was poorly assessed by the Conservancy members, but that there was a general acceptance of the Conservancy. The 2008 study can be criticized for the fact that the statistical analysis was purely descriptive and that no statistical connections between the indicators were checked (COLLOMB et al. 2008: 7ff.). The methodology was somewhat refined in 2010 and supplemented by a simple correlation analysis that, however, did not find any correlation between the degree of Good Governance and socio-economic indicators (COLLOMB et al. 2010: 303ff.). A valuable finding of the study was that smaller and older Conservancies tended to be more accountable and had a better flow of information. This was attributed to simpler information logistics and long-established

structures and trust (COLLOMB et al. 2010: 306ff.). Although these studies represented progress in quantitative research, the use of horizontal accountability as an indicator of Good Governance can be criticized, since many elements of Good Governance are overlooked by this simplification.

A more differentiated analysis was provided by MUYENGWA (2015), who tried to identify key factors for the individual support of the Conservancy of members. His regression analysis found that the distribution of game meat and participation in conservancy meetings had a significant impact on the acceptance among members. On the contrary, monetary benefits and employment opportunities in the Conservancy had no influence on acceptance (MUYENGWA 2015: 615ff.). This could be due to the fact that pure cash benefits per capita are very low and the Conservancy usually offers only a few jobs in relation to the high number of members (up to 3000). MOSIMANE and SILVA (2015) contributed further to the debate on governance in Conservancies by exploring the role of governance in the distribution of benefits. As a result, local governance systems in Conservancies are still so weak that an equitable distribution of benefits has not yet been achieved. Conservancy members could not identify a real system of distribution and their opinions were based on assumptions and rumors. From this result, it can be concluded that local governance is still very much dependent on external support and that transparency and fairness in the distribution of benefits must be respected in order to increase the satisfaction of the Conservancy members.

2.7 Research gap

The state of research on CBNRM described in Chapter 2.4 clearly indicates a highly relevant need for research on governance processes in Conservancies. A first analysis of the explorative interviews conducted for this study and the available literature indicated strongly that governance is one of the main determining factors in Conservancies. Only Good Governance can increase the acceptance of the local population and guarantee the sustainability of the system. A fair and transparent distribution of benefits is essential. What exact role the specific dimensions of governance play for the acceptance and satisfaction of the population, however, remains open and therefore represents a research gap. In order to understand the complex network of non-state, state and local actors and their overlapping competencies, an actor analysis is well suited. However, this investigation should be complemented by a sophisticated quantitative approach. The quantitative studies available so far have provided valuable insights, but the methodologies have not yet been comprehensive enough. This is to be improved by a factor analysis and a subsequent regression analysis, as these methods can provide much more precise and robust findings (see Chapter 4.3). Furthermore, the governance analysis should clearly go beyond the indicators used so far and include as many dimensions of Good Governance as possible. Another question is how success is defined in Conservancies. Per capita cash benefits are still very low, while wildlife numbers continue to rise. However, as soon as the damage caused by wild animals exceeds the benefits of the Conservancies, the entire system is endangered. In addition, many Conservancies continue to depend on external support from NGOs and the MET. If the budget were cut, capacity would immediately be lost, and the system would be on the verge of collapse. For these reasons, governance plays a central role in making management more independent and effective, increasing participation and acceptance, and making decision-making processes more transparent and inclusive. These considerations give rise to the following research question:

To what extent does governance affect the satisfaction with and acceptance of Conservancies in the Zambezi region and what role do differing interests of stakeholders play?

3. Area of Study and Historical Overview

This chapter will provide the context of CBNRM in Namibia with a short historical overview, the current economic, ecological and political situation of the Conservancies as well as a characterization of the research area.

3.1 *The State of Conservancies in Namibia*

The number of municipal Conservancies in Namibia increased rapidly after a longer start-up phase in 1996, during which a detailed elaboration of policies, laws and implementation plans took place. On the one hand, this is due to the increasing support of bilateral and multilateral donors who, after the beginning of the political unrest and the deteriorating economic situation, sought other possibilities for support than the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE programme (BALINT/MASHINYA 2008: 791f.). On the other hand, the first Conservancies in Namibia achieved rapid successes and found numerous imitators in the communal areas. The number of Conservancies rose from 4 in 1998 to 86 in 2018 (last registration of three Conservancies in July 2018; NACSO 2018a). About 190.000-200.000 people live in these 86 Conservancies, which account for 7-8% of an estimated 2.6 million inhabitants of Namibia in 2018. In 2012 about 1.1 million people lived in communal areas, which roughly means that about one fifth of the population of communal areas lived in Conservancies (MENDELSON/SHIXWAMENI/NAKAMHELA 2012: 24). These 86 Conservancies cover an area of approximately 165,000 km², which accounts for almost 20% of Namibia's surface area. As all communal Conservancies are located on communal land, the Conservancies cover 53% of Namibia's communal area (NACSO 2016: 7). Together with national parks and other protected areas, a total of 43.7% of Namibia's land area was protected in 2017 (NACSO 2017). In 2016 the Conservancies generated more than 111 million Nam\$ for local communities or 550 Nam\$ per capita (approx. 7 million €= 35 € per member) and offered 5147 permanent jobs for the members of the Conservancies (= 1 job for 38 members, e.g. work in tourism and hunting enterprises, employees of the Conservancy administration, arts and crafts and other cultural institutions) (NACSO 2016: 7). In addition to monetary benefits, Conservancies had a positive impact on wildlife numbers in Namibia's communal areas. Before the establishment of the Conservancies, wildlife numbers in the communal areas had collapsed massively due to prolonged droughts on the one hand and increasing poaching for personal consumption and unregulated hunting to combat Human-Wildlife Conflict (HWC) on the other hand. In the 1980s, the populations of many animal species reached their minimum and their monetary value was estimated to be very low prior to the establishment of Conservancies. Only the commodification of wildlife through the promotion of tourism and professional trophy hunting and the associated jobs and revenues led to an appreciation of the natural resource of game and to its increased protection (NELSON/AGRAWAL 2008: 564f.). For example, the elephant population recovered from 7.500 elephants in 1995 to 22.800 in 2016 (NACSO 2016: 7). Figure 1 shows a clear increase in wildlife in the North-Western region between 2001 and 2008. However, it should also be noted that the data are somewhat distorted by the introduction of buffalos and zebras from commercial farms into the communal areas. The fluctuations following the recovery until 2015 can mainly be explained by a prolonged drought and the onset of natural migration in the KAZA area between

Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, the data situation for all-Namibian wildlife populations is very weak, so that no reliable and generalizable statements can be made about the populations. Nevertheless, the individual evidence suggests that Conservancies contribute strongly to population recovery. Looking at the indicators of jobs, monetary benefits and conservation/game numbers, a positive effect of Conservancies can be observed. However, these absolute figures do not indicate anything about a fair distribution of jobs and monetary benefits in the communities, nor about Good Governance or compliance with the rules for Conservancies. The continued existence and acceptance of Conservancies depends less on an increase in absolute benefits than on the satisfaction of the local population.




Figure 1: Wildlife sightings by Game Guards in the Zambezi Region (Source: NACSO 2016: 35)

3.2 The Zambezi Region

The Zambezi Region (formerly Caprivi Region) is one of 14 regions in Namibia and is located in the north-eastern part of Namibia, bordering Botswana, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its total area accounts to 14,785 km². On the one hand, the region is strongly influenced by the three national parks (Bwabwata, Mudumu and Nkasa Rupara National Park), a state forest, eight community forests and 15 Conservancies and on the other hand by the perennial rivers Linyanti, Zambezi and Kwando (see figure 2). In contrast to the other Namibian regions, which are highly arid and characterized by episodic rivers, the rivers in the Zambezi Region provide a year-round water supply for agriculture, game and the human population (MENDELSON/ROBETS/HINES 1997: 4). In the Zambezi Region 66.9% of the total area is protected (National Parks 29.9%, State Forest 9.7%, Conservancies 27.3%), which makes the Zambezi Region a hotspot of biodiversity in Namibia (MLR 2015a: 23). Furthermore, the Zambezi Region is located in the centre of one of the largest cross-border nature conservation projects in the world, the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, a transnational cooperation between Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which forms a conglomerate of numerous national parks, CBNRM areas and other nature reserves. The Zambezi region is crossed by some of the most important migration corridors for wildlife, e.g. elephants that migrate from the Chobe National Park in Botswana via Namibia to Zambia (MLR 2015b: 50ff.).

According to the last census in 2011, the total population of the Zambezi region was about 91,000 inhabitants, which corresponds to a population density of 6 inhabitants/km² (almost three times the national average of 2.6 inhabitants per km²). 70% of the population live in rural areas, while 30% live in urban areas. The most important city is Katima Mulilo with about 28,000 inhabitants (MLR 2015a: 57f.). The livelihoods of the population of the Zambezi region consist mainly of rain-fed agriculture, irrigated agriculture, livestock farming, horticulture, tourism and CBNRM as well as the collection of firewood, Devil's Claw and other plants (MLR 2015a: 68f.). The soils are strongly influenced by sediments of Kalahari sand and are largely unsuitable for intensive agriculture. Sandy soils dominate, while clayey and loamy soils also occur in alluvial areas of rivers, enabling a more intensive agricultural use (MENDELSON/ROBETS/HINES 1997: 16f.). The vegetation of the Zambezi region can be divided into three main zones: Alluvial areas with grass vegetation,

Kalahari forests and mopane forests. The average precipitation is 500 - 700 mm per year, which is many times the precipitation in the arid south (MENDELSON/ROBETS/HINES 1997: 18f.).

The Zambezi region is dominated by four traditional authorities (TA): the Masubia TA in Bukalo, the Mafwe TA in Chinchimani, the Mayeyi TA in Sangwali and the Mashi TA in Choi. The Mayeyi TA and Mashi TA emancipated themselves from the Mafwe TA and were only recognized by the Namibian government in recent years, which led to land and competence conflicts between these




Figure 2: The eastern part of the Zambezi Region (Source: MLR 2017: 50)

three TAs. These have not yet been resolved, which also leads to jurisdictional problems and land use conflicts in the Conservancies (The role of TA is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.3.2). Belonging to one of the TAs still plays a major role for many inhabitants of the Zambezi region. Depending on the language, culture and place of residence, the population is oriented towards a specific TA (MLR 2015a: 27.). Historically, the Zambezi region has often played a special strategic role, which has affected the current status quo. The region belonged to the Lozi Kingdom between 1600 and 1890 and was partly under British administration. However, it came into German possession under the Helgoland-Sansibar Treaty between Germany and Great Britain under the name "Caprivi Zipfel" and was administered from Botswana, Windhoek and Pretoria between 1918 and 1990 before finally becoming one of Namibia's regions in 1992 (MENDELSON/ROBETS/HINES 1997: 8).

Under the German colonial administration as well as the various administrations until 1960, the area was systematically neglected economically and politically, among other things due to the long distance (1000km) to Windhoek. From 1960 onwards, the region was heavily militarized under the South African administration and used by the South African Defence Force as a base in the fight against the independence fighters of the South-West Africa People's Organisation

SWAPO, which operated from Zambia and Angola. Under the guise of science and nature conservation, aerial photographs and maps of the region were produced in order to make better military use of them and secure South Africa's hegemonic position (LENGGENHAGER 2015: 477ff.). These maps later became the basis for the planning of nature reserves and national parks, which still shape the distribution and extension of nature reserves in the Zambezi region (LENGGENHAGER 2015: 481ff.). The region, which is characterized by regional isolation, economic neglect, militarization, conflicts between the individual ethnic groups and foreign dominance/external administration, has taken and continues to take on a special role within the Namibian regions. In 1999, during the Caprivi conflict, the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) attempted to gain independence from Namibia. Government buildings and the airport were attacked, and several people died. However, the uprising was suppressed, also because not the entire population supported the uprising. Many of the rebels went into exile or were arrested (KANGUMU 2011: 260ff.). In 2013, the Caprivi was renamed Zambezi Region, which caused protests among the local population and former rebel leaders who saw the renaming "*from Caprivi to Zambezi is destined to destroy our identity and history as a symbol of renaissance, the dilution of political foundations [...]*" (SANZILA 2013).

3.2.1 Dzoti Conservancy

The Dzoti Conservancy is the first research area of this master thesis. Dzoti is located in the south




Figure 3: Dzoti Conservancy (Source: NACSO N.d.a)

28). The Dzoti Conservancy is also part of the multi-actor platform Mudumu South Complex.

of the Zambezi region and is situated to the east of Wuparo Conservancy. Dzoti borders the Nkasa Rupara National Park to the south and the Mudumu National Park to the north, making it an important migration route between the two national parks. Dzoti has direct access to the Linyanti River in the south. Dzoti was registered as a Conservancy in 2009 and covers 287 km² with 1220 registered members (Dzoti 2015). There is no tourist activity in the Conservancy and all jobs outside the Conservancy as well as all income is generated through professional hunting. Dzoti falls largely under the jurisdiction of Mayeyi TA in Sangwali under Chief Shufu, although the Mafwe TA also claims areas in Dzoti (MLR 2015a:

3.2.2 Sobbe Conservancy

The Sobbe Conservancy is the second research site of this study. Sobbe is located in the northwest of the Zambezi region and in the east of the Mashi and Mayuni Conservancies. The Mudumu National Park and the Dzoti Conservancy are situated in the south of Sobbe. The wildlife corridor that already runs through Dzoti also crosses the Mudumu National Park and Sobbe. The area of Sobbe overlaps with two community forests, Lubuta and Masida, which will not play a role in this study. The registration of Sobbe as a Conservancy took place in 2006. The total area of Sobbe is 404 km² and there are 1030 inhabitants registered as members (Sobbe 2015). Similar to Dzoti, trophy hunting is the only source of Conservancy income and employment in Sobbe. The Mafwe TA in Chinchimane under Chief Mamili is the responsible TA for




Figure 4: Sobbe Conservancy (Source: NACSO N.d.b)

Sobbe and has authority over land issues. Sobbe is also part of the Multi-Actors Platform Mudumu North Complex. For an in-depth look at the Mudumu North Complex and Mudumu South Complex platforms, see WEIDNER (2017).

The two Conservancies Dzoti and Sobbe were selected as research sites because they offer relatively similar conditions for an investigation. The 15 Conservancies in the Zambezi region differ in their period of existence, sources of income, area, members and other indicators. In this case, Dzoti and Sobbe exist for almost the same length, are of comparable size, both have about 1000 members and a similar income. In addition, neither Conservancy has any lodges or other tourism enterprises, so that both depend on trophy hunting. Furthermore, both Conservancies are traversed by the same elephant migration corridor and thus have to contend with human-animal conflicts. All these indicators should allow a certain generalizability - which of course can never be fully achieved - of the results.

Conservancy	Dzoti CC	Sobbe CC
Founded	2009	2006
Area	287km ²	391km ²
Members	1220	1030
Population (Member) Density	4.2/km ²	2.5/km ²
Employees CC	22	23
Employees PS	15	10
Total Employees	37	33
Income 2015	1,485,000\$	1,072,000 \$
Income 2016	1,373,000\$	1,737,000 \$
Income 2017	1,384,520\$	872,310\$
Share Tourism (2017)	0	0
Share Hunting (2017)	100	97
Cattle (Estimate)	1000	5000
Cattle per Member	0.8	4.9
Cattle per km²	3.4	12.4
Boreholes	6	17
Members per Borehole	197km ²	60.6
Area per Borehole	48km ²	23km ²
HWC Incidents 2014	70	38
HWC Incidents 2015	40	40
HWC Incidents 2016	20	30
HWC Incidents 2017	52	19
Total cost of HWC (2017)	70.140	25.740
Income - HWC Cost Ratio	22:1	34:1
Income – Member Ratio	1135\$/Member	847\$/Member

Figure 5: Overview of the most important data in Dzoti and Sobbe Conservancies (Sources: Dzoti 2015, 2016, 2017; Sobbe 2015, 2016, 2017 and WEIDNER 2017)

4. Methodology

For this study, a special type of triangulation was chosen as the research design: The Mixed Methods approach (TASHAKKORI/TEDDLIE 1998; KELLE 2014: 153). The purpose and advantages of a Mixed Method approach are to enable a more precise analysis of complex facts. The following procedure was carried out: First, a qualitative exploration of the topic was conducted through several semi-structured interviews with experts and stakeholders of CBNRM in Windhoek and in the Zambezi region. A first analysis followed to identify the central challenges of Conservancies. These central challenges were categorized and tested in a quantitative survey among the members of the two selected Conservancies. In the next step, further qualitative interviews with Conservancy staff were conducted in order to gain deeper insights in Conservancy governance. A core hypothesis was formulated to quantitatively support the answer to the research question:

Satisfaction with the activities of the Conservancy depends on Good Governance in the Conservancy.

4.1 Qualitative Interviews

Over the course of two months, a total of 31 interviews were conducted in Windhoek, Katima Mulilo as well as in Dzoti and Sobbe Conservancies. Two different types of interviews were conducted: problem-centered interviews and expert interviews. The 16 expert interviews were carried out with experts from different ministries, NGOs and other governmental agencies. These interviews were utilized to get an overview over the governance issues in Conservancies as well as to explain certain processes and problems. The experts were asked to give their opinion on a variety of topics, also covering CBNRM in general as well as the different actors in Namibia. The 15 problem-centered interviews were carried out mainly in the two Conservancies and were more focused on local governance processes in these Conservancies as well as on the perceived challenges and opportunities in the two Conservancies. For an anonymized list of interviews, see Appendix, Chapter 3.

4.2 Quantitative Survey

After the first few interviews, the questionnaire for the quantitative survey was designed. It included questions on the satisfaction of Conservancy members as well as on Good Governance. For quality assurance purposes, a pre-test in one of the target villages was conducted in English with the support of an IRDNC employee before the survey was started. After the pretest, the decision was taken to have the questionnaire translated from English into Silozi, the lingua franca of the Zambezi region, in order to prevent comprehension problems with the rural population with a low level of education (Silozi version, see Appendix, Chapter 1).

After the pretest, the target groups were selected, and the sample size calculated. The Dzoti and Sobbe Conservancies were selected for the empirical study. These are well comparable due to several characteristics and have 1220 (Dzoti Conservancy 2015: 3) and 1030 members (Sobbe Conservancy 2015: 3) according to the latest official status (2015 Audit Reports). The determination of the target group was followed by the calculation of the sample size, in which the minimum size necessary to achieve a certain representativeness for the population was calculated. The formula for the minimum sample size required for a finite population is as follows (MOSSIG 2012: 21):

$$n \geq \frac{N}{1 + \frac{(N-1) \times \varepsilon^2}{z^2 \times P \times Q}}$$

The variables of the formula are broken down as follows (according to MOSSIG 2012: 17f. and MATTISSEK/PFAFFENBACH/REUBER 2013: 62f.):

- n = Minimum required sample size for a finite population.
- N = number of elements in the population.
- In this case, N is either 1220 (Dzoti) or 1030 (Sobbe).
- ε = Selected tolerated sampling error. Indicates the permissible deviation from the population. A sampling error of 10% = 0.1 was selected.
- z = Confidence level: In this study, a confidence level of 90% was chosen, which is still acceptable for simple opinion polls.
- P = In order to achieve an appropriate sample size for the worst case, P is set to 0.5,
- Q = $1-P$, in the conservative case also 0.5.

In the case of Dzoti and Sobbe, the minimum number of questionnaires are:

$$n \geq \frac{1220}{1 + \frac{(1220-1) \times 0,1^2}{1,645^2 \times 0,5 \times 0,5}} = \mathbf{65} \text{ Questionnaires in Dzoti}$$

$$n \geq \frac{1030}{1 + \frac{(1030-1) \times 0,1^2}{1,645^2 \times 0,5 \times 0,5}} = \mathbf{64} \text{ Questionnaires in Sobbe}$$

With 70 Questionnaires in Dzoti and 78 Questionnaires in Sobbe, these numbers were surpassed.

4.3 Statistical Analysis

In order to be able to provide a sophisticated analysis of the data collected, two multivariate statistical methods are used in this paper. The first method is a **factor analysis** (according to BAHRENBURG et al. 2008). The aim of a factor analysis is to compress a number of variables into a smaller number of independent variables, the so-called **factors**. In this analysis, variables, that correlate strongly with each other, are combined into a factor which represents a newly created variable. This procedure is often used before a regression analysis in order to reduce the number of independent variables and make clearer statements about statistical relationships (BAHRENBURG et al. 2008: 187). The various questions on Good Governance were included in this Factor Analysis. The results of this procedure - the three extracted factors of Good Governance - are presented in Chapter 6.1.

In the second step of the statistical analysis in this study, a **multiple regression analysis** was performed (according to BACKHAUS et al. 2015). In a regression analysis, the relationships between a dependent variable Y and one or more independent variables X are examined. Since three factors expressing **Good Governance** were identified in the previous factor analysis, a multiple regression analysis was necessary for this work in order to measure the **relationship** between these **three factors** and the **satisfaction** of the members with the Conservancy (BACKHAUS et al. 2015: 64).

5. Analysis of Actors in CBNRM

Prior to the quantitative analysis, the most important actors in nature conservation and CBNRM in Namibia will be presented and analyzed in order to ensure a better understanding of the CBNRM system. The study starts at the international level, then analyses the actors at the national level, followed by the regional level and finally the local level. However, it is limited to the most important actors, since a holistic analysis of all relevant actors would need an entire separate study. For example, in addition to IRDNC and the WWF, numerous other local and international NGOs are committed to CBNRM. Other ministries also have an influence on the status of CBNRM, such as the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development or the Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare.

5.1 International Actors

Actors at the international level have played a decisive role in the establishment of CBNRM in Namibia. The WWF is listed here as the most important international NGO, as it is still active in the country and continues to support CBNRM. GIZ and KfW are representative of bilateral donors, most of whom have withdrawn from the country after Namibia was promoted by the World Bank to the level of an Upper Middle-Income Country (ROBERTSON/LEVEY/CROSBY 2013: 3).

5.1.1 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)

As described in Chapter 3.1, the WWF played a central role in establishing the CBNRM system in Namibia and was already present in Namibia at the beginning of the 1990s. Back then, WWF was actively involved in formulating CBNRM policies and supported the first Conservancies (WWF N.d.). Through the presence of the WWF, the implementation of CBNRM was influenced by Western ideologies, a fact that continues to have an impact today: *“WWF implemented the first 15 Conservancies, if they raised their hand, WWF would rush out there, build an office, get a car, employ six game guards with donor money and pay meeting allowances”* (E9). This has led to an expectation of the Conservancies and a focus on operational costs, because *“it was implemented by one of these American headhunters, that do all US government projects [...], but they are business oriented, and [...] here the donor put in the money to invest in wildlife management before the Conservancies even started earning money and it posed a problem because operational money seemed to become a priority”* (E9). The WWF has a clear focus on the protection and use of wildlife and is critical of other sources of income in Conservancies: *“why on earth do we want to diversify income for a Conservancy? A Conservancy has in its constitution that its main purpose and mandate is to generate wealth out of wildlife. If we are going to do diversity of income, we should be focusing on diversity of wildlife-based economy”* (E3). This focus on conservation also manifests itself in the fact that the WWF is under a constant burden of proof to deliver results: *“WWF is a conservational organization, and they have to prove that they are doing conservation, so they had to get the game guards up and running and doing something to demonstrate that they are doing something”* (E9). The WWF therefore does not see the small-scale benefits for the communities as the main purpose of CBNRM but stresses the importance of large nature conservation budgets in Conservancies: *“Our support focusses on big income streams around hunting and tourism, that’s what’s generating 100% of income and 80% of returns. We need to focus on the big options, don’t focus on the campsites and craft markets even though they are very important, [...] but that’s generating household income [...] what kind of income streams can we generate that’s of collective nature that can go back into management costs of a Conservancy, looking after wildlife and paying for human-wildlife conflict?”* (E3). A professional hunter also criticizes the WWF's orientation and dependence on donations which leads to the overemphasis

on superficial successes of Conservancies: *“they have to make the Conservancy look better, so they can get more funding, as long as their effect is positive, funding keeps on coming, if their effect is beginning flatten out, than the funding dries up [...] and that’s politics again, looking after their own pocket”* (P1).

5.1.2 GIZ and KfW

GIZ and KfW are the two most important actors in German development cooperation and have been active in Namibia for a long time. Germany has been one of Namibia's most important donors of development funds since 1990. In addition, Namibia receives the most development funds per capita of all German development cooperation. One of the reasons for this is Germany's historical responsibility. In the period 2017/2018, for example, Namibia received € 130 million. The three priority areas of German development cooperation are the management of natural resources, sustainable economic development and the promotion of transport and logistics. With the "NAM PARKS" programme, KfW promotes national park infrastructure and integrated park management, which also aims to involve Conservancies. KfW is also the main sponsor of the KAZA project which covers Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. With its project “Support to Community based Natural Resource Management”, GIZ indirectly promotes the Conservancies by providing policy advice in an attempt to improve the control processes in MET, by introducing a web-based management system and by identifying possibilities of income diversification in Conservancies. Overall, KfW therefore mainly promotes infrastructure, while GIZ aims to increase capacities and Good Governance (BMZ 2018, GIZ 2018, CHRISTIANSEN 2018). The main criticism of the work of these two institutions is that KfW's Financial Cooperation (FC) is not sufficiently coherent with GIZ's Technical Cooperation (TC). One MET employee reflects: *“Even the GIZ still doesn't look at it enough, for example in debushing and feed production, the GIZ would have liked to have done this in the Conservancies, but the project doesn't take place where the Conservancy Project is. [...] It would be ideal if FC and GIZ were in the same area, then FC could make infrastructure. This would also make it possible to better demonstrate our effectiveness”* (E1). This criticism is taken up by an NGO: *“we found that partnership makes it actually much easier to implement, but it's never easy to be honest with you. [...] I understand my component within GIZ and what I am supposed to do, I know they have other programmes, and sometimes out of the blue, they will come out and say: this programme we are also doing something in Conservancies [...]. And then KFW and GIZ. Sometimes it's waiting until they approach you for something and then you look where it fits in, if it doesn't fit in, I just say, I don't think I am the best programme to implement it, or it will not work, some of them ignore you and go on”* (E10). Another challenge is that different GIZ and KfW projects are located within different ministries and measures are not coordinated between these individual projects. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.1 on ministries. Concerning KfW, there was one case where seed capital was available for a basket fund of the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR), through which boreholes were financed: *“The government started drilling boreholes, just drilling but no allocation and no ownership. Because of that then people started coming there, almost illegally by only getting consent of the traditional authorities, then the areas became overpopulated”* (E4). A MET staff member describes the problems created by this: *“Waterholes were drilled in the Wildlife Core Area, now a rich guy of the Conservancy is moving his cattle there, which is conflict with the wildlife. The Hunter can't go there because cattle are with the elephants. At the same time there is a KfW project for Conservancies in MET, there is a lack of communication”* (E1). So, the KfW project within MLR contradicts the KfW project within MET. As a final comment about KfW's work, the KAZA project is criticized for the fact that it is moving further and further away from people and Conservancies: *“if you want to understand Kaza, go ahead and look at all the literature of globalization, it's all there [...]. SEN said you can have all the granaries full and there's*

still poor people, for Kaza it's: we can have lots of lodges but there's still poor people. That trickle down doesn't happen on its own. The more you elevate a programme further away from the communities' control, it gets more in the hands of the political, economic and movable elite, people that can capture the benefits" (E3).

5.2 National Actors

At the national level, the ministries play a formative role in nature conservation and CBNRM. In most cases, these ministries also have a branch in the individual regions of Namibia. For this work, interviews were conducted in the ministries in Windhoek, but also in the regional departments, as these offered a much more in-depth field perspective. The most important national non-state actor IRDNC is also investigated.

5.2.1 Ministries

In the following, the three most important ministries for nature conservation and CBNRM context are presented. These are the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry and the Ministry of Land Reform.

5.2.1.1 Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET)

As already mentioned in Chapter 1, Namibia is one of the few countries, which anchors the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of biodiversity in its constitution. MET is the ministry dealing with these issues and has the following mission statement: *"The mission of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism is to promote biodiversity conservation in the Namibian environment through the sustainable utilization of natural resources and tourism development for the maximum social and economic benefit of its citizens" (MET 2018).* MET is on the one hand the most important actor in the national park administration and on the other hand MET acts as the patron for all Conservancies and has made it its mission to promote CBNRM, but also to ensure compliance with the rules. One MET representative describes the role as *"we don't see it as supervising, but rather advising Conservancies and making sure they are complying, our main role is compliance. [...] they are independent, the only co-financing which happens is through the game product trust fund, and through the HWC self-reliant scheme, where the Conservancies also put something into that account" (E11).* The Game Product Trust Fund is co-financed by MET and the Conservancies and compensates for human-animal conflicts. Cooperation with various NGOs is extremely important for MET, as it does not have sufficient capacity to take care of all Conservancies. One MET staff member says about the relationship with IRDNC: *"IRDNC, we see them as our support. We don't do different things, even if they are there we are not there, we know that what they are doing is for the benefit of the ministry and in most cases, we do activities together" (E11).* He continues to emphasize the importance of IRDNC, but at the same time stresses a leading role for MET: *"The government is the head of the project, but also they have an MoU for IRDNC to push and also support the ministry, where the ministry can't reach, or resources are limited, IRDNC also comes in [...]. But when it comes to the issue of compliance, it's the ministry who takes it up. If IRDNC see a non-compliance issue they will report it to MET and MET through the mandate they have, they will do the response procedure" (E11).* An NGO representative describes the relationship to MET as *"perfect relationship" (E10)* and a Conservancy representative praises the trusting working relationship: *"they are like the father, it's a good relationship, like we game guard, when we are having a problem animal, we have to contact MET, or we arrested a poacher, we have to contact MET and they assist us" (P3).* MET, like many government institutions, has struggled with budget cuts in recent years. The difficult financial

situation of MET is exacerbated by the fact that MET does not receive any part of the entrance fees for national parks: *"even with the entrance fees for the national parks, that goes to the Ministry of Finance and into another fund, but not to the MET, although the legal situation is different and there are many international studies that say tourists would be willing [...] to pay more if they knew that the money would flow directly back [...] into the national park they visited"* (E7). In addition to these positive voices, there is also criticism of MET's approach, for example in the case of breaches of the law in the Conservancies: *"MET is sometimes reluctant to be forceful or direct about enforcement. [...] Maybe 8 out of 10 times your best way to go for healing of trouble is gonna be to the TA, because they are gonna be much tougher. [...] I think that might also be in government, if there is a special person that is being accused, depending on who this person is special to you might wanna go to the opposite"* (E6). A very experienced NGO expert also criticizes the lethargic approach of the MET: *"the fifth time I've trained everyone on the compliance monitoring. I would go over this in four hours and everyone gets a copy, never ever read and never ever get back to it"* (E9).

5.2.1.2 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry (MAWF)

MAWF also plays an important role in CBNRM through its competence in the area of forests and community forests and through the relevance of agriculture in the Conservancies. MAWF defines its vision for its activities as *"the nation's Agricultural, Water and Forest resources are sustainably and equitably used for improved livelihood, wellbeing and wealth for all"* (MAWF 2018a). On the one hand, MAWF promotes Green Schemes, large-scale irrigated agricultural projects that are intended to increase national food sovereignty and the contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic product (MAWF 2018b). On the other hand, the Agricultural Extension Service of MAWF operates Agricultural Development Center (ADCs) throughout Namibia to improve smallholder farming practices, provide cheap seeds and fertilizer and other advisory services (MAWF 2018c). According to one MAWF employee, small farmers in Conservancies are also reached: *"Yes, we cooperate with everyone including Conservancies, in the sense that we have some farmers who are living in Conservancies, who are practicing farming. So, we do reach them, of course, some of them we do in collaboration with other stakeholders like NNF. We are trying to avoid overlaps here, we have farmers who are supported by other organizations [...], so we don't want to duplicate this"* (E12). Another MAWF employee describes a different situation: *"ADCs are also in Conservancies in Zambezi. But there is no direct work together, but through the agricultural advisory service [...]. The official reason is the fear that farmers will seek compensation from MAWF when animals destroy crops. My guess lies more in the aversion between MAWF and MET"* (E2). Asked about the relationship between MAWF and MET, the MAWF employee replies: *"I can say the working together is still very weak at this stage. We don't have many platforms where we meet to discuss that kind of issues. [...] we have an agricultural office in Sachona, I am not sure how involved our technician is"* (E12). Another reason for the aversion between MAWF and MET is the existing land use conflicts between nature conservation and agriculture. The MAWF employee explains this as follows: *"The problem that we have is, we don't have a clear land-use plan, that indicates where Conservancies should be and farming should be, because of this, you know that farming and wildlife are not that compatible. [...] The problem with that is the plans might be there on paper, but they are not fully implemented [...] of course there is a need for closer cooperational working relationship between MET and MAWF to make sure that these plans are implemented as intended. You see the problem is, I haven't really seen a very clear plan"* (E12). One MET employee characterizes the situation as follows: *"MAWF what we have with them is with the directorate of forestry, we have a strong integration. [...] with the other part of farming, conservation farming, all those things its possible for them to come and assist Conservancies with those things, but they don't do it. It's something which is lacking"* (E11).

5.2.1.3 Ministry of Land Reform (MLR)

MLR is the third ministry that is relevant to the CBNRM system, as MLR is committed “to ensure that Namibia's land resource is equitably allocated, efficiently managed, administered and sustainably used for the benefit of all Namibians” (MLR 2018a). MLR has its own data and map department which forms the basis for the work of the MLR (MLR 2018b). Among the main tasks of the MLR are the implementation of the land reform, in the course of which land is to be redistributed to historically disadvantaged groups. In addition, the MLR advocates the registration of customary land rights in municipal areas, for which it administers so-called *communal land boards* in all regions, in which decisions are made on TA land allocations and registration applications (see Chapter 5.3.2) (MLR 2018c). In addition to land redistribution, the MLR has a mandate for land use planning and prepares land use plans for the individual regions. The Integrated Regional Land-Use Plan for the Zambezi Region was completed in 2015 (MLR 2015a, MLR 2015b). An MLR employee in the Zambezi Region describes his tasks as follows: “specifically on the land board, our function is to exercise control on the allocation and cancellation made by traditional authority in terms of the communal land reform act. And I am also supervising the registration of customary land rights by our staff members. We are urging all the residents of Zambezi Region to register and secure their tenure rights” (E13). With regard to the Integrated Regional Land-Use Plan, he says: “we have now completed our land-use plan for Zambezi Region, also this plan is to be handed over to Regional Council for implementation in the due course, so we will also be responsible to monitor and evaluate the implementation of that plan” (E13). Another MLR employee presents the difficulty of this land use plan: “That is the challenge we have even for the Integrated Regional Land-Use Plan, because of that we are changing the way we do things, because most of the planning was done from Windhoek, [...] now the concept is: a lot of training for regional councilors so they know what are these plans for. [...] We have a problem of ownership, even with Integrated Regional Land-Use Plan, you go there, and they say, “it’s a document of the MLR” (E4). A representative of the Regional Council agrees with this criticism and adds that “most of the decisions are still taken at central level, and right here it’s implementation, [...] the control of the planning itself it’s a bit difficult because when the MLR is dealing with their land reform activities, they don’t do it in the region, they do it at the central level and all you see is the instruction given to the decentralized function, this is the document that you need to go and implement” (E16). An NGO representative extends this criticism and notes that the land use plans are not communicated clearly enough so that they are first implemented and then planned: “Then the MLR I think sometimes they are also a confusion for me because they go and do all these land use plans, I still sometimes don’t understand the land use plan, where does it stop and where does it end and where it is now, that creates even much more confusion on the ground. [...] we had an amended parks and wildlife act, which is now being amended again [...], but I don’t know how that is going to link with the current land act, because now we have to revise the land act again. It creates a lot of problems. For us working in the conservation sector, we have made peace with the fact that we just go and implement and that this actually informs the policies” (E10). An interesting fact is that the MLR was not involved in drawing up the zonation plans of the Conservancies: “we had a case study, when we went into the field and did the actual mapping, then we compared our map with Bamunu zonation [...] where they were saying, this area is for hunting, that’s where the farmers were. So, you see opposite land uses. [...] We haven’t been collaborating. As MLR we are experts in mapping, and they are not making use of us” (E4). This fact actually suggests a lack of communication between the ministries again, whereby the cooperation between MET and MLR is rated as basically good by the respective employees: “It’s very good, we meet regularly, we share one common thing, because there is no for a bigger project, there is no way land board can allocate a leasehold without the involvement MET department of environmental affairs. For environmental clearance, we need these guys to clear

the environmental aspect of the environmental impact assessment (E13)". Only the MET employee expresses slight skepticism about the participation of the MLR in joint meetings: "I can't say that we are bad, our communication is good, when talking to the seniors, personally for me we have been good, [...] you never know when they are understaffed, they are right, when they say that they invite them and never show up. If people don't show up, then it's a problem" (E11).

5.2.2 Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation - IRDNC

IRDNC is a Namibian NGO that has been active since the 1980s and is committed to nature conservation and rural development. IRDNC was founded by Garth-Owen Smith, who also developed the Community Game Guard System in the 1980s to counteract increasing poaching in marginalized areas of Namibia (IRDNC 2018). The Community Game Guard System was transferred to the Conservancies in the 1990s and, together with the legislative changes for the devolution of rights, formed the cornerstone of the CBNRM system in Namibia. IRDNC is still working with the Conservancies of the Kunene and Zambezi region and supports them in three pillars: management of natural resources, development of livelihoods and business relationships of Conservancies and strengthening of local governance (IRDNC 2015). IRDNC is funded by private donations, the WWF, the Finnish Embassy in Windhoek and the Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia and has 55 permanent employees working in Windhoek and the project regions (IRDNC 2018). As already described previously, IRDNC works very closely with MET and the two institutions coordinate their approaches and carry out most of the projects together. The importance of the presence of IRDNC can be seen from the following four statements by Conservancy staff:

1. *"Then, another one is to work together with the ministry and IRDNC, if there is anything that we need as a Conservancy from MET or IRDNC, then I am responsible to meet them, then we discuss, also with IRDNC" (P15).*
2. *"We are trying to rewrite the constitution, even made some copies for each management, so they will sit here and then we read for them [...], then we say, let us change here, after that we'll call IRDNC and ministry for the meeting. [...] We have to communicate with IRDNC, they are the only people who can help us with trainings" (P14).*
3. *"That one is an operator has a lodge in Wuparo, so for us we invited IRDNC to the site itself, then they have to take the coordinate of the site, then they have to give it to him for him to put it on the map for those people who are interested. The information is not confidential that we are in need of an operator, with the help of IRDNC and MET, together they give the contacts to investors" (P6).*
4. *"The reason they give us is that the corridor it's too big. We should make it small. Otherwise to leave the space for people. We reported to IRDNC, they should make it smaller" (P5).*

From these statements it can be concluded that in many areas, the Conservancies are extremely dependent on the input and capacity of IRDNC: In principle, the Conservancies call on IRDNC for every problem, IRDNC helps to change the constitution of the Conservancy and is the only actor to carry out training. IRDNC supports the search for investors and is involved in discussions about wildlife migration corridors. From these facts, it can be deduced that the 30-year presence of IRDNC - which has accompanied every Conservancy in the Zambezi region since its registration - has created a strong and dependent relationship. A professional hunter further criticizes IRDNC: *"IRDNC is a lost cause in my opinion, they are an institution that has totally lost the direction [...]. They are not able to support the Conservancies [...] IRDNC is supposed to hold the Conservancy accountable to do their job, push to see, where is your financial statements, why haven't you done them yet, let's get them, where did the money go?" (P1).* In addition to the lack of capacity, the

hunter lists the expectations of hunting raised by IRDNC: *"The Conservancies obviously love it, and they are that far now, where IRDNC is teaching the Conservancies to calculate the maximum of their budget and quota. So, our Conservancy comes every year and has issues because now we haven't shot one elephant, now they are short on their budget. They are calculating their chickens before they even lay the eggs. And that's why I got so little trust in IRDNC"* (P1).

5.3 Regional Actors

The two actors that shape the regional discourse on CBNRM and nature conservation are the regional departments of the ministries already described in Chapter 5.2.1 and, above all, the Regional Council and the various levels of Traditional Authorities, whose role is now to be discussed.

5.3.1 Regional Council

The Regional Council's (RC) responsibilities are set out in the Regional Councils Act 1992 and defined as follows: *"a regional council shall have the power to undertake [...] the planning of the development of the region for which it has been established with a view to (i) the physical, social and economic characteristics of such region and [...] (ii) the natural and other resources and the economic development potential of such region [...] (iv) the existing and the planned infrastructure, such as water, electricity communication networks and transport systems, in such region (v) the general land utilization pattern [...]"* (Republic of Namibia 1992: 27f). The RC is thus a form of local government with responsibilities in areas such as development planning, infrastructure, natural resources and land use. The RC is chaired by a Governor and several Councilors. One member of the RC staff added to this definition: *"The regional council is actually the sub government from the central government [...] there are some decentralized ministries or functions of ministries who the RC have a direct link and direction and instruction over, but there are other ministries that have not decentralized yet, that still report straight to their line ministries. [...] We have an internal structure which is called RDCC - regional development coordinating committee - is actually responsible for prioritizing plans of this region and it's made up of these ministries, whether decentralized or not decentralized"* (E16). When asked whether this RDCC would be a platform to coordinate the conflicting activities of the various ministries, the RC officer replied: *"That is very true, that situation is happening. What we have seen is the RDCC is actually the platform that tries to coordinate these activities. And until the RDCC has been strengthened, this is the only time we will start realizing some of this integrated planning. [...] we only rely heavily on RDCC, which is not really so effective because the planning itself, a lot of it is done at central level [...] we want all the services at central level to be down here and this is what we are mandated to do. But it is the ministries who are still taking it slowly because some ministries have a fear that they will be stripped of most of their responsibilities"* (E16). On the connection to the MET, the RC staff member reports that, *"they still have too much direct reporting from the regions straight to the head office. Even though we are trying to put them on the RDCC, they are just there to report, which makes it difficult for us to control their activities"* (E16). A MET staff member expresses similar dissatisfaction with the connection to the RC: *"Regional council staff, from them we don't get support. They are very far from the activities of the Conservancies, that one I can say with confidence, we don't have that, only with specific councilors"* (E11). For CBNRM, in addition to the link to the MET, the relationship of the RC to the Conservancies is of fundamental importance. The RC officer characterizes the RC's approach and at the same time demands responsibility for the Conservancies for the RC: *"Our duty is just to create a conducive environment where our Conservancies are operating [...]. The RC doesn't have a direct bearing on the Conservancies. Even though they are [...] within the custody of the region, our daily interaction with them is very limited."*

This is a bad thing because these are the people that are also providing a service in the community which we are responsible to serve. Therefore, I wanted to see a situation where Conservancies report directly to the RC as well, because MET have not decentralized any of these functions" (E16). Several Conservancies continue to report a lack of support or a non-existent relationship with the RC: "They don't support us, they are just asking for help, if they have any events, they ask for the donation" (P9), "Right now, we don't have a real relationship, because it's them who always request from the Conservancy. But when we request from them, there is nothing" (P7). An NGO representative criticizes precisely this phenomenon, namely that the RC expects monetary contributions from the Conservancies rather than supporting them with its own resources: "Their interest is capturing the money from the Conservancies, same as the TAs, getting a slice of the pie. [...] the RCs, they are paid, but they could complain that that's a decentralization process from central to regional government, but it's been a very uneven process, so they don't always have the staff or budget to carry out their regional development [...]. The poor guys are rather powerless, they don't make decisions, so I sympathize with the fact that there's uneven devolution of human resources and budgetary resources [...]. So, in some ways it isn't necessarily they want to line their pockets which is what the TAs are doing but it is to empower their role" (E9).

5.3.2 Traditional Authorities

The Traditional Authorities (TAs) are governance institutions that manage a traditional community. The Traditional Authorities Act No. 25 of 2000 defines a traditional community as follows: *"traditional community means an indigenous, homogeneous, endogamous social grouping of persons comprising of families deriving from exogamous clans which share a common ancestry, language, cultural heritage, customs and traditions, who recognizes a common traditional authority and inhabits a common communal area, and may include the members of that traditional community residing outside the common communal area"* (Republic of Namibia 2000: 3). The Traditional Authorities Act grants the TA numerous rights which enable traditional jurisdiction, administration and social organization at the traditional community level (Republic of Namibia 2000: 4). The Traditional Authorities in the Zambezi region are organized hierarchically over several levels. Each smaller settlement is headed by a headman, in most cases the village elder. This headman in turn reports to the senior headman or Induna, who chairs the local council of the TA or Subkhuta. This Induna represents several villages and represents them in the tribal council or Khuta. This Khuta is the highest legal and administrative body of the TA. The chairman of this Khuta is called Chief and is the real King of the Traditional Authority (MENDELSON/ROBETS/HINES 1997: 8). The Dzoti Conservancy can be assigned to the sphere of influence of the Mayeyi Traditional Authority in Sangwali, which is headed by Chief Shufu. Most members of the Sobbe Conservancy feel that they belong to the Mafwe TA under Chief Mamili in Chinchimane (BOSCH n.d.).

The land rights situation in the communal areas of Namibia is regulated in the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002: *"Subject to the provisions of this Act, all communal land areas vest in the State in trust for the benefit of the traditional communities residing in those areas and for the purpose of promoting the economic and social development of the people of Namibia, in particular the landless and those with insufficient access to land who are not in formal employment or engaged in non-agriculture business activities"* (Republic of Namibia 2002: 11). This means that the state is the sole and incontestable owner of the communal land and administers and uses it for the benefit of the traditional communities and the landless and marginalized population. At the same time, however, the same legal text gives the Traditional Authorities the power to distribute so-called customary land rights, which contain a right of use of the land rather than a right of ownership: *"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the primary power to allocate or cancel*

any customary land right in respect of any portion of land in the communal area of a traditional community vests (a) in the Chief of that traditional community; or (b) where the Chief so determines, in the Traditional Authority of that traditional community" (Republic of Namibia 2002: 11). However, in order to officially legitimize such a distribution of land rights, it must be submitted to a communal land board, which decides on the application. The communal land boards were created in the course of the Communal Land Reform Act and consist of a member of the respective TA of the affected area, a member of the respective smallholder organization, a member of the RC, four women with land rights expertise, four ministry representatives (Regional Government, Lands, Environment, Agriculture) and a nominated representative of the Conservancies of the region. Applications can be passed with a simple majority (Republic of Namibia 2002: 5f.). The Communal Land Reform Act thus makes the TAs the guardians of municipal land rights, which, however, only become legally valid through the communal land boards.

An MLR employee describes the challenges that the MLR has with the TAs as follows: *"this concept of customary land right registration, most of the people construe it that maybe we are there to overtake the power of traditional authorities [...], they don't have the understanding that the land belongs to the state. They still have that feeling that the land belongs to them and that they are the sole controller of this lands. [...] The Traditional authorities are not really conversant with the communal land reform act"* (E13). Nevertheless, the TAs are a very important player in the rural area of the Zambezi region and a good relationship with them is also considered necessary by the RC: *"Our relationship with the traditional authorities is very strong, because the TAs are the entry points in the communities which we are serving. And if you don't have a good relationship with the TA there is no way, you can actually do something. You know our people listen very much to their TA, traditionally than they do to government officials. [...] Even when we are doing our strategic plan for the next 5 years, we had to involve the TAs, because they are a stakeholder in planning and development, they are a stakeholder in politics"* (E16). However, the RC staff member sees similar difficulties in the cooperation with the TAs: *"if you don't communicate with them, you'll have a serious problem, because they do have the authority over land. [...] As much as they are the custodians of land allocation, they believe they are the owners of land, which is not the case. And until we iron out that understanding, we still face problems"* (E16). One phenomenon that is often observed in Conservancies is the establishment of settlements in wildlife migration corridors and the granting of land rights in these corridors with the support of TAs: *"They get support from the TA, if the TA writes a letter and states that this is their motherland, also the MLR will approve it. [...] some of them they don't understand about corridors, that's the problem. That's why they give support to members. And also, because some they don't want these corridors"* (P7). Besides actively supporting land rights in migration corridors, some TAs even demand their reduction: *"We told the indunas, that there in the corridor, no one should build their house there or plowing the crops. [...] The reason the indunas give us is that the corridor it's too big. We should make it small. Otherwise to leave the space for people. We reported to IRDNC, they should make it smaller"* (P5). An NGO employee, however, does not see the sole blame on the TAs, but rather on the unreliable functioning of the communal land board: *"I am not saying that it is willful, like I said, they know where these corridors are. It's a triangle of miscommunication, you got the TA that's issuing the right and you got another family that is eligible to go to MLR to get registered. In between, you got the land board [...] Ideally you imagine them pulling up the file: First of all, let's look at the regional land use plan, now is it within a gazetted Conservancy? No? Fine, but if yes: look at the land use map of the Conservancy, does it violate any of those? Those boxes are not being checked in every instance"* (E6). The relationship between TAs and Conservancies is central to land issues and, as in the case of Dzoti, can have a negative impact on the development of the Conservancy: *"Land issues they pose a problem, because our indunas, first*

they were not having a good relationship, even now it's like that. It's one area Dzoti, but we have three subkuthas, whereby each subkutha needs its development, doesn't want to share with the other one. [...] We have this site for the campsite and also the lodge. So that people of that site, they are the people who don't want to give the lands to the Conservancy" (P2). An NGO employee sees similar problems concerning rivaling Indunas in a Conservancy which can put the whole development of the community on hold: "Three indunas who are in Dzoti, each induna will say you cannot build that traditional village in my soil without my consent [...] Also the one who came and who wanted to build that lodge, he did not build because of land issues. He went without anything. [...] The Conservancy they have given them money to develop the water at Kachiramupepo. They bought tanks, pipes, up to now those pipes are a white elephant, they are nothing. There is no water in those water tanks. They are fighting for the land" (E14). When asked about power relations in the Conservancy, a professional hunter answers: "The power lies with the Conservancy. Because they can laugh at indunas trying to [...] We want from your own use quota, we want a certain portion of meat. No, we don't do that, we've decided we're selling it and that money will be used for projects. [...] They have to keep the indunas calm, which they do. But in areas where the Conservancy went up against the indunas, the indunas lost. [...] There was an outfitter that bribed the Conservancy, and the previous outfitter had the full support of the TA there. And the Conservancy chose the bribing outfitter, and the TA tried to protest, but they were choosing him, and the TA could do nothing about it" (P1). However, the TAs have not yet lost all their power, because they continue to send consultants to every Conservancy Management Committee and also influence the choice of Area Representatives as can be seen in the following exchange with an Area Representative: "Q: Did you get elected? A: I was chosen by the community. Q: Were there other candidates? A: Yes. Q: How did they choose you? A: I won the selection. Q: Did you have the support of the Induna? A: Yes. Q: And the other ones didn't? A: Yes. Q: Then they said, ok that one? A: Yes. Q: So, are you related to the Induna of Malengalenga? A: Yes" (P5). However, TAs are also perceived as useful and important for the functioning of a Conservancy: "The role of the TA is just to advise, they are part of the Conservancy, they are Conservancy members [...] they advise, just like the MET to the Conservancies. [...]. So, the TA don't run the money of the Conservancy, or the Conservancy would just go to the TA for support, we have this project, can you support us? We want land where we can put a lodge, can you support as?" (E11). One final opinion, which shows how divided the perception of the role of TAs is in reality, comes from an NGO employee: "With the TAs its purely greed. [...]. I sat with the director of wildlife and parks he's from that region, this was several years ago, it was just him and me, how to deal with the TAs because they were trying to grab more and more and the problem with the Conservancies is, to powerful chiefs they don't know how to say no, so the TA says I want 20% of the income and they don't know how to say no" (E9).

5.4 Local Actors

The most important local actors in nature conservation are the private sector and the Conservancies themselves. There are still more actors who have an influence on nature conservation, such as schools, village development committees, churches, illegal poachers and fishermen. For reasons of space and time limitations, however, this work focusses on the private sector and Conservancies. The poachers' perspective could only have been captured in the context of a longer ethnographic study, which would have required an extremely high degree of trust in the community. Since there is no tourist activity in Dzoti and Sobbe Conservancies, in this case trophy hunting represents the private sector. For more details about the perspective of the tourism sector in Conservancies of the Mudumu North and South Complexes, see WEIDNER (2017).

5.4.1 Private Sector: Professional Hunters

The *Policy on Tourism and Wildlife Concessions on State Land* summarizes the advantages of trophy hunting in Namibia: *"Trophy hunting concessions represent valuable economic assets and hunting experiences with considerable international marketing potential. The granting of such concessions can play a beneficial role in Namibia's rural areas, as a means of creating employment, facilitating the empowerment of formerly disadvantaged Namibians, contributing to the management of declared problem animals, providing meat for distribution to traditional authorities and rural communities, addressing overpopulation of certain species, and generating revenue from land or resources that are otherwise unproductive"* (MET 2007: 10). Trophy hunting has played a fundamental role since the founding of the first Conservancies. Without this hunting and the commodification of game, which makes the local population aware of the value of an animal, the successes of recent years would not have been possible, because trophy hunting is the main source of income for many Conservancies.

Figure 6 shows the respective contributions of tourism and trophy hunting to the cash income of




Figure 6: Conservancy Income from Trophy Hunting and Tourism (Source: NACSO 2016: 55).

Conservancies and households. It is quite obvious that the contributions of trophy hunting to the cash income of Conservancies in 2015 were twice as high as those of tourism. The opposite can be observed for the cash income of households in Conservancies: The contribution of tourism here exceeds that of trophy hunting by a factor of seven. This development can be explained by the fact that significantly more people find formal employment in tourism that contributes directly to household income, while a tourism company pays only a small fee to the Conservancy. Trophy hunting, on the other hand, requires a much smaller workforce, with the hunter paying a fixed percentage of the profits to the Conservancy. This has the advantage that the operational costs of the Conservancy can be covered by this profit sharing and the Conservancy therefore remains functional. A combination of both income streams is certainly desirable, since a higher household income means that the local population benefits significantly more from the Conservancy. In order to be able to act as a professional hunter in Conservancies at all, a demanding education and a lengthy registration process are necessary. All hunters must have reached the hierarchy level of the "Big Game Hunter" (at least six years of professional experience) in order to apply for a concession in a Conservancy (WEAVER/PETERSEN 2008: 49). Trophy hunting is determined by a quota set by the MET in consultation with NGOs and Conservancies (BOLLIG/OLWAGE 2016: 11). A total of 55 out of 82 Conservancies awarded concessions to professional hunters in 2016. Conservancies without concessions mostly lack wildlife (NACSO 2016: 53). A representative of an NGO explains the special importance of trophy hunting vividly by saying: *"Hunting brings in money, tourism brings in more jobs. And they both impact Conservancies differently. Jobs help with benefit distribution.*

Hunting brings in cash which is good for operational costs. The other difference to realize is when you get a revolution in South Africa or Cairo, tourists stop coming to Namibia, but not hunters, they are a heartier breed. Tourism is more volatile and vulnerable, so they are not quite interchangeable" (E9). The robustness and importance of trophy hunting is also stressed by one hunter in an interview, but with a different reason: "Amongst the photographic safari companies and Conservancies, I know of no lodge that supports game guards with transport, patrols, physical backing in the field, going to take camps down, to arrest people, nothing. So, if you take the hunters influence away, photographic guys do nothing, they just look the other direction. You can see, they are poaching that place empty" (P1). The hunter also criticizes the fact that professional hunters are fundamentally excluded and not involved in decision-making processes and attributes this in part to the critical attitude of many NGOs and conservationists towards the topic of trophy hunting: "That's another thing, nobody will explain to us what's happening, so we can monitor it for them in the field, so if they want feedback they can come to us. But nobody is interested, these hunters, we don't talk to them, they are terrible people. I mean, we are from the private sector, we do business, that's what we do [...]. You could sure as hell make it easier to yourself, by talking to other people and figuring out what didn't work by them or for them" (P1).

This marginalization continues with the issue of the determination of hunting quotas, in which the hunter had advocated a reduction of the quota for sustainability reasons: *"The quota setting is another thing, we get invited, but your opinion counts zero. [...] nobody wants to take our side of things seriously [...] The Conservancy obviously wants to stone you to death for wanting to reduce the quota [...] it's the type of MET employees that are there, sitting back in their chairs, taking a nap while these guys are giving their presentations" (P1). Another problem that arises regarding the hunting quota is the development that many hunters guarantee Conservancies ever-raising shooting quotas, sometimes up to 100% of the allocated quota, which leads to Conservancies calculating their annual budget with this 100% guaranteed quota: "I think the greatest challenge for them is to get their budget figured out and regain trust of the community. [...] because it's now year after year, where they don't meet their budget and it's because IRDNC is teaching them the wrong way. And they should work a budget out on the guaranteed amount (70%) that's what we guarantee that we are paying them [...], I have a principal issue of guaranteeing a 100% [...] one client doesn't make it, doesn't hit and misses and we can't get a substitute client in. Why should I be punished for that? And other Conservancies are meeting that, but the outfitters are overbooking the quotas [...] to make sure they get their animals. And that's giving Namibia as a destination a terrible name because clients have gone back unsuccessful" (P1). In principle, the hunter considers his relationship to the MET to be "Good, very good, no conflicts. If you don't expect more from them" (P1). He also states that he has no contact whatsoever with other government institutions such as the RC or the MLR. The only other institution that plays a role is TA: "they are very strict, they forced us once into paying them more money. We just paid it, which was probably the wisest thing to do. Twice a year they want money for this, fuel, every now and then we give them a can of fuel and they are happy. This is additional to the fees for the Conservancy, it's just to keep the fly out of your head" (P1). The Conservancies characterize their relationship to the hunter as good: "The relationship with our hunter is good, because he doesn't owe us. Sometimes he gives support to the Conservancy itself. But now he's willing to build two blocks for the school, additionally to supporting the Conservancy. He is supporting from his pocket. Even, he built three boreholes in our Conservancy" (P6). However, a Conservancy representative picks up the issue of the guaranteed launch rate again: "Our guarantee is not more than 500,000 and something a year, whereby on optional, which means that when he shoots is when we get that amount is only 1 million [...]. But if you make all of this guaranteed, then it'll be better. It's a loss to his side, yes. But for now, it's a loss to the Conservancy. [...] the ministry said that the hunter*

must start hunting in February, but always the hunter comes in July. You start hunting in July, whereby 1 million and 400,000 is optional, do you think it will finish?" (P5).

5.4.2 Conservancies

As an institution anchored in the *community*, the Conservancies are the central local actor for the management of natural resources and nature conservation. Although national parks fulfill a similar nature conservation function, their fortress conservation approach rarely provides direct benefits for the local population. The historical evolution of CBNRM and the Conservancies in Namibia has already been described in chapter 3. The Management Committee with the chairperson and area representatives, elected from different zones, is the most important decision-making body for the strategic orientation, while the employed manager leads the day-to-day business. Within 20 years (1998-2018), the number of Conservancies has risen from 4 to 86. This has created many employment opportunities and wildlife numbers have recovered rapidly. However, corruption, mismanagement and conflict have repeatedly occurred in the Conservancies, and they have never fully emancipated themselves from the support of MET and NGOs. Governance challenges in Conservancies will be presented in Chapter 7. Many relationships between Conservancies and other actors have already been discussed in this chapter, so only some relationships will be discussed here. In chapter 5.2.1.1, MET already was described by a Conservancy representative as a *"father"*. This image can also be observed in other interviews with Conservancy employees. However, the Conservancies are also accountable to MET: *"the monthly report, we always do it at MET and every month they have to get it and our quota comes from MET, if there is any problem with our hunter, we invite MET or we ask them how do we do about this one? They come, make trainings and we meet with him, then they will ask the problem, then we solve with MET and IRDNC"* (P2). Only one member of a Conservancy expresses slight criticism of the MET's behavior: *"Same with MET, they also anything that we do, we just give report to them. The only challenge with the ministry, when there is an incident that has happened, then it takes time for them to respond to our report. That's the only challenge. But when we go there for advice or directions, they are good"* (P15). In principle, the MET's advisory services are received positively and the monthly preparation of a report does not seem to be a burden. Some interview partners see the TA as another important advisory actor: *"So we work with them, but generally we are depending on the subkuthas. That's why in the management there are advisories, they are from the subkuthas. Q: But are these subkuthas actually supporting the goals of the Conservancy? A: Yes, they support"* (P6). In contrast, the relationship with the MAWF is rated very differently by some interviewees: *"Relationship with MAWF? That one, I am not satisfied with it, because we can really apply something there, or want help from them, it's just promising, they don't do it, they don't assist"* (P10). Another Conservancy staff member agrees with this thesis and says that there is no relationship between Conservancies and MAWF: *"Relation with MAWF? We don't have. Q: They don't engage? A: No. Q: Why? A: I don't have any information about those people, and they don't always come to us like the way MET and Department of Forestry, they are the only people who used to come to us, and we sit, we share information"* (P14). However, there are other opinions in the Conservancies in support of the MAWF: *"We get free seeds from MAWF and we have other one for selling, but every year they give free seeds to everyone [...] maybe these people don't know that it's from the MAWF"* (P2), or: *"That's the issue, some of them, they are getting training some of them they are not. When it comes to seeds, you'll find that some of them they receive, some of them they don't"* (P15).

6. Results of statistical analysis

6.1 Factor analysis

n=148

The aim of the factor analysis is to reduce the number of variables into factors, which then can be utilized for further analysis.

KMO- and Bartlett-test		
Test for Sampling Adequacy after Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin.		,870
Bartlett-Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	714,149
	df	78
	Significance after Bartlett	,000


Figure 7: KMO- and Bartlett-test for a factor analysis (Own graph)

The first step of the factor analysis was to perform a KMO and Bartlett test (Figure 7) to determine whether a factor analysis is feasible at all. The KMO value should not be less than 0.6. From 0.7, a sample is well suited for a factor analysis, so the value of 0.870 calculated here represents a very good value. The Bartlett test serves a similar purpose by stating whether a factor analysis is feasible on the basis of significance. With the Bartlett test, a sufficient significance is achieved from values of <0.001 . Since even a significance of 0.000 was achieved here, a factor analysis can be performed without restrictions. Displaying the second step of the factor analysis, the calculation of the individual correlations between the 13 chosen variables, is skipped here, due to the enormous scope. The 13 variables can be observed in figure 10. In the third step, the appropriate number of factors is determined.

Explained total variance			
Factors	characteristic value		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulated %
1	5,491	42,238	42,238
2	1,477	11,360	53,599
3	1,018	7,834	61,433
4	,842	6,474	67,907

Figure 8: Explained total variance by factors (Own Graph)

Figure 8 shows what percentage of the variance between all variables could be explained by the three or four factors. In principle, the characteristic values in factor analysis should not fall below 1 and the extracted factors should be able to explain at least 60% of the variance, which is why it was decided to extract three factors. Here, a balance must be struck between the additional benefit of another factor (here: a 6% increase in the explained variance) and the actual goal of the factor analysis, namely the reduction in the dimensions of the variables.



This weighing is shown graphically in the scree plot in Figure 9. Three factors are just above the desired characteristic value of 1.0. With the addition of each further factor, the additional benefit decreases further and further.

Figure 9: Scree plot on the relation between characteristic value and number of factors (Own calculations)

Rotated factor matrix	Factor		
	1	2	3
1. Does the Conservancy do enough to enforce its rules?	,833		
2. Do people respect the rules of the Conservancies, like wildlife corridors?	,822		
3. Does the Conservancy respect your rights? (land rights, grazing rights)	,740		
4. Do you think benefits like meat and jobs are fairly distributed?	,562		
5. Do you think that committee members are elected fairly?	,560		
6. How often do you receive information about the Conservancy activities?		,813	
7. Are you satisfied with the information flow?		,698	
8. Do you think that the Conservancy Management is accountable for its actions?		,600	
9. Are you satisfied with the way people are chosen?		,568	
10. Do you think you can criticize the activities of the Conservancy Management freely?			,846
11. Do you think you have an influence on the activities of the Conservancy Management?			,716
12. Does the TA have a strong influence on decisions made in the Conservancy?			,558
13. Do you think life has improved for most people because of the Conservancy?			,540
Method of Factor Extraction: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser-Normalization			

Figure 10: Rotated factor matrix with matching of individual variable to the respective factors (Own graph)

Figure 10 shows the final result of the factor analysis. The 13 variables have been grouped relatively clearly into three factors. The values to the right (factor loadings) indicate how strongly a variable affects the respective factor. Values of <0.5 were suppressed. In principle, the individual variables are assigned to the factor on which they act most strongly, but almost every variable acts on every factor. The final step in factor analysis is to determine the similarities that connect the variables in a factor and then to name the factor. Since the variables were already designed to measure dimensions of Good Governance when the questionnaire was constructed, the naming of the factors was also based on the Good Governance principles described in Chapter 2.3. The five variables assigned to Factor 1 clearly refer to the principles of **Rule of Law and Fairness**, which is why Factor 1 was named **Rule_of_Law_and_Fairness**. Factor 2 was treated in the same way. When considering the four assigned variables, similarities emerge which are summarized under **Transparency and Accountability**. Similarly, Factor 2 was named **Transparency_Accountability**. The same process took place with factor 3. On closer inspection, the four variables combine the dimensions of **Participation and Effectiveness**. Factor 3 **Participation_Effectiveness** was named accordingly. Thus, it can be claimed with a relatively high probability that in a regression analysis including these three factors **six** very important dimensions of Good Governance are covered.

6.2 Multiple Regression Analysis

Before the multiple regression analysis could be performed, a dependent variable had to be determined. Since the core hypothesis "Satisfaction with the activities of the Conservancy depends on Good Governance in the Conservancy" had to be proven, a variable had to be found which expresses member's acceptance or satisfaction with the Conservancy. For this purpose, an index variable was calculated from the two questions in the questionnaire which surveyed the satisfaction with the Conservancy. This was done by calculating a simple arithmetic mean of the data in the Likert scale of both questions and transferring the result of this calculation into a new variable called "**Satisfaction**". This **index variable** forms the dependent variable, which is to be explained by three independent variables with the help of regression analysis. The three independent variables are the three factors of Good Governance extracted from Chapter 6.1: **Rule_of_Law_and_Fairness, Transparency_Accountability and Participation_Effectiveness**. The multiple regression analysis was then performed in SPSS. Figure 11 shows the final result and model summary of this regression analysis:

Summary of regression model			
R	R-Squared	Adjusted R-Squared	Standard error of the estimator
,746	,556	,546	,71526

Figure 11: Summary of the regression model (Own graph)

The R-squared is the determining value here and expresses how much of the variance of the dependent variable "Satisfaction" can be explained by the included independent variables. In social science, already a value of 0.2 is considered very useful and interpretable. The value of 0.556 calculated here is therefore quite powerful and can explain 56% of the members' satisfaction with the Conservancy. These 56% can lead to the assumption that Good Governance generally has a very high determining influence on satisfaction.

However, before a more accurate interpretation can be made, the model had to be tested for significance. For the assessment of significance, an F-test is carried out in the course of an analysis of variance (Figure 12, ANOVA). If significance is present, the null hypothesis (=all coefficients are equal to 0) can be rejected and at least one coefficient with influence on the dependent variable exists. The p-value in this case is 0.000, so that the **highest significance level** is reached, and the null hypothesis can be rejected (p <= 0.05 significant, p <= 0.01 highly significant p <= 0.001 highly significant).

ANOVA (Dependent Variable: Satisfaction)				
	Sum of squares	df	F	p (Sig.)
Regression	82,608	3	53,8	,000
Non standard. Residuals	65,997	129		
Total	148,605	132		

Figure 12: ANOVA Table (Own graph)

In order to make more concrete statements about the significance of the three Good Governance factors, the regression coefficients must be individually tested for significance and then interpreted. For this purpose, a T-test was carried out which fulfils exactly this purpose. As can be seen in Figure 13, the p-value for all three factors is 0.000, so that the null hypothesis, which states that there is no correlation between the individual independent variables and the dependent variable, can be rejected.

Regression coefficients (Dependent Variable: Satisfaction)					
	Non standardized coefficients		standardized coefficients	T	p (Sig.)
	Regression coefficient B	Std.-Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-,211	,062		-3,394	,001
Rule_of_law_and_Fairness	,327	,062	,308	5,247	,000
Transparency_Accountability	,548	,062	,516	8,800	,000
Participation_Effectiveness	,468	,062	,441	7,517	,000

Figure 13: Regression coefficients (Own graph)

Now statements can be made about the individual Good Governance factors. The second factor **Transparency_Accountability** has the highest influence on the variable "Satisfaction" with a regression coefficient of 0.548. This means that transparency and accountability are most important for satisfaction in the Conservancy. Any **increase** in the category transparency and accountability by **1 %** would accordingly result in an increase in general **satisfaction** in the Conservancy by **0.548%**. **Participation_Effectiveness** follows as the second most important variable with a coefficient of 0.468, which also makes participation and effectiveness in the Conservancy a very important factor for satisfaction. So, the third most important factor is **Rule_of_Law_and_Fairness**. The regression coefficient is 0.327 and thus more than 0.2 less than the most important factor. However, a value of 0.327 still expresses a relatively strong influence, which means that greater satisfaction can also be achieved by increasing the rule of law and equal opportunities/fairness.

Including the three regression coefficients and the constant/interference factor of -0.211, the following equations result for the dependent variable **satisfaction**:

$$a) Y = 0,548 * x_1 + 0,468 * x_2 + 0,327 * x_3 - 0,211$$

$$b) \text{Satisfaction} = 0,548 * \text{Transparency/Accountability} + 0,468 * \text{Participation/Effectiveness} + 0,327 * \text{Rule of Law/Fairness} - 0,211$$

7. Good Governance in Conservancies

Based on the factor analysis as well as the regression analysis, the three extracted Good Governance factors and their occurrence in Conservancies are examined in the following chapter. The study starts with the factors **rule of law and fairness**, to which the least influence on satisfaction was assigned. This is followed by the second most important factor **participation and effectiveness** and finally the factor **transparency and accountability** completes the analysis.

7.1 Rule of Law and Fairness




Figure 14: Partial regression diagram on the influence of rule of law and fairness on satisfaction (Own graph)

The factor that has the weakest - but still relatively strong - influence on members' satisfaction with the Conservancy is rule of law and fairness (see Figure 14). Important elements of the rule of law in the Conservancy are above all the enforcement of applicable rules and the prevention of corruption and theft. One phenomenon that threatens the enforcement of rules and thus the rule of law in Conservancies is the **reluctance of the local population to report misconduct**. An expert reports on *"related social systems, a kind of extended family in a jurisdiction area of a chief or a Conservancy. The treasurer may be my uncle and I'm supposed to report him and say he embezzled money? There are many social conflicts that come along where there are no possible solutions for the people. We can of course say that you have to tell that democratically at such a meeting and then decisions are made and then people stand alone with the consequences"* (E1). These **social systems** can lead not only to **mutual protection**, but also to a **fear** of reporting other people: *"You are working in an area where there is a King and people are his subjects. People are fearing that one is the nephew of the king who is the chairperson, the treasurer is the granddaughter of the king and the secretary is the nephew of the grandfather of the king. So, you as an ordinary villager or member, you are fearing"* (E4). It is these social systems that make law enforcement and reporting of misbehavior particularly difficult. Family bonds and the very relatively homogenous society where many related people are living together in a very small and defined area like a conservancy have to be considered when talking about the rule of law.

Another element that undermines the rule of law is the **reluctance of the police, MET and Conservancies to enforce rules**: *"there is very poor enforcement on both sides [...] the police don't follow up. The police and the judiciary have a dreadful track record here in following up on cases. It is [...] a national troublesome trend, the inefficiency of the judiciary. So, when some members of the Conservancy are being strong and taking someone's actions to the police and put his head out and then things don't happen"* (E3). This fact poses a great problem: Even when a conservancy member dares to report misbehavior and the police don't investigate, the member has risked his reputation for nothing. This can be very discouraging for all conservancy members and **prevent** them from **future reporting**. Another expert who is very experienced with legal matters in Conservancies also reports on the lack of the police's assertiveness: *"community members have reported to the police and I've chased things up and talked to the inspector general [...] and prosecutor general, but these things still get stuck somewhere. The famous case in Dzoti, which is somewhere about 1.5 million, was reported in 2013 and it's still sitting with the regional prosecutor in Windhoek, investigation completed with nothing more to do but to set a date. You won't get internal accountability until there is some results of an investigation or there's a degazettement of a Conservancy, but it's unlikely to happen"* (E9). It is precisely the consequences of a **degazettement** - a dissolution of the Conservancy - and the strength of the TA's involved that can explain MET's hesitation: *"In Conservancies when a theft occurs, they are supposed to file a police report [...] and if they don't do that, MET is supposed to write a letter with a time frame to do that or they may suffer degazettement and there will be consequences, but this is such a sticky situation depending on the circumstances surrounding theft, depending which TA it is, depending on historical issues that might still be burning. MET is sometimes reluctant to be forceful or direct about enforcement"* (E6). The process of degazettement is complex and can be accompanied by very **bad publicity** for MET and the CBNRM community. Conflicts with a local TA, who might be involved in power struggles with the conservancy or MET further complicate things. It is these two factors, the **strong social bonds** in conservancies, and the **reluctancy of legal enforcement** that pose as the two biggest threats to the rule of law in conservancies.

The lack of the rule of law and the enforcement capacity of the institutions can manifest itself in **non-observance of the rules, corruption or elite capture** (see Chapter 2.5) Another explanation for corruption is that *"people that are not used to work with a million dollars in the bank and suddenly they have that million dollars in the bank [...] but do they understand these systems? Or do they have skilled people to run these systems? [...] I feel a lot of that corruption comes because there is a gap in terms of knowledge, these ones that are much more educated take advantage of the situation because these guys don't know how to run the system"* (E10). This observation was also made by a member of the Namibia Agronomic Board who suggests that this phenomenon cannot be limited to CBNRM alone: *"I have worked with cooperatives for years and we have already found that the democratic management of money is the most difficult issue in Namibia [...] everyone suffers from having no experience in this issue. They only know my own money and I can dispose of it or as a family, according to hierarchy and this 'I first have to ask others from the committee how I can do this' is a very difficult issue"* (E8). Cooperatives of any form as well as Conservancies share a similar governance structure and seem to experience similar problems when it comes to corruption, management of funds and Good Governance. This **lack of experience** in dealing with money and **public funds** makes it possible for people with a **higher level of education and power** in the community to skim off money from existing Conservancy resources, i.e. to pursue **elite capture**.

However, a representative of an NGO uses a different term: *"I would say committee capture, the committee gets there and gets in control, whether you are elite or not, [...] when we are talking about elite capture we might be going down the wrong road [...] people are getting more like 'we*

would like to get on the committee because we see there's money, we want to sit on as many committees as we can, because each time we get paid" (E3). Another NGO employee suspects that the already existing elite skims off most of the advantages: "I don't think they create a new elite, they elect someone who is already there, however, because such a large percentage of money goes or may go for meeting allowances, then this becomes a form of benefit distribution, they cannot distribute to all 5000 people in that Conservancy" (E9). This means, that Conservancies can contribute to the already existing division of a community into an educated elite that gains even more power through MC membership and the remaining members of the community.

In Dzoti Conservancy these described processes of theft occurred: "Money in 2014, that was supposed to be for the clinic, just two people went to withdraw the money, the signatory system was not good. Q: Were there sanctions for those people? A: The case has been opened but nothing has happened so far. [...] Q: Is it clear to everyone who these people were? A: Yes it's clear, but it's still with the police and we from MET, we are really pushing, last year and this year, we really want answers, we have our own Permanent Secretary also pushing on these cases, the cases are still there, we want answers to say, why did nothing happen so far, cause they can't tell us that there is no evidence, the evidence is there" (E11). In this case, MET is pushing for an investigation, but the process is held up at the police, even though there is enough evidence.

In the Conservancy context, the **category of fairness** can mainly be understood as the **distribution of monetary and non-monetary benefits** (jobs, meat, etc.): "the cherished few well of families that are participating on the committees are the ones who are getting the benefits. It is a widely held opinion that the little guy doesn't get much out of [...] it's those families that are appointed to the committee who get to call the shots and direct the spending where they want it to go. Being appointed to these positions not because you're qualified but because of who you are in the relative hierarchy in a community" (E6). As can be observed in this quote, benefit distribution is closely connected to elite capture as well. The people in power can decide where the money should be spent. Another factor that leads Management Committee members to benefit from Conservancies is: "that as a Conservancy does earn more money, instead of that extra money going to increasing the benefits, it goes into operational costs and who benefits from operational costs? The committee members" (E9). The composition and effectiveness of this Management Committee is also diminished by the fact that "in Conservancies people are very close, almost like families and relatives, we also have issues such as, people want to see their relatives in the committees instead of choosing a person who is going to do something for the Conservancies, but you just want to see your brother go up" (E11). It seems that **monetary benefit distribution** is the **biggest threat** to **fairness** in Conservancies. The ones who participate and work for the conservancy receive the most benefits, on the one hand through wages and on the other hand, through increasing **operational costs** instead of investing in community projects for the benefit of all. The distribution of meat, however, does seem to occur mostly fair, as there were no complaints about this issue in the interviews.

To conclude, the **committee's control over the budget** can either lead to a **soft elite capture**, which can legally be carried out by collecting meeting allowances and directing Conservancy spending or it can lead to corruption or theft, when committee members with access to the Conservancy funds use the earmarked money for their own benefit. This is amplified by the fact that most cases never lead to legal consequences.

7.2 Participation and Effectiveness




Figure 15: Partial regression diagram on the influence of participation/effectiveness on satisfaction (Own graph)

Participation and effectiveness is the second most important factor and has a higher influence on the variable satisfaction than rule of law/fairness (see Figure 15). In the following, the challenges of participation and effectiveness - which includes improving the livelihoods of members and capacities of Conservancy employees - are presented. A **fundamental problem of participation** is that too **few Conservancy members attend** the various **meetings**: *“That challenge is that people don’t always come to the meeting. You call a meeting, if that meeting is not about money or food, they won’t come. If it’s about not money or employment, they won’t come”* (P6). Part of this problem are the so-called **Area Representatives**, who fail to carry important information into the villages: *“The area reps, they are told that they must go to the members. During the AGM, if you ask the member, they will deny that, we did not hear that information. The members they should elect someone, who knows how to talk with people, so not that when he gets the information, he just closes the books without telling the community the information. Some are just shy to make a meeting they don’t want to talk in the meeting”* (E14). The lack of capacity among the area representatives will be discussed further below in this chapter.

Another Conservancy employee criticizes that the **annual AGM is not sufficient** for good participation and that he therefore wants to hold more regular meetings with presentations: *“I realized that I have to make some awareness with the members, like in a month, I can make two awareness meetings, to go to the members and explain to them what happens, and according to the financial matters, we must give a financial report for the community. It’s what I tried to make so that members should know what is going on”* (P10). A final point of criticism of participation is that **meetings are often dominated by eloquent members** with higher education: *“It will be only 2-3 coming with good ideas, [...] so to make a decision, all the few should agree on one thing. Or you come with an idea, if you find somebody who oppose that idea, [...] it should be discussed first, before following it to see the advantages and disadvantages of it. Q: Who are these people who make these propositions? A: Those people who can easily catch up the information”* (P11). This **one-sided participation** can have strong negative effects on the Conservancies and the general

satisfaction of the members and their representation: *“In these remote villages, there is only a certain type of people who attend these meetings and amongst them, they elect, [...] you have to ask why don’t they go to the meetings, because they don’t see the benefits, they don’t get the information and they are not well represented. But it’s because they don’t go to these meetings, they don’t elect a person to speak for them. It’s only people who are interested in the Conservancy who go to these meetings and they go elect a person who represents their interest. [...] people who don’t go to the meetings, are not represented, they don’t send anyone, they don’t have anyone in the center to represent their interests and they are not getting feedback”* (E15). What the expert describes here can be called a **vicious circle of non-participation**. Members who don’t attend the meetings don’t elect representatives and their interests will continue to be ignored. If they feel neglected, their willingness to participate in Conservancy matters further decreases and they will be unsatisfied with or even unaccepting of the Conservancy.

The **effectiveness** of the Conservancies is largely determined by the use of the funds earned through trophy hunting and tourism. Yet, Conservancies are characterized by **extremely high transaction costs**. The secretary of the Dzoti Conservancy, for example, has to bring his handwritten minutes to Katima Mulilo, type them into a computer, have them copied and return to the Conservancy over a distance of 100km. Since all this is done without a car, he is dependent on carpooling: *“The big challenge which I am facing now is computer skill, I am lacking it, completely. I have never worked with a computer, as you see our office, there is no computer and no electricity. All the things which I used to do, typing, I need to go to town, everything which I do, first I do it roughly on a paper, after that I have to hike from here to Katima, to make copies or printing”* (P7). A similar process takes place with financial transactions or financial reports: *“We go to Katima for the bank statements, before we produce the financial report, monthly report, make sure when you produce, we have a bank statement”* (P2). These activities usually take more than one working day, which significantly limits the effectiveness of Conservancies that have to work without modern technology. The **lack of internet access** and **electricity** severely impedes Good Governance and effective administration. A secretary or a treasurer who will spend one whole working day just for getting bank statements or copying minutes, cannot dedicate himself to other tasks that would actually improve Conservancy governance.

The second aspect of **ineffectiveness** refers explicitly to **the use of resources**: *“There has to be more benefits that come from CBNRM that should go to the people, they should start **investing into tangible projects**, instead of sharing cash 500\$ each, [...] put electricity for all members, or a school block or clinic for all members. Already if people can see that, look at my kids, they can study at night, I am sure, that people will start reconsidering, instead of giving 500\$ which you just drink in one hour and finish”* (E11). When benefits are paid out to each member individually, they usually get spent on consumable goods and will disappear after a few days. Members then feel an immediate benefit, yet, when the goods are used, the benefit disappears. Some conservancies already have started to invest in projects like electrification, but progress is still very slow, and several projects are carried out at the same time without being finished. A representative of an NGO also criticizes the approach to the use of funds: *“Under most circumstances, projects that Conservancies build for the community are not well advertised to the community, and most members don’t even know that the Conservancy paid for that. [...] Conservancies overall do a very poor job at involving enough community members to really show them the benefits that are being brought to the community, through cash, non-cash, projects, employment. Should be advertised better and tackle the lack of awareness in the villages”* (E6). This **lack of awareness** can on the one hand be attributed to **insufficient participation** by members in meetings and on the other hand to a **slow information flow and communication**. It should also be noted that the available budget for investment in Conservancies is greatly reduced

by the **operational costs**. For example, Dzoti spends more than 60% of his income on covering salaries and running costs, which causes displeasure among members: *“So it’s 45 people who get money, but what about the rest of the members? For the members, it’s true, they are not getting enough benefits. I’ll say so because there are a lot of complaints in the community, they are saying they are not getting any benefits”* (E14).

Finally, **employee capacity** has a huge impact on the **effectiveness of governance** and natural resource management in a Conservancy. An NGO employee notes that the training and capacity situation in which the CBNRM system finds itself is extremely problematic: *“The last two years I have been convinced that unless something is done with legislation to stop what happens with the appointment of committee members on this rotating cycle, it’s a **training nightmare** for a supporting NGO. It’s like a hamster wheel. You just got a good group that’s starting to understand and for a multitude of reasons it’s time for someone else to eat [...] The cycling of committee members of every one or two years is absolutely exhausting for the foundational building of capacity”* (E6). She points out that there is an extremely high fluctuation in the Management Committees (MC) of the Conservancies. The MC members are elected by the Conservancy members and can be voted out of office at any AGM, even earlier in the event of misconduct. As a result, **many terms of office of the MC last only one year**. After election, MC members usually are supposed to get trained by MET or different NGOs. Yet, working with limited budget, not all MC members can be trained immediately. So occasionally a MC member will receive training and after a few months will not be reelected again and the resources are almost wasted, and the **skills and knowledge are lost**. The NGO employee also criticizes the personal attitude of the MC members: *“Educating these committees that their role is not just to be a community member to show up and get a stipend to attend a meeting. This is a volunteer role to make their community better. It should be functioning like a board of directors, people don’t like to hear that Conservancies are businesses, but it does mean that capacity is needed”* (E6). Here it seems that sometimes, the MC does not perceive its role as vital for the Conservancy and lack the attitude to run the **Conservancy like a business**, with certain responsibilities and the need to make a profit.

Yet, not only the MC members are affected by this **high fluctuation**, because the same applies to well-trained employees: *“those skills will come from skills in which we have invested over the years, or government will pick up or some of them, they will come to urban areas and find jobs in hotels and places where they can get employed, so as a result there is a high turnover in terms of staff but also in terms of committees”* (E10). Since lodges and government are able to pay higher salaries than Conservancies, well-trained and educated Conservancy staff members often change their job as soon as they receive a lucrative offer. Another NGO employee provides an illustrative example of what this high fluctuation can lead to: *“In Sobbe, they don’t even reflect on the strategy plan of the Conservancy, because they are new. This might be third or fourth manager of Sobbe and with Dzoti, maybe the second manager. The manager for Sobbe, is as new as of this year, chairperson also, enterprise person [...]. The same thing will happen to these ones, because there is nothing that protects them, the management does not stand over the issue of consistency and upbringing of these managers. You will see that chairperson after chairperson is elected, manager after manager is appointed and that puts the stability of the Conservancy into danger in terms of proper management, because year one has been started by a different manager, year two continues with a different manager”* (E15). Money is being spent on drafting management plans that hardly any Manager or MC member reads or follows. Furthermore, there is **rarely a transition** carried out from a leaving manager or MC member to their successor. The newly elected or employed members mostly start from zero, without a lot of knowledge of what has been going on in the Conservancy or what the management plan looks like. This leads to **ineffectiveness** and an **inconsistent governance and management** of Conservancy affairs.

7.3 Transparency and Accountability




Figure 16: Partial regression diagram on the influence of transparency and accountability on satisfaction (Own graph)

In the model developed for this study, the factor of transparency and accountability plays the most important role (see Figure 16). In order to increase the satisfaction within a Conservancy most effectively, it makes sense to apply measures that improve transparency and accountability (see chapter 6.2). Transparency here primarily includes a flow of information from Conservancy Management to Conservancy Members. Accountability refers mainly to the opposite process of members controlling the Conservancy Management. These two dimensions of Good Governance are closely connected to participation, which has been examined in the previous chapter. An NGO employee defines **deficits in transparency and accountability** as follows: *“Now, the Conservancy says: we invite them all the time, each community has their representative, if they have issues they’re supposed to go to area rep, the area rep brings it here. It’s hard for them to understand that a feedback mechanism and a feeling of being inclusive is a big challenge. Conservancies overall do a very poor job at involving enough community members to really show them the benefits that are being brought”* (E6). She therefore assumes that the Conservancy Administration does not have an overview of the function of the feedback mechanisms with the community. The mere existence of area representatives does **not automatically** ensure a **regular information flow** and a working feedback mechanism, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter. An annual AGM is simply not enough to diffuse information about activities in the Conservancy to its members. Without internet access, electricity and the possibility to print in the conservancy office, this poses a big challenge.

An NGO employee describes how the system of **Area Representatives**, who are **mainly responsible** for transparency and the flow of information, has developed: *“That’s the fundamental problem, the assumption, that a committee member goes back and reports or collects information and brings it the committee, it does not happen. They don’t see that there is a responsibility to this position. But the Conservancies have responded by taking the Conservancy and dividing into villages so they have sub committees or area representatives to address this issue, but I don’t think it’s had an overwhelming success, what I keep hearing is that the area reps*

*don't report back" (E9). Another NGO employee also sees the Area Representatives as a weak point in the information and feedback system: "As soon as you get a committee we are moving from what we call a **participatory democracy to a representative democracy**, there you have committees you have bottlenecks and it needs to work both ways, the committee needs to be held accountable and hold themselves accountable to the members, need to inform the members, do the members biddings and represent the members best interest, which often gets forgotten behind closed doors in committees. And the members should be exerting more control and more holding their representatives accountable and making sure that they are getting information and that they are pursuing their interests and making sure that the money is managed properly and hold them accountable if they are not. That is not yet happening, and I am not surprised" (E3). As the NGO representative stresses here, **accountability** should work in **both ways**, the MC needs to supply the members with **regular information**, while the members need to **demand transparency** and accountability. However, a lot of interviewees in the survey showed little interest in the Conservancies' activities and it seemed that only the people who were directly or indirectly involved in Conservancy affairs really knew about current developments.*

Furthermore, a professional hunter also blames the **community for a lack of control**: *"What's the role of the community there? It's 1000 members and there has been a million stolen from them. So, they come to the tree and they shout there one Saturday morning: we want our money back. The accused sits there, he says he didn't touch that money. The community themselves, they know he's got it, because just after that he built his house with bricks. So, they shout and take it to the police demanding action on this thing. But the accused diverts the public's interest with too late burning, too early burning, unfulfilled hunter's quotas and everybody forgets about it and the case never progresses and stays there" (P1). In this case of misappropriation of funds, a combination of the **weak rule enforcement** regime on the part of the police described above and a rapid **lack of interest** in the community led to the accused person not being convicted.*

Another self-critical remark of a CBNRM pioneer in Namibia sees the **blame** for the **lack of accountability on the NGOs** who helped to build CBNRM: *"These programs were designed by guys like me, wildlife guys, who know very little about the communities, I worked in Zambia as a ranger, we had strong chiefs. I spoke with the chiefs, but I did not understand the social dynamics of communities. The assumption was that general members elect the committee and hold them accountable. But here people are interdependent, of course they are interrelated and have strong family ties, because in a drought you help out your neighbor, he helps you. So 'internal accountability' does not work. And it's because guys like me didn't understand that, we say: community, they elect, they'll hold them accountable, but doesn't work and hasn't worked. So, MET is the only stakeholder that can externally hold a Conservancy accountable" (E9). The NGO staff member describes a **very closely related** and **resilient population** in the Zambezi region, which is strongly dependent on each other and therefore **cannot control itself** and its elected representatives. He sees the MET as the only way to ensure **external accountability**. As described in chapter 2.5, during the induction of CBNRM in Namibia, the mistake of considering the **community** as a homogenous entity with similar interests and uniform relations was made.*

A MET employee reports on the **procedure of control of Conservancies**: *"When it's a serious non-compliance issue, you have to hold them accountable. We have the standard operating procedures for non-compliance to the key requirements: financial management, not holding an AGM, not holding elections, wildlife management and utilization plan. If they don't do it, then we have response procedures, which can end in a degazettement. They have to inform us of their activities and planning for the coming month and what they did in the past month, but also ourselves, from time to time we need to check up on them" (E11). However, this process of **sanctions** in the standard operating procedures is **complicated** and requires several steps. Letters must be sent to*

the Conservancy, who then have time to respond and act. If several deadlines are missed, first consequences can follow, yet this takes time and is **rarely carried out** until a degazettement or punishment of the Conservancy.

This is why an NGO employee proposes new measures to tackle these problems: *“You know how publicly held corporations have to have calls with their shareholders on a quarterly basis to present what’s going on and take challenges and questions back. I thought about the heavy use of cellphones and a way we could get a community conference call by Conservancies every six months, so those that can’t travel can see on a radio show or a free call in number, giving a periodic report about financial and member benefits, planned projects. It is about showing that willingness to be transparent and overcome the travel issues and challenges that those remote community members have”* (E6). This could be a first way to increase information flow, transparency and accountability. **Feedback** and **information flow** should be increasingly **institutionalized**, like any other business would do with its shareholders. Yet, members must really feel that they are the ones who form the Conservancy and **demand information**. MC members and employees should also realize that for a successful governance, members must be informed, as this forms basis for participation, acceptance and satisfaction.

It is quite difficult to draw the line between participation, transparency and accountability, since they all depend and influence on each other. After looking at all six forms of Good Governance included in this study, it becomes clear that they are intertwined and cannot be treated in an isolated manner.

8. Key Recommendations

This work has shown that Good Governance is one of the determining factors for satisfaction in the Conservancies and thus also for the endangered survival of the Conservancies mentioned in the introduction. Bad governance is one of the main causes of conflicts and ineffectivity in the Conservancies and should be tackled as quickly and strongly as possible. By identifying the three key factors of Good Governance, the following general recommendations can be made:

1. Focusing support from NGOs and the government on promoting Good Governance in Conservancies
2. For the most effective increase in satisfaction and acceptance, the following areas of governance should be promoted in Conservancies: Transparency and Accountability, Participation and Effectiveness as well as Rule of Law and Fairness.

Transparency and Accountability

- In order to improve information flow, Conservancies need at least one computer with internet access, the possibility to print and of course, electricity. Meetings could be conducted in a more efficient way and information could be spread rapidly and easily.
- The Area Representatives have been identified as the bottle necks in the information flow, limiting transparency and accountability. Frequently they are elected not because of skill, but because of popularity. The capacity of the ARs should be increased through training and democratic processes of selection should be strengthened.
- Since an annual AGM is not enough to provide information, more frequent meetings should be called.
- Members should be educated on how to carry out their task of demanding transparency.
- MET should also focus on accountability and not rely on NGOs and the local population for a control of the Management Committee (MC).
- The process of sanctioning a Conservancy should be more flexible and be carried out in a quicker, stricter manner.
- Politics, NGOs and science need to increasingly acknowledge communities as heterogenous and account for differing interests and power relations in their work.
- Feedback and information flow between members and the MC should be institutionalized.

Participation and Effectiveness

- Participation of Conservancy members in meetings needs to be increased by advertising the meetings, conducting them regularly and making attendance more attractive.
- This could be achieved by including members actively in decision making processes in these regular meetings instead of only telling members about Conservancy activities.
- To combat the feeling of neglectedness by certain members, meetings need to be conducted in a more open manner. They need to be moderated so that less eloquent and less educated members of more remote villages can be given a voice. Their attendance needs to be valued and their feedback included.
- In order to make conservancies more effective in benefiting the local population, income needs to be increased and diversified, otherwise Conservancies run the risk of losing the support of the local population.
- Operational budgets of conservancies should be examined and possibly lowered. Especially transaction costs like driving to Katima Mulilo for printing could be cut. With

50% of the funds going into employees and transactions, members don't really see the benefits and it becomes increasingly hard to improve life for the communities.

- Direct cash transfers should be stopped, since with more than one thousand members, they account for a very small amount per person. Community projects which foster economic development can benefit the whole population.
- These projects should be very tangible, like irrigation, electrification, schooling etc. They should be advertised as "paid for with conservancy money". Awareness about benefits and activities of the Conservancies should be spread.
- Capacity in management of Conservancies should be strongly increased. Conservancy employees manage millions of Nam\$ and dozens of people and sometimes have little to no education.
- In order to increase capacity of the MC and combat the high fluctuation, the minimum term of Area Representatives and MC members should be at least two years.
- More trainings should be conducted with the MC since it is the body that takes the main strategic decisions.
- A transition plan from old employees to new employees needs to be drafted. New Area Representatives sometimes have no idea what their predecessors were working on.
- Management Plans need to be followed more strictly and conservancy governance and policy should be more coherent.
- These management plans should focus on the most important policy areas and should be very comprehensive. A lot of money is being spent on hiring consultants to draft management plans that are rarely followed.
- MET and Conservancies should think about hiring (semi)-professional managers for the conservancies or one manager for several conservancies that have experience with leadership and administrating conservation areas and businesses.

Rule of Law and Fairness

- In order to foster the rule of law, combat the reluctance of the local population to report misconduct and account for the strong family relations in the Zambezi Region, anonymous reporting should be made possible.
- MET's control mechanisms and NGOs should rely less on a strong, homogenous community, as this does not reflect reality. A stronger focus should lie on power relations and differing interests of different actors in the communities.
- A better enforcement of applicable Conservancy rules and the prevention of corruption and theft is essential. This needs to be strengthened in Conservancies, at MET and in the police force. To not discourage people who risk their reputation and report misconduct, legal action needs to follow quickly.
- The ultimate consequence, a degazettement of a Conservancy, should be considered if all other measures fail.
- Elite capture either in the way of employing family members or directing Conservancy funds towards preferred villages and projects benefiting a certain group of people, needs to be prevented by having clear rules and control mechanisms.
- Benefit distribution in general should be fairer: If transaction costs can be lowered, more money would be available for actual investments in development, leading to a broad perception of benefits and a subjectively fairer benefit distribution.
- Remote villages who cannot voice their opinions in Conservancy Decision-making should also benefit from Conservancy Funds.
- A systematic allocation formula for benefit distribution could be developed, that assigns funds towards each village according to different variables like population, etc.

- The vicious cycle of non-participating people who in consequence do not have any influence on Conservancy policy, do not receive any benefits which further decreases their willingness to participate needs to be stopped.

Further Recommendations

- The ministries that are relevant when dealing with Conservancies need to work in a very close cooperation and should not struggle over competencies and influence.
- MAWF and MET need to cooperate strongly in the area of solving land-use conflicts between agriculture and conservation. MAWF should also be active in Conservancies and help farmers dealing with HWC and adapt their agricultural techniques.
- MLR should be closely involved in zonation and land-use planning in Conservancies, as they have a very strong expertise in this field and designed the Integrated Regional Land Use Plan for the Zambezi Region, which should be the basis for all land-use planning.
- MET and MLR as well as the Conservancies should cooperate with the TAs for land-use planning, since the TAs are the custodians of the land rights.
- In order to combat land-use conflicts, the land boards should be strengthened and their capacity improved. There should be no more settlement in Wildlife corridors, which is very frequent in Dzoti and Sobbe Conservancies. TA's are still distributing land rights in these essential wildlife corridors.
- The Regional Council should interact more directly with the Conservancies.
- The RC and the regional ministries should coordinate their policies, since this is rarely taking place at the moment.
- MET should take its role in the land board seriously to avoid land-use conflicts and prevent land rights registration in wildlife migration corridors. They have not yet used their veto rights in land boards effectively.
- There should be closer cooperation between Donors (like KfW, GIZ, MCA, GEF) and also NGOs (like WWF, NNF, IRDNC). Their activities should be more coherent. For example, GIZ should be active in the same regions as KfW, in order to support infrastructure with capacity building.
- Professional Hunters should be consulted and also be included in decision making, since they are very experienced in the field of conservation and anti-poaching and have been the actors that have directly been involved with Conservancies for many years.
- Budgets of Conservancies should not be calculated with a 100% fulfilment of the hunting quota. This leads to overbudgeting and pressure on the hunters to hunt irresponsibly. If a hunter cannot fulfil the quota, a Conservancy can run into severe funding problems mid-month, resulting in frustration of staff and further ineffectiveness of governance.

9. Conclusions

The measures proposed in chapter 8 should increase satisfaction in the Conservancy, increase participation and bring the CBNRM system closer to its original purpose: The protection of natural resources while at the same time sustaining the social, ecological and economic development of Namibia's local population. Good Governance is the deciding factor to determining satisfaction in a conservancy. The results of this work are of a very heterogeneous nature, since the study has dealt with a multitude of actors, conditions and conflicts of interest. It was recognized that the CBNRM approach was adapted from western conservation ideology for Namibia, which of course brought some difficulties. The criticism of the image of a homogeneous community that forms a single entity of interest has proved to be true. Especially the power struggles between old local elites, new elites created by the establishment of the Conservancies (members of the Management Committee, managers or higher officials), ministries and politics, the representatives of the Traditional Authority as well as the local population for access to resources show that Conservancies really are a battleground of diverging interests. The land use conflicts are particularly worth mentioning here: Settlements in the wildlife corridor, agriculture in exclusive wildlife zones or livestock farming in the national park are just some of the manifestations of these conflicts. What is striking here is the dwindling power of the Traditional Authorities, which are still able to carry out land allocations, but which must now always exchange views with a Conservancy representative on the communal land board. Processes such as elite capture or committee capture, in which management committee members enrich themselves in the Conservancy, have been identified. The power struggle for competencies at the national ministries was also recognized. The MAWF tends to discriminate against small farmers in the Conservancies because its sphere of influence was curtailed by the establishment of the Conservancies there. The cooperation between the MLR and the MET is virtually non-functional, as it does not even function properly in the communal land board.

A "vicious circle of non-participation" has also been discovered, which states that in marginalized villages only interested people participate in the activities of the Conservancy. Thus, only interested and privileged people take part in elections and are therefore exclusively represented at the Conservancy level. The elected persons naturally stand up for their clientele and direct the politics of the Conservancy in such a way that their voters benefit, thereby further excluding marginalized people. In general, the Zambezi region is characterized by strong personal relationships and kinships, which make accountability and the enforcement of the rule of law very difficult.

Of course, since their establishment in the 1990s, Conservancies have come a very long way, also because of the fierce efforts from NGOs as well as the international and local community. Namibia can still be recognized as a role model when referring to the devolution of rights towards the local communities and the departure from fortress conservation that has excluded the local population from utilizing natural resources. The sustainable management of natural resources can only succeed when the local population is included in decision-making and is also benefitting for economic and social development at the same time.

However, in order to really improve livelihoods of local communities as well as ensuring the protection of ecosystems and natural resources in a world of climate change, scarcer resources and a growing human population, Conservancy governance needs to be improved and the interests of all the different actors need to be coordinated towards a more coherent, sustainable CBNRM policy.

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11. Annex

1. Questionnaires (English and Silozi)

Survey – Conservancy Governance

You are free to criticize the conservancy and can speak freely. It will not be used against you; the questionnaire is anonymous and we cannot tell who gave the answers. We don't write down name or location. You can be honest to improve the conservancy.

1. Gender	m		f			
2. Conservancy Member	No		Yes			
3. Age	<18	18-24	25-44	45-59	60+	
4. Education	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Other:		
5. Disposable Income / adult / month	0-293\$	294-520\$	521-1001\$	1001-1502\$	>1502\$	
6. Are you related to the conservancy staff or the TA	No (staff)	Yes (staff)	No (TA)	Yes (TA)		
7. Main Livelihood:	Farming (Crops)	Farming (Livestock)	Other informal:	Formal Employment:		
8. Do you work for the conservancy in any way?	No		Yes: How?			
9. Did you ever receive support from the Ministry of Agriculture?	Yes, frequently	Yes, sometimes	Yes, rarely	but	No	
10. Did you go to the last AGM?	No	Yes	Why or why not?			
11. Do you attend other Conservancy Meetings?	No	Yes	Why or why not?			
12. How often do you receive information about the conservancy activities?	weekly	monthly	Every few months	Few times a year	Almost Never	Never
13. How do you receive this information?	Management Committee	Area Representatives	Staff	Other Members	Other:	
14. Are you satisfied with the information flow?	Not at all satisfied	Not satisfied	Neutral	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	
15. Are you satisfied with the work of the area representatives?	Not at all satisfied	Not satisfied	Neutral	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	
16. Are you satisfied with the work of the management committee?	Not at all satisfied	Not satisfied	Neutral	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	
17. Do you think that committee members are elected fairly?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
18. Do you think you can criticize the activities of the Conservancy Management freely?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
19. Do you think you have an influence on the activities of the Conservancy Management?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
20. Do you think that the Conservancy Management is accountable for its actions?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
21. Do you know about plans for the distribution of financial benefits?	No			Yes:		

22. Do you think benefits like meat and jobs are distributed fairly?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
23. Do you know how they choose the people who work for the conservancy?	No		Yes:		
24. Are you satisfied with the way people are chosen?	Not at all satisfied	Not satisfied	Neutral	Satisfied	Very Satisfied
25. Does the traditional authority have a strong influence on decisions made in the conservancy?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
26. Who makes the decisions in the conservancy?	TA	Management	Different Families	All members	Other:
27. Do you think life has improved for most people because of the conservancy?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
28. Do you think the conservancy creates more conflict than benefits?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
29. Do you know about the Zonation Plan in the Conservancy?	No		Yes:		
30. Do people respect the rules of the Conservancies, like wildlife corridors?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
31. Does the Conservancy do enough to enforce these rules?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
32. Does the conservancy respect your rights (land rights, grazing rights)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
33. Did you ever hear about mismanagement or misuse of funds in the conservancy?	No	Yes	Was it reported? What happened?		
34. If you could change whatever you wanted in the conservancy, what would you do?					
35. Do you have further comments?					

Patisiso– Ya Kamaiso Ya Konzabesi

Baikutwe kulukuluha haba alaba lipuzo kuamana ni Konzabesi hape bakona kubulela kusina kainole nikamita. Pampili yapatisiso haina kusebeliswa kwa kutamisa mutu, hape mabizo a babafa likalabo hana kuzibahazwa. Hakuna mabizo kamba libaka zekanolwa mwa pampili yee. Mukupiwa kufa likalabo kabusepahala kuli luzwiseze konzabesi yahesu kwa pata.

1. Banna kapa Basali	munna		musali			
2. Mu Limembala za Konzabesi	Ee		Awa			
3. Lilimo za sipeppo	<18	18-24	25-44	45-59	60+	
4. Mayemo a tuto	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Amanwi:		
5. Lukau ka kweli	0-293\$	294-520\$	521-1001\$	1001-1502\$	>1502\$	
6. Muna miba habo mwina kwa babeleki ba Konzabesi kapa kwa manduna	Ee (Babeleki)	Awa (Babeleki)	EE (manduna)	Awa (manduna)		
7. Muipilisa kani	Bulimi bwa limela	Bulimi bwa limunanu	Mukwa omuni	Musebezi		
8. Nemukile mwasebeza kwa Konzabesi?	Batili		Enisha, Sifi?			
9. Nemukile mwa fumana tuso kwa likolo la Njimo?	Enisha Kasa mulaho a likweli	Enisha, kasiwela mwa silimo	Enisha, Lukali hakuna	Hakuna		
10. Nemubile teni kwa mukopano omutuna wa silimo o felile?	Batili	Enisha	Libaka?			
11. Mubanga teni kwa mikopano ye minwi ya Konzabesi?	Batili	Enisha	Libaka?			
12. Mufumananga hakai manusa aze ezahala kwa konzabesi?	Kaviki	Kakweli	Kasa mulaho a likweli	kasiwela mwa silimo	Lukali hakuna	Hakuna
13. Mufumana ucwani manusa?	Katengo ka kamaiso	Bayemeli ba lilalo	babeleki	Limebala zemu	Babamu	
14. Muzamaelo wa manusa ucwani?	Halu ikolwisisi nihainyani	Haluikolwisisi	Honacwalo	Lwaikolwisisa	Lwa ikolwisisa luli	
15. Mwaikolwisisa mubelekelo wa bayemeli ba lilalo?	Halu ikolwisisi nihainyani	Haluikolwisisi	Honacwalo	Lwa utwisisa	Lwa utwisisa luli	
16. Mwaikolwisisa ka musebelezo wa katengo ka kamaiso?	Halu ikolwisisi nihainyani	Haluikolwisisi	Honacwalo	Lwa utwisisa	Lwa utwisisa luli	
17. Kana muhupula kuli limembala za katengo liketiwanga hande?	Halu lumeli ni hainyani	Halu lumelu	Honacwalo	Lwa lumela	Lwalumela luli	
18. Kan muhupula kuli mwa kona kunyaza likezo za katengo inge mulukuluhile?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwa lumela	Lwa lumela luli	
19. Kan munani susuwezo kwa misebelezo ya katengo?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwa lumela	Lwa lumela luli	
20. Kana katengo ka kamaiso kana nibuikalabelo kuze kaeza?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwa lumela	Lwa lumela luli	
21. Kana mwa ziba za mulelo waku aba lukau?	Batili		Enisha:			

11. Annex

22.Kana likabelo za nama ni misebezi lieziwa handa?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwa lumela	Lwa lumela luli
23.Kana mwa ziba moku ketelwa batu babasebeza mwa konzabesi?	Batili	Enisha:			
24.Mwa ikolwisisa moba ketelwa?	Halu utwisisi nihainyani	Halu utwisisi	Honacwalo	utwisisa	Lwa utwisisa luli
25.Kana manduna bana ni susumezo mwa kupanga milelo ya konzabesi?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwalumela	Lwa lumela luli
26. Ya eza milelo ya Konzabesi kimani?	Manduna	Katengo ka babeleki	Mabasi a siani	Limembala kaufela	Babanwi
27. Kana konzabesi lmbweshafalize mipilelo ya batu?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halulumeli	Honacwalo	Lwalumela	Lwa lumela luli
28. Kana kikuli konzabesi itisa lifapano zenata kapa buswa?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halulumeli	Honacwalo	Lwalumela	Lwa lumela luli
29. Mwa ziba za mulelo o aluhanya Konzabesi?	Batili	Enisha:			
30. Kana batu bakuteka milao ya konzabesi(Linzila za Lifolofolo)?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwalumela	Lwa lumela luli
31. Kana konzabesi I tiiseza ahulu yona milao ye?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwalumela	Lwa Lumela luli
32. Kana konzabesi ikuteka liswanelo za mina , Za mubu ni mafulisezo?	Halu lumeli nihainyani	Halu lumeli	Honacwalo	Lwalumela	Lwa lumela luli
33. Kana semukile mwa utwa za kusinyasinya masheleni mwa konzabesi ?	Enisha	Batili	Neibihilwe? Kini sene siezahezi?		
34. Hane mukabe nikolo yaku chinca lika mwa konzabesi , kisifu sene muka chinca?!					
35. Maikuto amina ama felelezo?					

2. Example Interview Guideline

Introduction:

- Short introduction Christian Weidner and purpose of interview
- Short introduction Interviewee
- What are your main duties in your institution? How long have you been in office?
- What are the main challenges for your work/your institution?

Conservancies:

- What are the greatest challenges for Conservancies in the Zambezi Region at the moment?
- What impact on livelihoods of local people have Conservancies had since their introduction?
- Which structures need to be in place in order to increase benefit for the communities?
- What is the role of the Traditional Authorities in the Conservancies?

Good Governance:

- Do you consider processes in Conservancies really community-based, democratic and participatory?
- How are the power relations in the Conservancies? Who makes the decisions?
- Do you think that Conservancies create new elite, a kind of rentier class with the Management Committee?
- How can Good Governance be improved?
- How can financial management be improved?
- How can transparency and information flow be improved?

Land-Use:

- Which land-use conflicts exist in Conservancies between tourism, hunting and agriculture?
- Are Communal Land Boards or TAs allocating Land in Conservancies?
- Why are people still settling and farming in Wildlife Migration Corridors?
- Which factors and structures could lead to a successful land-use plan or zonation in Conservancies?

Relationship with other Actors:

- How do you coordinate with other actors in nature conservation?
- How is your relationship with MLR?
- How is your relationship with the Regional Council?
- How is your relationship with the MET?
- How is your relationship with MAWF?

3. List of Interviews

Nr.	Code	Type	Organisation	Date
1	E1	Expert interview	MET	23.03.18
2	E2	Expert interview	MAWF	23.03.18
3	E3	Expert interview	NGO	26.03.18
4	E4	Expert interview	MLR	27.03.18
5	E5	Expert interview	MAWF	27.03.18
6	E6	Expert interview	NGO	28.03.18
7	E7	Expert interview	MET	29.03.18
8	E8	Expert interview	NAB	29.03.18
9	E9	Expert interview	NGO	29.03.18
10	E10	Expert interview	NGO	29.03.18
11	E11	Expert interview	MET	30.03.18
12	E12	Expert interview	MAWF	12.04.18
13	P1	Problem-centered interview	Professional Hunter	25.04.18
14	P2	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	25.04.18
15	P3	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	03.05.18
16	P4	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	03.05.18
17	P5	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	03.05.18
18	P6	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	03.05.18
19	E13	Expert interview	NGO	03.05.18
20	P7	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	03.05.18
21	P8	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	07.05.18
22	P9	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	07.05.18
23	P10	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	07.05.18
24	P11	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	07.05.18
25	P12	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	07.05.18
26	P13	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	07.05.18
27	E14	Expert interview	MLR	08.05.18
28	P14	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	09.05.18
29	P15	Problem-centered interview	Conservancy Representative	09.05.18
30	E15	Expert interview	NGO	09.05.18
31	E16	Expert interview	Zambezi RC	11.05.18