
Empowering communities to manage natural resources: where does the new power lie? Case studies from Namibia

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This series of Research Discussion Papers is intended to present preliminary, new or topical information and ideas for discussion and debate. The contents are not necessarily the final views or firm positions of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Comments and feedback will be welcomed.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The move to local control³

The move to local control of forests and wildlife is now well advanced. Over the last 10 to 15 years, community-based approaches to natural resource management have received considerable policy, development and research attention in most southern African countries. New and emerging policies relating to conservation and land management therefore strongly articulate the need for the participation of local people in the management of natural resources, both within communal areas and on state owned land, and place much greater emphasis on issues of equity and benefit sharing. Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has become a 'catch all' for many different approaches and models for natural resource management, from joint or co-management initiatives with government on either state land or communal land, to private sector-community partnerships (with or without the state intervention), and finally to true common property arrangements on community-owned land.

Many of the first so-called CBNRM initiatives had a conservation focus, and dealt primarily with wildlife management and biodiversity conservation through reconciling this objective with the social and economic needs of local people. Often these initiatives were linked to obtaining legitimacy for state-run protected areas. The approach has now broadened to include local level participation in forest and woodland management, rangeland management, ecotourism, catchment management and land care and rehabilitation initiatives. The focus has switched from environmental conservation *per se* to an approach that aims at realising sustainable rural livelihoods through more effective natural resource management and productive use of the resource base. Many CBNRM programmes, in particular the Natural Resource Management Programme (NRMP) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), place an emphasis on local enterprise development as an incentive and means to stimulate development based on sustainable resource use.

Despite the broad scope of CBNRM, there are, however, certain basic ideals, principles and approaches that are implicit in all CBNRM initiatives. Some of these include:

- a) Fair access to resources - resource users/rights holders should have shared rights and status
- b) Participation - resource users/local community members participate either directly or indirectly, through a legitimate and representative local institution, in resource management issues, and are involved in the planning and implementation of local initiatives
- c) Ownership - ownership or tenure of the resource/s lies with the group as

³This section is based on material from the introduction to: Empowering communities to manage natural resources: where does the new power lie? First draft/outline. By Bruce Campbell and Sheona Shackleton. 1999.

- a whole
- d) Incentives, such as an income stream from tourism and hunting exist to help promote collective action and sustainable resource use
- e) Benefits accrue to all resource users/local community members
- f) Management, regulation and decision-making occur at local level, through a legitimate and accepted local institution
- g) Management systems incorporate local knowledge, traditions and institutions
- h) The state respects local level control, and enables and facilitates its development

It is argued that the above conditions are essential for successful and sustainable local level natural resource management, as without them there is little incentive for local people to take control and responsibility and thus ensure resource conservation rather than degradation.

1.2 Power relations in CBNRM

The devolution of authority and responsibility from one level to another implies a shift of power. While the higher level might retain the power to recentralise authority and responsibility, devolution means that the lower level has gained more power than it had before. This power might be expressed in different ways. It might be control of decision-making, control of income and expenditure, distribution of jobs and contracts, improved status, etc. Within CBNRM approaches in southern Africa, authority over wildlife and tourism is being devolved to lower levels of government (Zimbabwe) or directly to local communities (Botswana and Namibia). Central government is giving up (to varying degrees) control over wildlife and tourism as resources and allowing lower levels to keep the income that can be gained from the sustainable use of these resources.

It can be expected that such a shift in power will be accompanied by competition for the benefits of that power. This competition is likely to take place at an external institutional level i.e. between the institution receiving devolved authority and existing institutions that believe their own position to be threatened. It is also likely to take place at an intra-community institutional level where interest groups are moved to try to take control of a community-based process to further their own interests.

At the external institutional level competition for power may come from the very body which is devolving authority and responsibility. Murphree (1994) points to the tendency of bureaucracies to hold on to power despite attempts at devolution. Competition might also come from traditional authorities which in all southern African countries, to a greater or lesser extent, have in the past exercised control over the use of natural resources. While their authority has been eroded, they are often fighting to retain the power that they have or re-establish the authority they have lost. In many cases, new state administrative bodies have been created which need to raise revenue and increase their status with local residents. Often a plethora of new community level institutions (development committees, water committees, womens' committees, youth committees, etc.) have emerged driven by the new participatory ideology of rural

development and the specific agendas of sectoral agencies and large donors. A lack of clarity regarding the roles of these institutions in a range of issues including land allocation and natural resource management complicates and politicises the implementation of CBNRM and results in competition for power, recognition and control that deflects away from the real target of CBNRM initiatives, the local community itself.

Another level of potential external institutional conflict is present when communities are engaged in partnerships with the private sector. Communities usually lack knowledge of the tourism and hunting industries and their respective markets. This puts the private sector in a powerful position when striking deals with community institutions.

NGOs are also a powerful group of actors in CBNRM. In many cases they are recipients of funding and are involved in facilitating the CBNRM process. They can allocate or withhold funds, they can push communities into certain decisions, they can provide material benefits and employment. If NGOs are good facilitators their role will diminish as the community's capacity increases. This is not always the case.

Within the community there will be rich, poor, men, women, young, old, cattle herders, agriculturalists, wage earners, etc. All might have competing interests in the way land is allocated and used. Some will be more able to articulate their views, organise themselves as a group and determine the outcome of decision-making, often depending on their status within the community.

A clear challenge within CBNRM is to identify whether policy and legislation truly do "empower" local communities to control decision-making over land and natural resource use and to retain the benefits from that use. Another challenge is to identify and understand the different interest groups within a particular community and assist the development of a community coalescent authority structure which subsumes and reconciles internal and sectoral divisions (Murphree 1994).

This paper investigates the power relations within selected CBNRM case studies within Namibia. It looks at the extent to which policy and legislation devolve significant control over decision-making and benefit flows directly to community institutions. It looks at the relationships between these community natural resource management institutions ("conservancies") and external institutions such as regional government and traditional authorities. The paper also examines the relationships between different groups within conservancies and the conflict that has emerged over land and conservancy boundary definition.

2. COUNTRY CONTEXT

Namibia is the most arid country south of the Sahara, with average rainfall varying from above 600 mm in the north east to less than 25 mm in the Namib Desert to the west. Rainfall is erratic both temporally and spatially leading to large localised differences in precipitation and large fluctuations annually. Drought is a regular occurrence. This is the most important factor affecting population distribution and development options.

Namibia's economy is heavily dependent on natural resources. Two-thirds of the 1.6 million population live in rural areas and are directly dependent upon the soil and living natural resources for their livelihoods (Brown 1996). In 1995, per capita GDP was US \$4 591, but income distribution is highly skewed between urban and rural households. The richest 10% of the population receive 65% of total income (UNDP 1996).

Namibia still suffers the legacy of South African colonial rule and the imposition of apartheid policies. At independence from South Africa in 1990, 40,8% of the land had been allocated to black homelands which supported a population of about 1,2 million, while 43% had been allocated to mostly white commercial farmers. 13,6% was allocated to conservation and a small percentage was unallocated State land. The former black homelands are now recognised as communal lands to which rural residents have access for the use of the land and its natural resources (although communal land ownership is vested in the State). Some resources such as wildlife and forestry have been subject to strict state controls and communal area residents had little or no legal access to these resources. Despite these controls, wildlife numbers have generally suffered huge declines in most communal areas except where long running community-based conservation projects exist such as in Kunene Region in the north west (Durbin et al, 1997). In many northern communal areas, uncontrolled cutting of trees for various purposes is prevalent and in the north-east woodland is being cleared for shifting cultivation. State regulation of wildlife and forestry products is extremely difficult to enforce due to large distances from administrative centres and lack of government resources.

In many cases traditional mechanisms of land and resource allocation and management have broken down. Under South African colonial rule, land allocation was the function of government officials, but in practise, traditional leaders believed that the land was owned by the chief or king and allocated land in terms of customary law (Corbett and Daniels 1996). However, a number of factors, including post-independence government policy, have eroded this *de facto* allocation of land by traditional leaders. The erosion of the power and status of traditional leaders has contributed to the development of 'open access' situations on much of Namibia's communal land.

3. CASE STUDY AREAS

Two case study areas have been selected in Namibia, the Kunene Region in the arid north west and the Caprivi Region in the wetter north east. Within the Kunene Region attention is focused on one emerging and two established communal area 'conservancies'. In Caprivi data is provided for one established and three emerging conservancies. A communal area conservancy consists of a legally constituted group of communal farmers who have pooled their resources to manage and benefit from wildlife and tourism on their communal land. The government gives rights over wildlife and tourism to communities that meet prescribed conditions for forming a conservancy (for more detail see section 5).

3.1 Kunene Region

In Kunene Region human population densities are less than one person per square kilometre, reflecting the arid conditions. The *Sesfontein* emerging conservancy and the *Torra* Conservancy (registered by government in 1998) fall within the pro-Namib and Namib desert proper below the escarpment of the central southern African plateau. Rainfall varies from about 50 mm in the west to about 240 mm in the east. The economy of the region is confined mainly to semi-nomadic pastoralism or sedentary livestock farming at low stocking rates. Residents of *Sesfontein* conservancy consist of Herero, Himba, Damara and Nama ethnic groups and the *Torra* conservancy consists mainly of Damara and Riemvasmaker people with some Hereros. The population mix and distribution has been affected by forced removals and relocations imposed by successive colonial governments. According to Durbin et al (1997:1) "The consequence has been frequent inter-group tensions and rivalries, tenure insecurity and leadership instability, factors which militate against an easy transition to effective and efficient local organisation. The fact that the ecology and economy of the area dictate dispersed household settlement further exacerbates social cohesion and creates logistic problems for collective decision-making." Both conservancies are attracting increasing numbers of tourists seeking to enjoy a combination of spectacular desert scenery and large mammals not normally associated with desert habitats such as elephant, black rhinoceros and giraffe.

The #*Khoadi //hoas* Conservancy (registered 1998) lies between the commercial farmland on its eastern border (rainfall 300 mm) and the escarpment in the west (240 mm). The main economic activity is sedentary livestock farming, although some movement takes place during times of drought. The population comprises mostly Damara-speakers, with some Hereros. Despite constraints to social organisation similar to those experienced by the *Sesfontein* and *Torra* conservancies, the community has been relatively well organised since the early 1990s through a strong Farmers' Association. The area does not have the same tourism potential as *Sesfontein* and *Torra*, and wildlife is less, although elephant numbers are increasing.

3.2 Caprivi Region

The Caprivi Region, in the north-east of Namibia stretches between Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Caprivi is the best watered part of Namibia with the amount of rainfall increasing from west to east. The rainy season can extend to five months (November - March) and may reach a total precipitation of more than 600 mm a year. Temperatures are among the highest in Namibia, ranging from a daily average of 10°C in winter to 39°C in summer. Caprivi's sub-humid climate dictates vegetation characterised by forest savanna and woodland.

The Caprivi region has a population of 90 400, on a total surface of approximately 19 532 kilometers, giving a population density of 4.2 people per square kilometer. The population density is considerably higher than the national average of 1.69 persons per square kilometer. There is a total of 18 000 households in the region, with an average household size of 4.6.

This paper focuses on the eastern part of Caprivi Region between the Kwando River in the west and the Zambezi in the east. Data has been gathered from the *Salambala* Conservancy and the *Kwandu, Mayuni and Wuparo* emerging conservancies.

Caprivi is particularly riven by ethnic divisions. The dominant group on the eastern floodplains is the Basubia, who are generally believed to support the ruling political party, SWAPO. For many years the western part of eastern Caprivi was dominated by the Mafwe, a coalition of several different tribal groups, generally supporting the opposition DTA. More recently the Mafwe have fragmented and the government has recognised a new traditional authority, that of the MaYeyi under Chief Sifu. Another breakaway group under Chief Mayuni operates more or less autonomously of the Mafwe, but has yet to be recognised by government. The breakaway groups are said to be more sympathetic to SWAPO.

Politics in Caprivi have been complicated by the recent activity of secessionists which initially led to the flight to Botswana of many Mafwe including the head of the group, Chief Mamili. More recently a failed armed rebellion by the secessionists led to 47 Caprivians being charged with high treason. The secessionist group was led by a former DTA leader who comes from Caprivi.

The tribal conflicts, overlaid by differing allegiances to political parties and the politics of secession have made it difficult to encourage the formation of community institutions for collective decision-making over natural resource management.

The *Salambala* conservancy was registered in 1998. It is based around the mainly uninhabited Salambala forest, a former hunting area of the Basubia Chiefs. The wildlife had mostly disappeared by 1989 when the Basubia tribal authority requested the conservation authorities to develop the area as a game reserve. The government refused the request because of the lack of wildlife and the community opted for forming a conservancy once appropriate legislation had been passed in 1996. Due to greater protection by the community, wildlife is beginning to return, and a number of species have recently been re-introduced. The conservancy has developed a campsite for tourists using the main tourist route from Namibia to Chobe in Botswana and the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. The conservancy has a small quota for trophy hunting including elephant.

The emerging *Kwandu* Conservancy falls within the Mafwe area and suffered a major setback when the chairman of its management committee and other office bearers fled with the secessionists. It is situated on the Kwando river opposite the Caprivi Game Reserve, which is its main tourism and wildlife resource. To the east, the conservancy is bounded by a State Forest Reserve. Changes in forestry policy offer the opportunity for developing some form of co-management arrangement with the forestry authorities.

The emerging *Mayuni* conservancy consists of a breakaway group from the Mafwe and conservancy formation has been driven largely by Chief Mayuni and his indunas. The conservancy borders the *Kwandu* conservancy in the north and is also on the Kwando River opposite the Caprivi Game Park. Residents of both conservancies suffer from

elephants and hippos that raid their crops. The *Mayuni* conservancy has several prime tourism sites along the Kwando floodplain.

The *Wuparo* conservancy has been formed by the Yeyi breakaway group from the Mafwe. It borders the Mamili National Park and wildlife moves freely from the park into the conservancy. Elephants and lions are problems for residents. The proximity of the park provides several tourism opportunities for the conservancy.

4. METHODS

The data from Kunene is drawn from several years of involvement by the first author in CBNRM activities in the region and recent community questionnaire surveys, and research carried out for the Community Conservation in Africa Project of the Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester.

The data from Caprivi is based on the field experience of the second author, and data collected over the past four years in various conservancies in the study area. Data has been gathered from in-depth baseline surveys, using formal questionnaires, focus groups and workshops. Information from a study thesis by the second author (Mosimane, 1998a) conducted in the study area is also used in the paper.

5. THE POWER OF THE CENTRAL STATE - LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS

In the late 1960s the pre-independence government gave to white commercial farmers limited and conditional ownership over certain species of wildlife and the right to use others on their farms. This led to an 80% increase of wildlife between 1972 and 1992 on commercial farmland (Barnes and de Jager 1995) as farmers had control over wildlife as a resource and could benefit financially from use of the resource (Barnard 1999). Due to the prevailing *apartheid* ideology in pre-Independence Namibia, these rights were never given to black communal farmers. In most communal areas, wildlife numbers declined considerably due to poaching by the South African military, government officials and local residents. ✓

With Independence in 1990 and a commitment to democratic government, changes in wildlife policy and legislation took place which gave communal residents the same rights and conditional ownership over wildlife as commercial farmers (MET 1995a, MET 1995b, GRN 1996a, GRN 1996b) These rights are given to communal area residents who form a conservancy. In order to form a conservancy, a community needs to define its membership, define its physical boundaries, elect a representative committee, agree on a plan for the equitable distribution of benefits and adopt a legally recognised constitution.

Once a conservancy is registered by government it receives conditional ownership over hutable game (kudu, springbok, oryx, warthog, buffalo and bushpig), and use rights over other species through a permit system. A communal area conservancy can register as a hunting farm in order to gain rights to trophy hunting and the legislation gives a conservancy rights to tourism activities on its land (see section 8). The

government sets trophy hunting quotas in consultation with conservancies, and even though not stipulated in law, the government also sets quotas for the use of huntable game. (This contrasts with the approach on commercial land where farmers may use as much huntable game as they please.) The government also retains the right to withdraw conservancy status if it believes this to be necessary. Despite the conditional nature of ownership, and government control over quota setting, Namibia has the strongest policy and legal framework in southern Africa that devolves authority over wildlife and tourism directly to community-level institutions.

Even though good policy and legislation may exist, there can be large differences between the stated intent of government and how bureaucracies apply this intent in practise. In the case of Namibia the government conservation agency, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) is generally supportive of the conservancy approach. It has information/extension agents who in some regions spend a large amount of their time working with emerging conservancies and supporting existing ones. There is a set procedure for communities to apply for conservancy status which is being used and followed, and the application process is overseen by a technical committee which evaluates conservancy applications. The committee deploys staff to investigate issues in the field if there appear to be problems with a particular application.

However, active support for conservancies within much of the conservation bureaucracy is only a relatively recent development. It has increased with the process of post-independence transformation within the MET and with the approval of policy and legislation. In the early days of CBNRM in Namibia, many conservation officials were sceptical of the approach and little field support was given to NGOs and communities.

The Directorate of Forestry (DoF) in the MET has developed draft legislation which makes provision for the creation of Community Forest Committees with attributes similar to those of conservancies. Community Forest Committees would gain rights to manage and benefit from designated community forests. Although the legislation has not been approved, the DoF has concluded a community forest agreement with one community in northern Namibia. A policy decision has been taken with MET that conservancies and community forest committees should not be set up in competition.

The DoF is supporting forestry activity within the *Salambala* conservancy in Caprivi for example. It still needs to be seen however, how the two approaches will in fact be integrated once the forestry legislation has been approved by Parliament.

6. LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

In rural Namibia there is no state local governance structure below the regional level. The country is divided into 13 regions each with its Regional Council made up of elected councillors and headed by a governor elected by the majority of councillors. Some of the regions cover large parts of the country and villages may be hundreds of kilometres from the administrative centre of the region.

Currently the Regional Councils have few powers and no revenue generating authority. However, a new decentralisation policy aims at transferring a large part of central government functions (including conservation and wildlife management) to the councils along with budgets and staff. Implementation of this policy is slow and while some ministries already have decentralised structures, some central Ministries are opposed to losing control to the regions.

The councils are encouraged to form regional development committees with satellite committees at village level. The regional councils have a minimal role in conservancy formation, being required by law only to endorse the application of conservancies for registration, after familiarisation with developments in the concerned area. The regional structures of government are not involved in the management and utilisation of wildlife and other natural resources in the conservancy. There is little institutional competition between regional councils and conservancies at present, although some individual councillors appear to feel some of their status is being threatened.

Generally in Namibia during colonial times and post-independence there has been an erosion of the powers and authority of traditional leadership. Traditional control over natural resource use has been eroded by past centralisation of decision making. The *de facto* rights of traditional leaders over land allocation will be eroded by proposed Land Boards although representatives of chiefs will play a role on these. Recent legislation has restored some authority over natural resources to traditional leaders, but does not define the scope of this authority.

The conservancy management committee is the highest authority at community level in the management of the conservancy and, in the absence of administrative units below the Region, the lowest governance structure in the study areas. The Conservancy Management Committee (CMC), consist of elected representatives of sub-villages or areas. In some cases representatives are elected from anywhere within the conservancy rather than from a specific village. The representatives at village level are elected by the village residents and the village headmen. The election of representatives and the period of service is spelled out in the conservancy constitution which is developed and approved by the residents of the conservancy.

The conservancy management committee deals directly with the relevant departments in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) regarding the management and utilisation of natural resources.

In both Kunene and Caprivi the traditional authorities also have representation at village level. In Kunene headmen and headman's councillors form the lowest level, while the King's Council forms the ultimate authority among some groups.

In Caprivi headmen (*Induna ya Munzi*) form the lowest level. In conjunction with the village representative, the village headmen ensure proper representation of their people. The highest level, the *khuta* (overall tribal authority), is also represented on the conservancy management committee, to ensure that the *khuta* is always well informed about the developments and activities of the conservancy. Since the *khutas*

have initiated most of the conservancies established in the Caprivi region they also have an influence on the composition of the management committees. The control and influence are maintained by recommending a loyal candidate for the chairmanship of the conservancy management committee. Therefore, the control of the traditional authority (*Khuta*) on the management of wildlife resources and other natural resources cannot be underestimated.

7. NGO INVOLVEMENT

NGOs provide a number of services within Namibia's CBNRM programme. A Namibian NGO, Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation, (a pioneer of community-based conservation in southern Africa) is the main implementing agency in Kunene and Caprivi regions. Funding and technical assistance is provided by the USAID-funded Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project administered by a consortium of international and Namibian NGOs. Overall programme direction is given by the CBNRM Association of Namibia (CAN). NGOs are also involved in community-based tourism, fund administration and training. A description of NGO activities is provided in Annexe 2.

Generally NGOs working directly with communities are providing what has been called consistent and persistent "light touch" community empowerment and facilitation (Hitchcock and Murphree 1995; Jones forthcoming). This approach involves working directly with communities and not only through local government institutions or traditional leaders. It includes regular visits to the communities concerned, staying in touch with community power shifts and internal dynamics, follow-ups to workshops, sending of messages to community members through word-of-mouth and other means, and spending a few nights in villages on occasion. It requires assisting communities to identify key issues and potential problems, helping them to work through these issues and then to develop appropriate decisions, solutions and actions. Usually facilitation staff live in the regions where they are working, but even if they are based in the capital, will visit communities at least once a month. At the same time, although regular contact is maintained and communities may be "nudged" into taking action, facilitators are not taking decisions for or on behalf of communities. The "nudging" is usually to get people to follow up and act on their own decisions. It is difficult to strike this balance however, and for NGOs not to become the community's gatekeeper to the outside world. Generally, implementing NGOs are striking this balance in Namibia mindful of an occasion when a San community threw out two senior NGO staff whom the community accused of taking too many decisions on its behalf.

8. THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURS

Entrepreneurs operate at different levels in the Namibian case study areas. A number of lodges have been developed by operators from within the mainstream tourism industry and local residents are beginning to develop their own enterprises. The conservancy legislation gives conservancies rights over "non-consumptive" wildlife use

and part of the definition in the legislation of "non-consumptive" includes for recreational purposes. This is much weaker than the intention of the policy makers which was to give conservancies concessionary rights over commercial tourism and which was expressed in the Policy on Community-based Tourism (MET 1995b). The lack of a strong right to tourism concessions provides an arena of potential conflict.

This conflict has begun to emerge over the issue of rights to business sites or tourism enterprise development. Under current legislation dating from pre-independence, entrepreneurs wishing to establish a business on communal land require a sort of lease called a **Permission To Occupy (PTO)** from the Ministry of Lands, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. All PTOs require the endorsement of the local headman and Regional Governor. Tourism PTOs also require a recommendation from the MET, which has taken a policy decision not to recommend new PTOs in emerging conservancies. This policy was adopted because the private sector was taking up prime lodge sites prior to conservancies being registered limiting the options of the conservancies to choose their own development sites and their own private sector partners.

Where conservancies have concluded contracts with the private sector they are becoming business entities themselves, with accounts reflecting expenditure on running costs and income from their contracts. At this stage conservancies have yet to re-invest income in new business opportunities, but this remains a future possibility. Private operators are increasingly becoming tourism and safari hunting partners of conservancies, providing capital, expertise and market access. *Torra* conservancy concluded a deal with a Namibian photographic safari company for an up-market lodge and currently covers 40% of its running costs. *#Khoadi //hoas* and *Sesfontein* conservancies are negotiating with established tourism concession holders on their land, now that the concession holders have agreed to government ceding its position as lessee to the conservancies. Generally private operators seem to accept the legitimacy of the conservancies. Profits appear to be high enough and there appear to be sufficient other important benefits for lodge operators to believe it worthwhile to work with communities (Ashley and Jones forthcoming). However, the time might come when conservancies are able to manage their own tourism businesses and will compete directly with the established industry.

Particularly in the *Sesfontein* Conservancy, individuals are beginning to recognise the possibilities for income generation through tourism and a number of small campsites and traditional villages are being developed, some with NGO support others with little outside assistance. This has led to some conflict where individual entrepreneurs see conservancies as seeking to prevent development and have resisted working through the conservancies (Davis and Jacobsohn 1999). NGOs argue that a reason for working through conservancies is that all tourism enterprises are taking place on communal land and if parcels of land (even though small) are taken up by lodges, campsites and traditional villages there is an opportunity cost to other land users. There should thus be some form of fee or levy paid to the community in compensation for the loss of the use of this land. Another reason is that conservancies are trying to co-ordinate tourism development and ensure the sustainable use of the tourism resource.

Some conservancies are trying to resolve this tension between collective rights and interests and individual rights and interest by establishing tourism development plans. These plans will encourage the establishment of enterprises in a way that is ecologically and socially sustainable as well as ensuring that development is appropriate to the regional product being offered and supply does not outstrip demand. Conservancies in Kunene and Caprivi have agreed that they themselves should apply for all PTOs within their boundaries and that individual entrepreneurs should enter into mutually acceptable contracts with the conservancies (Davis and Jacobsohn Ibid.)

In Caprivi there is currently less conflict between individuals and conservancies. Much of the craft production is carried out in an organised manner with the Caprivi Arts and Cultural Association buying up and marketing the bulk of what is produced by individual craftsmen and women. The Rossing Foundation also has an arts and crafts outlet in Windhoek which buys crafts from Caprivi. IRDNC have assisted the development of the Mashu Craft Centre which markets local crafts from the Kwando River area in Caprivi.

Women are involved in weaving baskets from palm leaves and making mats. The Community Resource Monitors (CRMs), assist women with techniques of harvesting palm leaves sustainably and cultivating their own palm trees in their backyards. In conservancies, local crafts markets are better organised, with the support of IRDNC. Due to lack of conservancy level natural resource management plans, traditional rules are controlling the harvesting of palm leaves in the conservancies. The natural resource management plans will have rules which regulate the harvesting of natural resources within the conservancy. These rules will be enforced by the CRMs and Community Game Guards (CGGs) who patrol the conservancy. There are traditional rules to regulate harvesting of other tree resources, but these rules are not respected or implemented by any organisation.

In *Mayuni* conservancy, the entrepreneurs are individual households which harvest thatching grass to sell to a commercial thatching company from Okahandja some 1000km away from Caprivi (Katjiua 1998). The individual households harvest grass to sell to a local representative of the company, once the trucks arrive to collect the grass. There are no rules to regulate the harvesting of grass, however the traditional authorities continue to make people aware of the consequences of burning grass. Like the harvesting of tree products it is expected that with the development of a natural resource management plan, rules will be put in place to control harvesting.

Safari operators in Caprivi deal directly with the Conservancy Management Committee (CMC) of the particular conservancy. In *Salambala* Conservancy where the management committee has been dealing with safari operators, communities were properly informed and consulted through their representatives and the traditional structures. In *Mayuni* Conservancy, safari operators are dealing with the chief and the traditional council (*khuta*), in the absence of a functional conservancy management committee. Communities in this conservancy are not well informed about tourism developments in their conservancy, such as building lodges and campsites.

9. TRADITIONAL VS MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES - WHO HAS THE POWER?

Although the power and authority of traditional leadership has been officially eroded, most rural Namibians, particularly older people, still respect chiefs and their headmen. Traditional leaders still play an important role in local decision-making in many areas. In Kunene Region the traditional leaders find their previous roles threatened by the emergence of new institutions such as the Regional Council, regional and local development committees and conservancies. This has led to some friction over who controls decision-making.

To some extent, potential friction between traditional leaders and the Regional Council has been avoided because many councillors in Kunene Region are also chiefs or headmen. However the emergence of conservancies has led to a redefinition of the role of headmen in relation to wildlife use and tourism development. The success of the community game guard system developed in Kunene Region in the mid 1980s rested largely on the commitment and support of local headmen who did not want to see wildlife disappear from their land. They appointed men from the community (often ex poachers) to act as game guards on behalf of the headman and his community. The game guards reported to the headman, who would decide whether to deal with a poaching case himself, or refer it to government conservation officers. Community hunting of surplus game was allowed in Kunene Region based on quotas allocated according to headman's wards and the hunting permit was allocated to the headman. This game guard system and the community hunting helped boost the status and authority of the headmen.

However, with the emergence of conservancies, the responsibility for the game guards and decisions concerning wildlife use have shifted to conservancy committees often made up of younger people including women. Conservancy committee members benefit through receipt of travel and sitting allowances, training, attendance at workshops and exposure to other countries. In the *Torra* and *Sesfontein* Conservancies the headmen began to argue that they had started community conservation in the area but now all the benefits were going to others. In order to ensure their support for conservancies, the committees co-opted headmen as non-voting members of the committees and "patrons" of the conservancies who would act as a watchdog for the community (Jones forthcoming).

In the *#Khoadi //hoas* Conservancy a headman failed to gain a position on the committee in community elections. His response was to negotiate a private deal to sell game from the conservancy to a safari operator. The committee in turn responded by making the headman an honorary member of the committee. In the *Sesfontein* Conservancy, at least one headman appears to view the emerging conservancy as a threat to his own patronage in terms of advising government where tourism development can take place and in terms of developing his own enterprises. He has attacked the integrity of the conservancy committee publicly and given little support to conservancy formation.

Interestingly community members in *Torra*, and *Sesfontein* conservancies clearly believe that the wildlife belongs to them collectively (Jones 1999a and 1999b). In none of the conservancies did many respondents believe the wildlife belonged to the traditional leaders as represented by the King's Council.

In Caprivi, the traditional structures and the modern administrative structures (i.e. the conservancy management committee) are integrated in all conservancies. The traditional structures have a representation in the conservancy management committee. At village level, the village representatives work in cooperation with the village headmen (*Induna ya Munzi*). However, the traditional structures command much more respect than the conservancy management committee in all conservancies.

In *Mayuni* Conservancy the traditional structure, the traditional council in particular, takes decisions regarding the conservancy activities such as tourism development, due to the immaturity of the conservancy management committee structure. Generally, people align themselves to the traditional structures which they are familiar with. The modern administrative structures are not well established and the village representatives themselves are not sure which villages they represent in *Mayuni* Conservancy.

In *Kwandu* and *Wuparo* conservancies, the management committees are in developing stage, and the traditional structures are part of the management. *Salambala* Conservancy is the only conservancy within the study area which shows strong development of modern administrative structures. The administrative structures in *Salambala* conservancy are widely accepted and respected. These structures have not yet developed a natural resource management plan which will have rules regulating access, management and utilisation of resources. Traditional rules are still in use which links the administrative and traditional structures. However, traditional rules are not adhered to, and are not enforced as well. State rules are incorporated in the administrative structure and are not enforced by government institutions. Government institutions are mostly involved on invitation by the community administrative structures.

10. GRASSROOTS OR EXTENSIONS OF THE STATE - WHO MAKES AND ENFORCES THE RULES?

The CBNRM programme in Namibia is essentially a grassroots programme. The people who are in the management committee are local community members, appointed to represent villages within the conservancy. Decisions are taken by the elected management committee of the conservancy in consultation with village representatives and traditional authorities. The management committees take decisions about day-to-day administrative matters and purchases of small equipment for the running of the conservancy. Major decisions on issues such as benefit distribution and spending on major capital items will be referred to the community either at the conservancy AGM or at special meetings. The AGM and special meetings are attended by conservancy members, and the constitutions of the conservancies set quorums for

such meetings.

Although this is the general picture of decision-making, there is obviously differentiation in performance by individual conservancy committees. In Caprivi conservancies and in *Sesfontein*, the system of village representation facilitates communication and the flow of information between the committee and members. Village representatives on the committee are expected to report back to members after each committee meeting. In others such as *Torra* and *#Khoadi //hoas* representatives have been chosen on merit from the whole conservancy and so do not have a specific local "constituency". In order to help committees monitor decision-making and communication with members, facilitating NGOs carry out participatory Conservancy Management Profiles with conservancy committees and commission attitude surveys among conservancy members.

The results of these surveys (see Annexe 1) indicate a high degree of ownership and awareness of the conservancies in general. They also reveal some areas where conservancy management committees need to improve their performance.

In Kunene Region surveys (Jones 1999a and Jones 1999b) show that residents have a high degree of awareness of the conservancies and large majorities believe the committees represent their interests or are doing an average to good job. In *Torra* and *Sesfontein* participation by residents in conservancy activities is high, but in *#Khoadi //hoas* less than half of respondents said a member of their household had participated in conservancy activities. In all conservancies, residents said they needed more information and feedback.

Communities in *Kwandu*, *Mayuni*, *Wuparo* and *Salambala* conservancies in Caprivi believe "the conservancy belongs to the community, and is a community initiative to conserve" (Mosimane, 1997, 1998a, 1998b 1999a and 1999b). During the surveys conducted in Caprivi, communities showed a strong sense of ownership over the conservancies, and the traditional authority was also seen to have ownership of the conservancies. The involvement of non-governmental organisations in conservancy awareness and support to establish administrative structures sometimes made the community members believe that the NGOs own the conservancies. These perceptions change once the administrative structures become strong and independent, and NGOs become less involved in the activities of the conservancies.

The survey in *Mayuni* conservancy indicated lower levels of feedback and information to residents and just more than half said they were not represented by the management committee. This demonstrates that the flow of information from the management committee to the respective villages in the conservancy is not yet effective and well established. People do not yet have a say in the decisions and are not even aware of the activities of the management committee. The committee itself did not have clear understanding of the village representation and the activities they could embark on. The current constitution of the conservancy was developed by the chief and a committee tasked to develop the constitution.

Communities in the conservancies always refer to the existence of traditional rules which regulate the use and access to natural resources (Katjiua 1998, Mosimane 1998a, 1998b & 1999a, 1999b). Several traditional norms were mentioned as rules, and it was generally believed by the traditional authority that all members of the particular conservancy are aware of the rules. In *Mayuni* and *Wuparo* conservancies traditional rules are enforced through the Anti-Poaching Units (APUs) formed by the traditional authorities and the management committees of the two conservancies. However, these rules in many cases were not adhered to and no cases could be mentioned where rules were enforced in all the conservancies in the study area.

The conservancy management committee is expected to have a natural resource management plan which will have rules regulating the management and utilisation of all resources within the conservancy boundaries. The rules from the administrative structures, in the natural resource management plan will be developed from the traditional rules and will also aim to include entrepreneurs in the conservancies in the study area. Rules will be developed through administrative and traditional structures, in consultation with residents in each conservancy, to make the rules specific to the resource and resource needs in the conservancy. The rules will be from grassroots administrative structures and the government only provides guidelines.

Neither the regional nor the central structures of the state have influence in the formation or management of conservancies, except for approving the applications for registration as conservancies. Non-governmental organisations are playing the leading role in facilitating conservancy formation and in some cases the driving force within the community is the traditional authority. Conservancies in the Caprivi study area were initiated by the traditional authorities. For example, in *Mayuni* Conservancy, where the administrative structures are not yet well functional the traditional authority takes decisions. Generally, the regional councillors in their constituencies assist and encourage people to support formation of the conservancies. They view conservancies as a way of bringing development to their respective constituencies. The regional councillors have no official role to play in the formation of the conservancy. The regional governor has to approve the formation of conservancies in the region, through signing their application forms. This process is facilitated by the councillor of the constituency where the conservancy is being established.

*Lees Taxes for
independent region 2% Govt
share*

Again, there have been exceptions. In the case of *Salambala* conservancy, the former (DTA) Governor of Caprivi refused to endorse the conservancy application because four families objected to the conservancy using a part of the Salambala forest as a core wildlife area. The central government took the view that the conservancy and the development of the core area had been approved by more than 2 000 residents and should not be held up by a small minority. The MET approved the conservancy without the Governor's signature. It is a matter for speculation whether the Minister of Environment and Tourism would have so easily overridden a Governor from his own party.

Wildlife hunting quotas in conservancies are set by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism in consultation with the management committee of the concerned registered

conservancy. Only registered conservancies qualify for a hunting quota. The quota is given directly to the management committee of the conservancy that applied for a hunting quota. Loss of crops and livestock to predators are still high in almost all the Caprivi conservancies (Mosimane 1996, 1998b 1999a and 1999b). These problems sometimes make community members argue for more elephants to be hunted in order to reduce crop losses in the conservancies. Problem animals are reported to the Community Game Guards (CGGs), who in turn inform the management committee of the conservancy and the Game Rangers of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The CGGs and ministry rangers then take a decision on how to control the problem animal.

11. WHERE DO THE BENEFITS GO? - AND WHO MANAGES? AND WHO DECIDES ON THESE?

Any revenue from wildlife and tourism goes directly to the management committee of the particular conservancy. Once a conservancy has a hunting quota the management committee enters into an agreement with a professional hunter and money is paid directly to the management committee. No portion of the revenue from hunting and tourism is required to be sent to the central government (Christoffersen and Johnson 1997). The residents of the conservancies decide how the revenues should be distributed at conservancy AGMs. The management committee of each conservancy has to develop a benefit distribution plan in consultation with conservancy members. A portion of income will be kept for household dividends or community projects and a portion for running costs. A number of conservancy administrative and personnel costs, such as community game guards, community resource monitors and community development facilitators, are currently covered by facilitating NGOs. Those conservancies receiving regular income are beginning to take over these costs.

The management committee can also decide *how* the overall conservancy quota can be used. Some wildlife might be sold as part of a smaller trophy hunting quota, but some might be reserved for hunting by community members, while some animals could be sold live to game farms. The committee could also decide not to use any wildlife in a particular year.

In Kunene Region, the *Torra* Conservancy is the most advanced in terms of income generation. Through a joint venture agreement with a Namibian safari company, the conservancy earned N\$242 736 (US\$40 456) between 1996 and 1998 in fees and levies from the development of an upmarket tourism lodge. A further N\$419 297 (US\$69 882) went to local people in wages and N\$39 175 (US\$6 529) on the purchase of services such as laundry and firewood provision. In 1998 the company spent N\$16 502 (2 750) on training for local staff (Ashley and Jones forthcoming). The conservancy recently completed a benefits distribution plan which should be implemented this year. A recent survey (Jones 1999a) indicated that most residents wanted income to be spent on community projects rather than on households dividends.

The *Sesfontein* conservancy has yet to receive direct income from wildlife and tourism although residents earn wages from two lodges in the area and a number of local

people run campsites and traditional villages. The conservancy committee is negotiating with existing lodges for the payment of fees and levies once it is registered. Residents also favour the use of conservancy revenue for community projects (Jones 1999a).

The #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy negotiated a trophy hunting contract with a professional hunter for 1998, but the hunter failed to carry out any hunting and the contract was terminated. The conservancy committee is negotiating a joint venture with an existing tourism concession holder. A recent survey (Jones 1999b) showed that residents wanted conservancy income to be spent on community projects. Elephant damage in the conservancy is considerable and there is widespread fear of elephants.

The conservancy plans to spend part of its future income on an Elephant Emergency Fund to compensate people for elephant damage.

Salambala Conservancy is in the process of finalising their benefit distribution plan in consultation with the community. The 1998/99 trophy hunting contract is worth N\$180 000 (US\$30 000) and by July 1999, the conservancy had earned N\$10 000 (US\$1 666) from the community campsite which opened late in 1998. In future the revenue will also be used for the operations of the conservancy, and the management committee will have to work out a formula of distribution. Presently, operational costs are carried by a grant from the LIFE Project, but for sustainability of conservancies the management committee will gradually take over some of the costs.

Due to the high population in the conservancy the management committee has decided they will invest the revenue from the conservancy in community projects identified by the community. A management committee member said, "households' dividends will be very insignificant, therefore this method of distribution is not considered". A decision has not yet been taken when to start considering projects from the community for funding, and how the rest of the money will be used. Households within the conservancy receive meat from the elephants shot by the trophy hunter in the area.

In *Mayuni* Conservancy a benefit distribution plan is not yet developed, revenues are currently being received by the traditional authorities. The traditional authority receives an estimated N\$2 000 (US\$333) a month from the tourist lodges and hunting camp in their conservancy. The money is being utilised to pay anti-poaching staff working for the conservancy a stipend, but it is not clear what the rest of the money is used for. *Mayuni* Conservancy is in the process of registering with the government, to be able to benefit from a wildlife hunting quota they could sell for revenue.

The survey of 1999 indicates that crop damage by elephants remains a significant challenge for the conservancy. 56% of the survey respondents stated that within the past three years they have lost 75% or more of their crops to elephants (Mosimane 1999). A village *induna* said, "we are losing crops to wildlife each year, but so far we never received compensation, and people suffer as a result". There is unhappiness amongst people who suffer from crop losses by elephants and the fact that no compensation has been forthcoming from the traditional authority, the conservancy management committee or the government.

Wuparo and Kwandu Conservancies are not yet registered with the government, and have not yet been able to generate revenue. The conservancy has not yet developed benefit distribution plans.

12. COMMUNITY DIFFERENTIATION - ARE THERE SECTORS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY WHO APPROPRIATE THE VALUE?

There are always social, political and economic differences within a community, even though they have a homogeneous culture. In *Salambala*, conservancy formation was resisted by four families, who other residents said were driven partly by tribal and political motives. In Omusati Region, outside of the case study areas, a conservancy has been opposed by wealthy cattle owners, who fear loss of grazing. In both these cases, a feature of the conservancy has been the demarcation of land to be used for wildlife re-introduction leading to a loss of access to the land by various stakeholders.

At *Sesfontein* it has proved difficult to build and maintain consensus among different ethnic groups, people living in scattered villages and between people of the same ethnic group, but with allegiances to different headmen. The emergence of minority factions opposed to the conservancy for various reasons has delayed conservancy formation considerably. An application from the conservancy management committee is currently with government. It remains to be seen whether government follows a similar line as it did with *Salambala* and rules that the will of an overwhelming majority should prevail.

In the Kunene conservancies, conflict has begun to emerge between the youth and the conservancy committees (Jones forthcoming; Jones 1999b). In *Torra*, *Sesfontein* and *#Khoadi /hoas* young people have been encouraged to form their own youth development committees by the Ministry of Youth and Sport. These committees have no powers and no funding and are looking for something to do. They have been challenging the conservancy committees, questioning their representativeness and their actions. In *Sesfontein* a group of young people from one community allied themselves with the headman who was also challenging the conservancy (see section 9. above).

The conservancy management committees have responded to the challenge from the youth by holding meetings with them, specifically targeting them with information on the conservancy activities and in the case of *Torra* prioritising job-creation that targets the youth.

The role of women in community-based conservation in Kunene Region has changed considerably since the initial development of the game guard programme, which was based on the authority of male headmen and involved the appointment of male game guards. Early meetings to discuss wildlife conservation almost invariably involved men only and attempts to include women were rebuffed with the response that this was not culturally acceptable. Women might sit on the periphery of meetings but would not participate. However, with the shift in focus to institutional development that

accompanied the conservancy approach, women have been playing a much more direct role in community organisation and decision-making (Davis and Jacobsohn 1999). They have taken on roles as "community development activators" with the primary task of ensuring that women are involved in CBNRM and conservancy decisions and activities. Women are represented on all conservancy management committees in Kunene Region. Davis and Jacobsohn quote a woman from Caprivi on an exchange visit to Kunene communities: "The most important thing I learned was that women can organise and chair meetings. I have never seen a woman do that before."

In Kunene there is little focus as yet on resources used by women, however in Caprivi, communities have appointed women resource monitors. The resource monitors play a role in community organisation but also monitor use of resources such as veld food and thatching grass. Women are also represented on conservancy committees.

The way in which income is distributed can have a significant impact on some sections of the community. Although most communities in Kunene seem to favour spending income on community projects, dividends which might be given to a specific poor household would mean more to the household, than money being given to a community project. Projects which might be funded from the conservancy might only benefit some people, and be irrelevant to other members of the conservancy.

The benefit in terms of employment and income derived from the conservancy to a member of a household will make a difference to that household. With high unemployment and lack of development in the study areas, people are looking to the conservancies for employment. Households deriving cash from the conservancy through employment or dividends, makes the conservancy programme more attractive to the particular household. Although cash earnings per household from CBNRM activities in Namibia have been relatively small they "are nevertheless *highly significant because much is earned by cash-strapped households for whom only a few hundred dollars can make a substantial difference*" (Ashley 1998: 17, original italics).

It is too early in the Namibian CBNRM programme to see how intra-community differences are being reflected in the receipt and management of benefits to conservancies and this is an area for which further research will be required.

13. CONFLICT OVER LAND AND BOUNDARIES

Although, the conservancy policy and legislation only confer resource rights, the approach is also linked to land access. The policy expects communities to define themselves and agree boundaries with neighbours. This often exacerbates existing conflict over land and resources and causes delays in conservancy formation. Disputes over boundaries between *Torra* and *#Khoadi //hoas* conservancies took a number of meetings and attempts at mediation before the conflict could be resolved. The dispute was over an area rich in wildlife resources. *Torra* was also involved in a dispute with another emerging conservancy which also needed mediation to resolve. Pragmatically *Torra* and the other conservancies pragmatically decided to leave out the disputed areas from their conservancy applications pending a later settlement. In

Sesfontein it took nearly three years for the community to define itself. In the process, one group of people isolated geographically from the rest of the community, decided to form their own conservancy, despite being linked to the bigger community through a number of factors including traditional leadership.

A border dispute between the Kwandu and Mayuni conservancies threatened to delay conservancy formation but has also been pragmatically resolved.

In most cases conservancy formation is being based on social units of people who decide that they are a "community" because of historical ties, access to a certain area of land linked to headmanship, etc. However, communities also need to take into account the issue of appropriate ecological scale for managing certain resources. Elephant move over wide areas and most other important game species in the Kunene Region move according to good rains. In *Sesfontein* this has been made more difficult because previous ethnic administrative borders cut through the area that people believed encompassed one "community". Some people living in certain villages have not shared the same sense of "community" and were reluctant to join the conservancy.

A process of conservancies expanding and shrinking can be expected to continue as communities over time find the appropriate social scale at which community organisation is desirable and practical and the ecological scale at which resource management is necessary and practical. It can also be expected that in the north west in particular, conservancies will join together to manage highly mobile resources such elephant (Jones forthcoming).

14. ATTITUDES TOWARDS CBNRM AND THE GOVERNMENT

Recent surveys in Kunene Region (Jones 1999a and 1999b) have shown that generally residents are positive towards the conservancies and by implication to the CBNRM process. In some areas, however, the conservancy committees need to improve the flow of information to members and need to involve them more closely in major decision making, if positive attitudes are to be maintained. Attitudes to the conservancies and CBNRM process will also depend upon whether significant benefits in some form or other are perceived by residents.

In parts of Kunene Region where the community game guard programme had been operating for many years, attitudes to government have been reasonably positive. There has been fairly good cooperation between the community and government in managing wildlife and this is reflected in the increase of wildlife in these areas. The development of conservancies is helping to formalise some of the arrangements between community and government. Particular individuals working within the MET in Kunene are providing considerable support to the conservancy programme and have developed good relationships with communities. In the *Torra* Conservancy residents and MET officials are jointly developing a wildlife management plan.

People in the Caprivi study area were hostile to the government conservation authorities before conservancies were formed. There was no direct benefit to them and

they were not compensated for losing crops and livestock to wildlife. Government game rangers were not there to assist people to control problem animals, but were quick to arrest someone poaching illegally. This picture changed somewhat when community game guards began operating in the region in the early 1990s, but for a number of reasons relations deteriorated again. However, the situation is changing with the formation of the conservancies although problem animal control remains a major challenge to the community, leading to dissatisfaction with government for not dealing with the issue.

Crop and livestock farmers in *Mayuni*, *Kwandu* and *Wuparo* conservancies have negative attitudes towards wildlife and not the CBNRM programme in particular. This is due to lack of compensation for farmers who lost crops or livestock. Problem animal control by Community Game Guards (CGGs) has not managed to reduce the problem to a significant level. These conservancies are not yet registered to receive revenue from trophy hunting, and as a result little benefit from conservancies such as employment has been forthcoming. The conservancies have not yet developed strategies to compensate people who lost crops and livestock to wildlife. But, people remain positive about the benefit they can derive from the conservancies. The CBNRM programme is viewed positively, and people would like to see development in their conservancies. Some people start to blame the government for slow process of registering the conservancies, as the main reason for lack of compensation.

The attitudes of people towards the CBNRM programme are very positive in *Salambala* Conservancy. These can be attributed to developments that took place in the conservancy, such as employing local people to fence the Core Wildlife Area, building a community campsite, receiving their first hunting quota and having wildlife translocated to the area from government parks. People are positive about development and are awaiting to derive more benefits from the conservancies.

Attitudes to CBNRM are starting to take shape around the effectiveness of the conservancy management committee, elected by the community. The government and CBNRM programme facilitators are less visible in communities where administrative structures such as the conservancy management committees are well developed and functional.

15. CONCLUSIONS

The communal area conservancy approach in Namibia is relatively new and the first conservancies have only been operating for about 18 months. Conclusions about many of the issues concerning power relations in CBNRM therefore have to remain somewhat tentative at this stage. It is likely that new conflicts internal to conservancies are likely to emerge as substantial benefits begin to accrue and when trade-offs have to be made over land uses when detailed land use plans are developed. It is also possible that there will be further conflict between conservancies and other institutions, such as regional councils or regional development committees in future. However, from the evidence available so far some initial conclusions can be drawn:

15.1 Proprietorship

The Namibian policy and legislation gives communities strong proprietorship over wildlife and tourism resources. This proprietorship includes decision-making on how wildlife can be used (or not used) and how tourism can be developed (or not developed). The State sets wildlife quotas although this is not provided for in legislation and the State can withdraw the rights that are given to conservancies. Communities retain 100% of income derived from wildlife and tourism and have total discretion as to how the income should be used. There is currently no pressure from state institutions to appropriate any of this income. Proposed legislation is likely to give communities similar proprietorship over areas designated community forests.

The strong proprietorship gives communities secure tenure over wildlife and tourism as resources, providing some of the key conditions for sustainable management. Proprietorship is also important in strengthening the position of local communities vis a vis outsiders such as the private sector. If policy and legislation do not give communities proprietorship over the assets of tourism and hunting (the land and the wildlife), then communities are in a weak bargaining position with the private sector, and there is little incentive for most operators to negotiate with the community (Ashley and Jones forthcoming).

15.2 Representation and decision-making

Residents generally have a high sense of ownership over the conservancies and believe the conservancy management committees represent their interests. There is a relatively high degree of involvement in conservancy activities. In Caprivi, in some cases the danger exists that traditional authorities who have been the driving force may not give up control to developing conservancy committees. *Salambala* is a good example of where the traditional authority has been involved in the formation of the conservancy but has given the management committee space to operate on its own and develop accountability to the community. In *Mayuni* conservancy residents are less well informed of conservancy activities and the traditional authority remains a powerful influence. In Kunene Region, conservancies have developed with less involvement of traditional authorities but have pragmatically co-opted them when conflicts have emerged. The potential for conservancy committees to become more accountable to community members appears greater where traditional leadership supports the development of conservancies, but does not drive decision-making.

15.3 Development of community coalescent authority structure

There are many individual actors within a conservancy who may make temporary alliances with other individuals in order to further their own interests. It is too early to say whether conservancies can develop into Murphree's "coalescent authority structure" which can reconcile the different interests. However, it would appear that the promise of some form of financial benefit at individual and community level, along with gaining control over wildlife and tourism have provided sufficient incentive for residents in seven communities in Namibia to organise themselves collectively in a way they have not done before. They have set up a democratic and accountable community

structure which can take decisions on natural resource use as well as represent the community's interests to outsiders including government. The opportunity costs in this process of organisation have been high in terms of time and energy spent on many meetings, workshops, negotiations and conflict resolution. The framework exists for conservancies to develop into "coalescent authority structures", but much will depend upon continued recognition from government and support from facilitating NGOs. It will also depend upon the extent to which management committees remain responsive to members and keep them informed of conservancy activities. Conservancies will also need to deliver a diverse stream of benefits which go beyond the financial, in order to satisfy the diverse needs of community members.

15.4. Enforcement of resource use rules

Enforcement of conservancy rules, which are neither traditional nor formal laws is a major challenge. A good example is *Salambala* conservancy where four families refused to move from the proposed core wildlife area. Although authority has been extended to local grassroots level, enforcement of this authority is not yet clearly defined. In the *Salambala* example, the four families have ignored directives from both the traditional authority and the central government. Neither the regional councils nor the traditional authorities seem able to enforce rules made by the conservancies due to a lack of clarity on their roles and responsibilities. The ability of conservancies to enforce such rules needs to be strengthened in policy and legislation. The ability to enforce rules will also depend upon the accountability of the conservancy management body to its members. Individuals in conservancies recognise that wildlife and tourism are largely common resources that require collective decision-making for their sustainable use. If management committees act autonomously and undemocratically, and against the interests of the majority of individuals, conservancy members will ignore resource use rules and wildlife will revert to 'open access' as the common property institution loses credibility.

15.5 Flexibility

A strength of the Namibian policy and legislation is its flexibility. The conservancy legislation enables communities to define themselves and does not impose artificial boundaries, thus allowing communities to decide who is included or excluded from resource use and receipt of benefits.

It also allows communities to elect their committees in different ways, shape their own constitutions (beyond certain prescribed provisions) and develop accountable structures that suit their own circumstances and cultures. This flexibility enables communities to accommodate local conflict and find local solutions.

Flexibility also leads to more time-consuming processes and makes more demands upon support agencies which need to facilitate communities identifying and thinking through key issues and coming to a decision. The disputes over land and boundaries described in section 13. have led to considerable delays in conservancy formation. However, the main implementing NGO, IRDNC, believes that it is important to work

through such key issues before conservancies are registered. According to Davis and Jacobsohn (1999:24) "Intervention by outsiders to speed up the process could result in the sort of problems created by the arbitrary colonial boundaries inherited by independent Africa". Communities are being asked to redefine themselves following the removal of arbitrary and artificial boundaries created by the social engineering of *apartheid*. This is bound to take time and result in conflict. So far most communities have been pragmatic and have found ways to resolve the conflict. Even so, most of those involved in the Namibian CBNRM programme believe there is a need for some form of outside mediation which can help break deadlock situations.

ANNEXE 1

RESULTS OF ATTITUDE SURVEYS CARRIED OUT IN CONSERVANCIES IN KUNENE AND CAPRIVI REGIONS

A. Kunene

In *Torra* conservancy (Jones 1999a) 97% of respondents said they had heard of the conservancy and 91% said they were members. 82% of households have a member or members who have participated in conservancy activities. A majority (63%) of residents believe the conservancy committee represents their interests. 43% said they were well-informed about the conservancy and its activities, 32% receive only a little information and the rest are not well informed or receive no information.

In the *Sesfontein* conservancy (Jones 1999a) 98% of respondents were aware of the conservancy, and 87% said they were members although participation in conservancy activities was lower than in *Torra* (52%). 82% said the conservancy committee represents their interests. 16% said they were well-informed about the conservancy and its activities, 40% said they receive only a little information, 30% said they were not well informed and 14% said they received no information.

In the *#Khoadi //hoas* conservancy (Jones 1999b) 79% of respondents said they were members of the conservancy and 46% said a member of their household had participated in conservancy activities. 46% said the conservancy committee was doing an average job and 35% said it was doing a good job. However, 69% said they receive little information about the conservancy and its activities and a further 17% said they were not well informed. Only 37% had attended a conservancy meeting over the past 12 months.

B. Caprivi

In the survey conducted Mosimane in 1997 in *Salambala*, at village level 88% of the respondents knew their village was represented and 78% received feedback about the conservancy activities monthly from the representative. When asked to whom the conservancy belonged, 92% of respondents answered "the community". The survey findings indicate the conservancy information flow was good and people felt that they were part of decision making in the conservancy. Concerning the process of developing the constitution, the 1997 survey indicated that 62% of the conservancy members said that they have provided input into the drafting of the constitution. The communities have a sense of ownership of the conservancy and constitution, since they were consulted when the constitution was developed and their ideas were incorporated by the management committee (Mosimane 1997).

The 1999 survey in *Mayuni* indicated that 54% of the respondents said they were not represented in the management committee and only 55% of the respondents said they

received feedback from representatives after each meeting (Mosimane 1999a). This demonstrates that the flow of information from the management committee to the respective villages in the conservancy is not yet effective and well established. People do not yet have a say in the decisions and are not even aware of the activities of the management committee. The committee itself did not have clear understanding of the village representation and the activities they could embark on. The current constitution of the conservancy was developed by the chief and a committee tasked to develop the constitution. In the 1999, survey, 60% of the respondents said they were not consulted when the constitution was developed. The current conservancy management committee said they only approved the constitution. The community was not much involved in the development of the constitution, therefore lacks knowledge of what it entails. However, there is strong community knowledge of (93%), and support for (92%) the *Mayuni* Conservancy. This shows that the community does have a strong sense of support and ownership of the conservancy (Mosimane 1999a).

The 1999 *Wuparo* survey, shows that 68% of the respondents said they are represented in the management committee, and 58 % said they received feedback after every conservancy meeting (Mosimane 1999b). The findings illustrate that the flow of information in *Wuparo* Conservancy is fair. The conservancy has developed a constitution, with community consultation and was approved by the community. There is ownership of the conservancy with 95% of the respondents saying they want a conservancy. When asked to whom the conservancy belongs 87% said "to the community" (Mosimane 1999b). The survey results show a strong sense of support and ownership of the conservancy. The community generally feels they are part of decision making, since their villages are well represented in the management committee.

In *Kwandu* Conservancy, the 1997 survey states that 64% of the respondents said they receive feedback from the management committee after every meeting, and 95% said they were represented in the management committee. The results indicate, strong representation but feedback to the community is a bit weak. When the respondents were asked to whom the conservancy belonged, 96% said the "community" and 82% said a conservancy is a community initiative to conserve. All respondents (100%) in the survey said they want a conservancy, which demonstrates support and ownership of the conservancy (Mosimane 1997).

ANNEXE 2

NGO ACTIVITY WITHIN CBNRM IN NAMIBIA

An NGO, Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC), pioneered community-based conservation activities in pre-independence Namibia. IRDNC directors Garth Owen-Smith and Margaret Jacobsohn worked in the mid 1980s on developing a community-game guard programme and a pilot project on returning benefits from tourism to Himba pastoralists in Kunene Region. IRDNC now facilitates the formation and operation of conservancies in Kunene and Caprivi. A consortium of three international NGOs (World Wildlife Fund US, Management Systems International and World Learning) and one local NGO (the Rossing Foundation), administers the USAID-funded Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project. LIFE provides funding and technical support to Namibian implementing organisations including IRDNC. The Rossing Foundation has its own CBNRM training and education programme. The Namibian Community-based Tourism Association (NACOBTA) represents the interests of tourism enterprises in communal areas, and the Namibia Nature Foundation provides a number of services within the national CBNRM Programme. An NGO umbrella organisation, the Namibian Non Governmental Organisation Forum (NANGOF) houses the secretariat to the CBNRM Association of Namibia (CAN) which is a collaborative grouping of all those involved in CBNRM including government agencies. The LIFE programme steering committee (consisting predominantly of Namibians) has also played a significant role in advocacy and policy formulation at national and international level.

Of the three case study conservancies in Kunene Region, *Torra* and *Sesfontein* have received considerable facilitation from IRDNC, while the *#Khoadi //hoas* conservancy has received only limited funding and technical support from the LIFE Project. In Caprivi, IRDNC has provided support to all four conservancies. LIFE has provided funding to IRDNC and the conservancies and LIFE technical support assisted IRDNC facilitators in the development of the *Salambala* Conservancy. The Rossing Foundation has played a leading role in supporting the development of the local crafts industry in Caprivi as part of CBNRM activities, and LIFE has supported IRDNC's work in encouraging a thatching grass industry in Caprivi for women.

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