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COOPERATION IN THE COMMONS:
COMMUNITY-BASED RANGELAND MANAGEMENT IN NAMIBIA

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ABSTRACT

Classic theories suggest that common pool resources are subject to overexploitation. Community-based resource management approaches may ameliorate “tragedy of the commons” effects. Using a randomized evaluation in Namibia’s communal rangelands, we find that a comprehensive four-year program to support community-based rangeland and cattle management led to persistent and large improvements for eight of thirteen indices of social and behavioral outcomes. Effects on rangeland health, cattle productivity and household economics, however, were either negative or nil. Positive impacts on community resource management may have been offset by communities’ inability to control grazing by non-participating herds and inhibited by an unresponsive rangeland sub-system. This juxtaposition, in which measurable improvements in community resource management did not translate into better outcomes for households or rangeland health, demonstrates the fragility of the causal pathway from program implementation to intended socioeconomic and environmental outcomes. It also points to challenges for improving climate change–adaptation strategies.

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1 **Title: Cooperation in the commons: Community-based rangeland**
2 **management in Namibia**

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13
14

15 **Abstract**

16 **Classic theories suggest that common pool resources are subject to overexploitation.**
17 **Community-based resource management approaches may ameliorate “tragedy of the**
18 **commons” effects. Using a randomized evaluation in Namibia’s communal rangelands, we**
19 **find that a comprehensive four-year program to support community-based rangeland and**
20 **cattle management led to persistent and large improvements for eight of thirteen indices of**
21 **social and behavioral outcomes. Effects on rangeland health, cattle productivity and**
22 **household economics, however, were either negative or nil. Positive impacts on community**
23 **resource management may have been offset by communities’ inability to control grazing by**
24 **non-participating herds and inhibited by an unresponsive rangeland sub-system. This**
25 **juxtaposition, in which measurable improvements in community resource management did**
26 **not translate into better outcomes for households or rangeland health, demonstrates the**
27 **fragility of the causal pathway from program implementation to intended socioeconomic**
28 **and environmental outcomes. It also points to challenges for improving climate change–**
29 **adaptation strategies.**

30

31 **Main text**

32 In his seminal 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Garrett Hardin argued that
33 poorly managed common resources are subject to overexploitation¹. Hardin explained the
34 tragedy of the commons using the metaphor of “a pasture open to all” in which each herd owner
35 receives individual benefits from accumulating livestock while sharing the cost of overgrazing
36 with other community members. This “natural” promotion of self-interest harms the common
37 resource and ultimately brings ruin to all herders. Today, rangeland degradation is not only a
38 textbook metaphor for the tragedy of the commons theory, but highly relevant globally: Drylands
39 occupy 41% of the Earth’s land area, support two billion people, and are experiencing rapid
40 environmental degradation exacerbated by climate change, and in many cases attributable to
41 overuse from livestock and crop agriculture². Strategies for coping with impending climate
42 change are critical for local and global policy.

43 Hardin concluded that the tragedy of the commons can be prevented only by coercive
44 government regulation or resource privatization. However, Elinor Ostrom and other critics of
45 Hardin’s thesis have documented numerous communities that successfully developed local
46 management systems to avoid overexploitation of commonly held resources, including
47 rangelands³⁻¹¹. These findings have generated considerable enthusiasm for programs undertaken
48 by governmental and non-governmental organizations that provide external support for holistic,
49 community-based management of natural resources^{2,12,13}.

50 But observing that some communities have developed successful systems of collective
51 management does not mean that collective management instigated by outside organizations will
52 succeed, and assessing the efficacy of such external interventions poses classic evaluation
53 challenges. It is difficult to identify the impact of interventions because of external factors such
54 as weather and macroeconomic conditions, and because of unobserved community or individual
55 traits that drive both program participation and successful community management.
56 Measurement is difficult because impacts are expected across many domains of a social-
57 ecological system and at different points in time¹⁴. Related evidence from recent randomized
58 evaluations suggests that community-driven programs can successfully deliver infrastructure and
59 economic returns, but have less success sustainably affecting community governance and the
60 creation of social capital¹⁵.

61 We evaluated an integrated program in Namibia’s Northern Communal Areas (NCAs)
62 that promoted improved rangeland and livestock management among cattle-owning households.
63 To overcome attribution and measurement challenges, we conducted a large-scale, randomized
64 evaluation and included multi-disciplinary measurement of behavioral, economic, livestock, and
65 rangeland outcomes up to seven years after the program was initiated. The main questions posed
66 were: (1) Can external support cause improvements in community resource management that
67 persist two years after the support ends? (2) What is the effect of external support for community
68 resource management on rangeland health, cattle productivity, and household well-being?
69

70 **Study context and design**

71 Namibia’s NCAs have a population of about 1.2 million people, predominantly
72 pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, who herd cattle and small ruminants using traditional methods
73 and grow crops (i.e., millet, maize) under non-irrigated conditions¹⁶. Rangeland vegetation and
74 soils have been degraded by pressure from growing populations and reduced herd mobility (see
75 Supplementary Information section 2 for details). Low-input management results in
76 uncoordinated livestock grazing and overuse of local resources. Resource management in the


77 NCAs is further complicated by climate change¹⁷. For example, climate change may increase the
78 prevalence of drought and bush encroachment, which are already destabilizing rangeland
79 ecosystems in the NCAs^{2,18}.

80 The economic and ecological challenges facing the NCAs are partially traceable to three
81 features of colonial-era land administration. First, in 1897 German colonial authorities
82 established a veterinary cordon fence (VCF) separating the NCAs from southern Namibia to
83 prevent the spread of livestock disease. Restrictions on movement and sale of livestock from
84 northern to southern Namibia remain in place today, severely limiting the development of the
85 formal livestock sector in the NCAs. Second, between 1897 and 1962, German and South
86 African colonial authorities expropriated land from hundreds of thousands of black Namibians
87 and relocated them to marginal communal lands known as “native reserves” on both sides of the
88 VCF^{19,20}. The native reserve policy restricted private land and capital accumulation by black
89 Namibians and eroded customary land governance institutions in communal areas^{19,21}. Finally, in
90 1962 the South African government, which took over the administration of Namibia from
91 Germany following WWI, funded widespread borehole development in the NCAs to address
92 growing political unrest. This dramatic expansion of water infrastructure, which was carried out
93 with minimal concern for ecological consequences or investment in local resource governance,
94 severed the link between grazing movements and the availability of natural water sources and
95 catalyzed the growth of human and livestock populations, laying the groundwork for many of the
96 ecological challenges that northern Namibia faces today^{16,22}.

97 The Community Based Rangeland and Livestock Management program (CBRLM) was
98 part of a four-year partnership between the Millennium Challenge Account-Namibia and the
99 Government of Namibia to reduce rangeland degradation and promote economic development.
100 From 2010 to 2014 the implementing partner, *Gesellschaft für Organisation, Planung und*
101 *Ausbildung* (GOPA), worked with communities to jointly develop locally tailored rangeland
102 grazing management, livestock management, and livestock marketing plans. GOPA then offered
103 multi-faceted support to communities that established committees to coordinate and monitor
104 these resource management plans. GOPA’s support included water-infrastructure development,
105 trainings on animal husbandry, livestock marketing, and rangeland management, livestock loans,
106 matching grants, and technical assistance from trained field facilitators.

107 The rangeland management approach underlying CBRLM centered on combined herding
108 and planned grazing. The program encouraged participating community members to combine
109 household cattle herds into larger herds and rotate them among pre-planned sites within the
110 grazing area. Planned rotation allows for vegetation rest and recovery and the establishment of
111 dry-season fodder reserves, while combined herding improves grazing coordination and reduces
112 the costs of herding. CBRLM field facilitators also encouraged enhanced livestock sales and
113 flexible stocking rates to optimize grazing pressure. According to CBRLM’s theory of change,
114 improved management practices and enhanced cattle sales would improve communities’
115 economic well-being while reducing the risk of rangeland degradation (see Methods).

116



118 **Fig. 1.** Distribution of Rangeland Intervention Areas (RIAs) and Grazing Areas (GAs) for CBRLM in
 119 northern Namibia.

120
 121 In order to select study areas, GOPA mapped 38 Rangeland Intervention Areas (RIAs),
 122 intervention zones with locally recognized boundaries and sufficiently low density of people,
 123 livestock, and bush cover to enable the implementation of new group-grazing plans Each RIA
 124 comprised 5-15 Grazing Areas (GAs), communal rangeland parcels shared by 5-35 households.
 125 We randomly assigned 19 RIAs to treatment and 19 RIAs to control, and measured program
 126 outcomes in 123 selected GAs (52 treatment and 71 control, see Methods). Figure 1 displays the
 127 GAs in treatment and control RIAs; darker shades identify the GAs sampled for measurement.
 128 Inference was computed using clustered standard errors and randomization inference, due to the
 129 38-unit clustered design.

130 To measure resource management behaviors, we conducted 1,241 and 1,348 surveys of
 131 cattle herd managers at program end and two years later, respectively. We confirmed key
 132 practices with direct observation audits conducted after each survey. To assess impacts on
 133 rangeland condition two years after program end, we collected vegetation and soil data via
 134 randomly-sampled 1-ha sites during the wet (Apr-May) and dry (Sep-Oct) seasons. To assess
 135 impacts on cattle health and productivity two years after program end, we weighed, aged, and
 136 assessed body condition scores of 20,000 cattle in 730 herds during the dry season. Finally, to
 137 assess impacts on household economic outcomes three years after program end, we conducted
 138 1,345 household surveys. We used ordinary least squares regression with standard errors
 139 clustered at the RIA level to estimate treatment effects.

140
 141 **Treatment effects on social and behavioral outcomes**


142 Figure 2 illustrates impacts of CBRLM on standardized indices of social and behavioral
 143 outcomes (see Methods for details of the composition and construction of indices). At program
 144 end, we find large, statistically significant effects on eight of thirteen social indices: grazing
 145 planning (+1.31sd, $p < 0.001$), grazing-plan adherence (+0.35sd, $p < 0.001$), herding practices
 146 (+0.37sd, $p = 0.003$), herder management (+0.15sd, $p = 0.07$), cattle husbandry (+0.36sd, $p =$
 147 0.002), community governance (+0.75sd, $p < 0.001$), collective action (+1.53sd, $p < 0.001$), and
 148 expertise (+0.30sd, $p = 0.005$). We do not observe statistically significant improvements in herd
 149 restructuring (+0.00sd, $p = 0.95$), cattle marketing (-0.06sd, $p = 0.37$), community disputes

150 (+0.07sd, $p = 0.34$), trust (-0.02sd, $p = 0.73$), or perceptions of self and community efficacy
 151 (+0.04sd, $p = 0.67$) (also see Extended Data Table 1).

152 To illustrate program influences on collective action we highlight two key outcomes: At
 153 program end, planned grazing with peers increased by 28 percentage points (control mean =
 154 22%, $p < 0.001$) while combining cattle with those of peers increased by 34 percentage points
 155 (control mean = 38%, $p < 0.001$) (Extended Data Table 4). Patterns were validated via direct
 156 observation audits (Extended Data Table 10).

157 Two years after program end, improvements in all four indices of rangeland grazing
 158 management persisted: grazing planning (1.02sd, $p < 0.001$), grazing-plan adherence (0.32sd, $p <$
 159 0.001), herding practices (0.30sd, $p = 0.001$), and herder management (0.43sd, $p = 0.004$), as did
 160 positive effects on community governance (0.55sd, $p < 0.001$), collective action (0.89sd, $p <$
 161 0.001), and expertise (0.35sd, $p < 0.001$). Improvements in cattle husbandry were smaller and no
 162 longer statistically significant (0.13sd, $p = 0.19$). Community disputes increased due to
 163 disagreements both within and between grazing communities over access to program-generated
 164 resources such as water developments and forage reserves (-0.29sd, $p = 0.002$) (Extended Data
 165 Tables 1 and 4).

166
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
169
 170 **Fig. 2.** Effects of CBRLM on 13 indices of social and behavioral outcomes at 0 – 1 years after program end (2014)
 171 and 2 – 3 years after program end (2016). For each index the mid-point is the standardized treatment effect size,
 172 with a corresponding 95% confidence interval. Supporting statistical results are shown in Extended Data Table 1.

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175 **Treatment effects on rangeland health, cattle productivity, and household economics**

176 Figure 3 illustrates results concerning our second research question, namely whether
 177 changes in resource management translated to improved rangeland health, cattle productivity,
 178 and household economics. No statistically significant effects were observed for herd productivity
 179 two years after program end or for household outcomes three years after program end. Of 10
 180 rangeland outcomes measured two years after program end, four showed statistically significant
 181 but negative effects. We observed these adverse effects on key rangeland outcomes during the
 182 wet season, including 4 percentage points lower protected soil surface (control mean = 81%
 183 protected, $p = 0.05$), 3 percentage points lower plant litter cover (control mean = 55%, $p = 0.04$),
 184 8 percentage points lower herbaceous canopy cover (control mean = 45%, $p = 0.07$), and a
 185 121kg/ha decrease in fresh plant biomass (control mean = 459kg/ha, $p = 0.10$). These are
 186 indicators of declining ecosystem health. We also observed a 5 percentage-point reduction in
 187 herbaceous canopy cover (control mean = 22%, $p = 0.002$) and a 6kg/ha reduction in fresh plant
 188 biomass during the dry season (control mean = 233kg/ha $p = 0.004$), illustrating that the CBRLM
 189 failed to enhance fodder reserves for risk management purposes (see Extended Data Table 6).

190



192

193 **Fig. 3.** Effect of CBRLM on 20 cattle, economic, and rangeland outcomes at 2 - 3 years or 3 years after program
194 end (2016, 2017). For each outcome, the mid-point is the standardized treatment effect size with a corresponding
195 95% confidence interval. Supporting statistical results are shown in Extended Data Table 2.

196

197 **Discussion**

198 We find that an external intervention to support community-based resource management
199 generated substantial and persistent improvements in rangeland grazing management,
200 community governance, and collective action. However, effects on rangeland, livestock, and
201 household attributes were mostly nil, and in some cases negative.

202 The null to negative effects on rangeland condition are most likely the result of CBRLM
203 increasing, rather than reducing, grazing intensity. For example, relative to control sites, sites in
204 treatment areas were 12 percentage points more likely to be heavily grazed in the wet season
205 (control mean = 13%, $p = 0.003$) and 10 percentage points more likely to be heavily grazed in
206 the dry season (control mean = 46%, $p = 0.02$) of 2016 (see Extended Data Table 9). While we
207 find no evidence that CBRLM increased the number of cattle herds or the number of cattle per
208 herd in treatment areas, we did observe that non-CBRLM-participating herd owners from inside
209 and outside treated areas exploited the treated GAs. Relative to herd owners in control areas,
210 herd owners in treatment GAs were seven percentage points more likely to report observing
211 “uninvited herds” in their GA in the previous year (control mean = 16%, $p = 0.005$). We
212 speculate that the incentives for outsiders to “poach” forage in treated areas were strong in the
213 dry season because of CBRLM investments in water infrastructure and encouragement of
214 CBRLM herd owners to set aside un-grazed forage reserves. Thus, one consideration for future
215 implementation and research is completeness of coverage: had implementation been able to
216 cover *all* areas, then this would have reduced the risk of such incursions. These effects were
217 compounded by the program’s failure to stimulate opportunistic livestock off-take through
218 livestock marketing.

219 Null effects on rangeland outcomes may also have resulted from an unresponsive
220 rangeland sub-system. In this sense, our findings mirror the outcomes from other integrated,
221 grazing management programs for commercial ranching in developed nations. Namely,
222 ecologically based processes exhibit significant temporal inertia relative to management and
223 social outcomes^{23–25}. Temporal lags between primary and secondary productivity can be
224 exacerbated by the precipitation variability that characterizes northern Namibia²⁶. Even if the
225 CBRLM grazing management schemes had been perfectly implemented with reduced stocking
226 rates, adequate protection from grass poachers and favorable rainfall regimes, rangeland
227 responsiveness to the treatment may have been limited by the nonequilibrium characteristics of
228 forage—dominated by annual grasses—and pervasive soil degradation (see Methods).

229 Nonetheless, further tracking of outcomes may be fruitful, and it is possible that positive
230 economic or ecological outcomes will manifest over longer periods of time. While we do not
231 observe early indicators of positive ecological or economic change, we also do not have a strong
232 prediction based on outside literature as to whether impacts will improve, worsen or remain the
233 same. We also recognize that improvements in social outcomes such as governance or collective
234 action may offer intrinsic benefits to communities.

235 Hardin proposed that effective management of the commons under population pressure
236 requires either coercive regulation or resource privatization¹ (neither of which is politically

237 realistic in many contexts in low-income countries). Inspired by Ostrom’s theories of community
238 resource management, CBRLM took a third path by investing in local institutions to arrest
239 environmental degradation.

240 Our findings should temper overly optimistic views of what external interventions to
241 promote community-based resource management can achieve in dryland situations to cope with
242 climate change. Although it is important to note, as with any evaluation, our findings are
243 particular to the specific program studied. Should our results temper enthusiasm for the theory of
244 change, or are the results that did not match the aspirations more a consequence of specific
245 programmatic decisions or imperfect implementation? The program studied took a holistic
246 approach to CBRLM, whereas the broad concept of community-based resource management
247 clearly could encompass a different set of components. For instance, water infrastructure
248 development as implemented may have increased participation rates and provided direct benefits
249 to the communities but at the cost of increased incursions by outside herds. On implementation,
250 the process data do reveal high levels of participation and strong, positive feedback indicators,
251 suggesting strong implementation fidelity (although a question remains whether the theory of
252 change requires an even higher participation rate than achieved).

253 When designing future programs to support improved community-based responses to
254 climate change and ecological degradation, policymakers should integrate complementary
255 strengths, resources, and wisdom from local (e.g., traditional), regional and national authorities
256 to address commons management challenges^{27,28}. One focal area should be how to better design
257 and enforce property rights for land, water, and grazing resources. The design of these rights
258 should reflect the varied levels (e.g., household versus community) at which different resources
259 are managed and utilized and incorporate historical perspectives about how social, economic,
260 and ecological sub-systems have evolved and interacted over time^{10,11,16,29-31}. Innovative
261 livestock marketing programs could be considered to better address structural constraints and
262 incorporate cultural perspectives of producers. Finally, policymakers could explore well-tested
263 alternative livelihood programs to achieve development goals in light of the long-time horizon
264 and uncertain effects of programs to support new community-management systems³²⁻³⁴.

265 In addition to its theoretical and practical implications, this research demonstrates the
266 value of providing experimental evidence on impacts of community-based development
267 programs in a policy-relevant setting. Many experimental studies of resource management are
268 conducted using tightly managed plots under direct researcher control, limiting their relevance
269 for answering real-world policy questions²⁵. On the other hand, field studies of community-based
270 resource management programs typically rely on non-experimental evidence that may be biased
271 due to self-selected participation or unobserved social, ecological, or economic factors. Given
272 the importance of resource management, particularly with increasing issues from climate change,
273 further research is needed to identify the contexts, approaches, and program components that
274 yield strong and inclusive impacts¹².

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280 **Methods**

281

282 **Intervention design**

283

284 ***Theory of change***

285 At the heart of the of CBRLM’s theory of change is the assumption that improvements
286 in the ecological sub-system provide a sustainable resource base for increased livestock
287 production and marketing³⁵. The ecological sub-system, however, depends on a functioning
288 economic sub-system because herd owners must be able to destock quickly in response to
289 adverse ecological circumstances. The theory holds that the most important constraint on the
290 economic sub-system is unproductive herds and low-quality cattle because farmers are unwilling
291 to sell their cattle when they command low market prices. Therefore, improvements in rangeland
292 grazing management need to be complemented by improvements in information and access to
293 livestock markets, herd structures, and animal husbandry practices.

294 Crucially, changes to the ecological, economic, and livestock sub-systems rely on
295 effective community governance and collective-action capacity in CBRLM communities. This is
296 because rangeland grazing management practices can be easily undermined by non-participating
297 herd owners inside or outside the GA. The theory therefore calls for investments at multiple
298 levels of the social-ecological system to ensure that improvements in certain program areas are
299 not undermined by failures in others³⁵. The CBRLM implementers believed that previous
300 rangeland development programs were undermined by a failure to account for the linkages
301 among sub-systems, which motivated them to design a more holistic intervention³⁵.

302

303 ***Intervention components***

304 CBRLM was a multi-faceted package of administrative, educational, financial, and
305 technical support. Implementation of the package was designed as an experimental treatment to
306 assist in project assessment. To select study areas for evaluation, GOPA identified 38 RIAs with
307 sufficiently low density of people, livestock, and bush cover to enable the implementation of new
308 group-grazing plans, one of the core treatment components. The evaluation team randomly
309 assigned 19 RIAs to treatment and 19 RIAs to control (see Randomization for details). GOPA
310 implemented CBRLM in up to seven GAs within each treatment RIA.

311 **Mobilization.** GOPA conducted pre-mobilization meetings with TAs and other
312 stakeholders in the second half of 2010 to identify GA communities most likely to participate in
313 CBRLM³⁵. Early mobilization efforts focused on soliciting community buy-in for the
314 cornerstone principles of CBRLM, including community-planned grazing, combined herding of
315 cattle, and efficient livestock management. There is also substantial evidence from qualitative
316 surveys that some community members were motivated to participate in the CBRLM by
317 prospects for water infrastructure development by GOPA³⁵.

318 While almost 100 GAs were initially mobilized for the project, by 2014 GOPA was
319 targeting resources and support towards 58 GAs based on community receptivity and the
320 discretion of CBRLM management. In each GA, GOPA worked principally with households
321 owning 10 or more cattle, although other community members benefitted from participation in a
322 “Small Stock Pass-on Scheme” and a variety of training activities, which are described below.

323 **Rangeland grazing management.** The core aim of CBRLM was to shift how
324 communities approached livestock grazing, forage conservation, and risk management by
325 encouraging two key practices: planned grazing and combined herding. Planned grazing entails

326 rotating a community's cattle to a new pasture on a regular basis in accordance with a written
327 plan. The goal was to preserve grass for the dry season and allow grazed pastures more time to
328 recover. Combined herding entails grouping many owners' cattle into one large herd and herding
329 them in a tight bunch. This practice is meant to concentrate animal impact on rangeland,
330 minimize cattle losses, and increase the likelihood that cows are exposed to bulls, thus increasing
331 the pregnancy and calving rates of the entire herd. The scientific and practical rationale behind
332 these practices is reviewed in Supplementary Information section 2.

333 GOPA staff developed grazing plans with each participating community and taught them
334 planned grazing and combined herding via field-based training sessions. These followed a
335 "training of trainers" approach in which GOPA recruited field facilitators from each community,
336 taught them the principles of CBRLM, and tasked them with training their fellow participating
337 pastoralists.

338 **Livestock management.** GOPA taught participants some best practices in animal
339 husbandry, including structuring herds to maximize productivity (by increasing the proportion of
340 bulls and reducing the proportion of oxen and cattle over the age of 10 years), providing
341 vaccinations and supplements, and deworming³⁵. Additionally, to support the introduction of
342 more bulls into herds, the project implemented a "bull scheme" in which participating
343 communities were given the opportunity to collectively buy certified breeding bulls at a
344 subsidized price. Communities were meant to repay the cost of the bulls either with cash or in-
345 kind trades of goats. Goats collected in this repayment process fed into the small stock pass-on
346 scheme under which participating community members nominated households to receive goats
347 from GOPA. GOPA requested that communities nominate households that owned few or no
348 livestock and were led by youth and/or women. When GOPA received goats as payment for
349 loaned bulls, they would pass them on to nominated households. The recipients were then
350 expected to pass on the offspring of the goats they received to other disadvantaged households.

351 **Cattle marketing.** CBRLM also sought to increase participants' marketing of cattle to
352 generate revenue from livestock raising and encourage offtake of unproductive animals³⁵.
353 Community facilitators and project experts provided participating herd owners with information
354 about market opportunities and ideal herd composition, and encouraged flexible offtake in
355 response to forage shortages. In 2013, GOPA invested in the development of regional livestock
356 cooperatives that held local auctions and helped farmers transport their animals to markets.
357 Finally, GOPA invested in identifying international export opportunities for CBRLM farmers to
358 Zimbabwe and Angola, although these were generally not successful³².

359 **Community development.** The project sought to institutionalize community-level
360 governance to organize and enforce collective activities like planned grazing, water point
361 maintenance, and financing of livestock inputs. The central management unit of each GA was a
362 new Grazing Area Committee consisting of five to 10 elected community members. The project
363 encouraged participating communities to collectively cover operational expenses in their GA
364 through a GA fund managed by the committee. Among these expenses were the payments to
365 herders, costs of diesel for water pumps and maintenance of water infrastructure, financing
366 collective livestock vaccination campaigns, and any other collective expenses that would support
367 operation of the GA. CBRLM supported every GA fund with a 1:1 matched subsidy. The
368 matched subsidy was limited by a ceiling amount determined by the estimated number of cattle
369 in a GA. GOPA also instructed committees to maintain "GA record books" to track grazing
370 plans, record meeting minutes, and keep logs of community members' participation and financial
371 contributions.

372 **Water infrastructure.** GOPA upgraded water infrastructure at a total of 84 sites
373 throughout the NCAs to facilitate planned grazing and combined herding. Water infrastructure
374 improvement included minor upgrades like water tanks and drinking troughs, and larger
375 investments such as the installation of diesel and solar pump systems, the drilling and installation
376 of boreholes, and the construction of pipelines, deep wells, and a large earthen dam³².
377

378 *Intervention timeline*

379 The timeline for major components of the research process and CBRLM roll-out is
380 illustrated in Supplementary Figure 1. The research team conducted the random assignments and
381 the implementation team began community mobilization in early 2010. Formal enrollment in
382 CBRLM began in early 2011. The program implementer conducted mobilization in two waves:
383 they mobilized 11 of 19 RIAs in 2010 and the remaining 8 RIAs in 2011. The evaluation team
384 conducted qualitative data collection to inform the design of social and cattle surveys prior to
385 project end 2014; social surveys in 2014 and 2016; rangeland surveys in the wet and dry seasons
386 of 2016; a cattle survey in 2016; and a household economic survey in 2017.

387 Cumulative GA-level implementation is illustrated in Supplementary Figure 2. The
388 project implementer first formally reported enrollment and field visits in April 2011. The
389 implementer achieved nearly full targeted enrollment (50 GAs) by November 11, although some
390 grazing areas were added or subtracted thereafter. Mobilization exceeded enrollment because
391 some grazing area communities chose not to participate in the program and some enrolled in the
392 program and then dropped out. The program averaged between 25 and 50 field visits per month
393 over the project period. A field visit consisted of a week-long community meeting about grazing-
394 plan development and implementation, animal husbandry and budget training, and marketing
395 opportunities.
396

397 **Randomization**

398 The unit of randomization is the RIA, an intervention zone with a locally recognized
399 boundary. Each RIA falls under the jurisdiction of a single local governing body, known as a
400 Traditional Authority (TA). As noted above, RIAs contain five to 15 GAs where a community of
401 producers share water and forage resources. Grazing areas do not have legally defined
402 boundaries. A herd owner's ability to move among GAs is variable.

403 GOPA mapped 41 RIAs prior to randomization. Three contiguous RIAs in the north-
404 central region, composed of two treatment RIAs and one control RIA, were omitted from the
405 study post-randomization because reexamination of baseline density of bushland vegetation
406 deemed them unviable for CBRLM implementation. These are the three RIAs without sampled
407 GAs in Fig 1. The other 38 RIAs were randomly assigned to either receive the CBRLM
408 treatment (19 RIAs) or serve as controls (19 RIAs).

409 The randomization was stratified by TA to ensure that at least one RIA was assigned to
410 the treatment in each TA. The research team then re-randomized the sample units until seven
411 variables were balanced (a p-value of 0.33 or higher for an omnibus f-test of all seven variables)
412 between treatment and control: (1) Presence of forest; (2) number of households; (3) number of
413 cattle; (4) cattle density per unit area; (5) quality of water sources; (6) presence of community-
414 based organizations (CBOs); and (7) overlap with complementary interventions (see
415 Supplementary Table 1). For future researchers, we recommend re-randomizing a set number of
416 times and choosing the re-randomization with the highest balance³⁶. These variables and
417 indicator variables for TA are included as covariates in all analyses.

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Sample selection

In the original sampling strategy, the project implementer was asked to predict the GAs where they would implement the project if the RIA were assigned to treatment. However, there was limited overlap between the GAs that the implementer predicted and the GAs where CBRLM was ultimately implemented. Therefore, the evaluation team devised a revised sampling strategy in 2013, which proceeded in four steps:

- (1) *Map GAs in sampled RIAs.* The evaluation team traveled to all 38 RIAs and worked with TAs and Namibian Agricultural Extension (AE) officers to map all the GAs in each RIA. The team mapped 171 GAs in control RIAs and 213 GAs in treatment RIAs.
- (2) *Collect pre-program data on GAs.* The evaluation team collected information on pre-program characteristics of each GA from interviews with TAs and AE staff, the Namibian national census³⁷, and the Namibian Atlas³⁸. The latter has a geo-referenced database on climate, ecology, and livestock for the nation.
- (3) *Predict CBRLM enrollment for treatment GAs.* The researchers used these data in a logistic regression to predict the probability that each GA would enroll in CBRLM and would adopt the CBRLM interventions based on pre-program characteristics. For example, the model found that GAs with more existing water infrastructure, strong social cohesion, and adequate cell phone service were more likely to be enrolled in the program. The variables used to predict CBRLM adoption were: (1) Presence of water installations (yes/no); (2) carrying capacity of the land (above/below the regional median); (3) community's readiness to change (high/very high); (4) community's social cohesion (high/very high); (5) spillover effects from neighbors; (6) quality of herders and herder turnover; (7) presence of members of the Himba ethnic group; (8) the TA's readiness to change; (9) cell phone coverage; and (10) primary housing material (mud, clay, or brick).
- (4) *Generate sample of GAs in treatment and control RIAs.* The evaluation team applied the statistical model (above) to all GAs in the sample and set a cut-off point to separate GAs that were likely to adopt the CBRLM program versus those that were unlikely to do so. In treatment RIAs, the model predicted 52 GAs, of which 37 were formally enrolled in CBRLM and 15 were not. In control RIAs, 71 GAs met or exceeded the cutoff; they offer the best counter-factual estimate of which GAs would have enrolled in the program had their RIA received treatment.

Data collection

The names, survey questions, and variable constructions for all outcomes included in the analysis are available at the AEA RCT Registry (ID number: AEARCTR-0002723). See Supplementary Information section 1 for a list of definitions of variables depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

Social surveys

Social surveys were intended to assess the effect of CBRLM on community behaviors, community dynamics, knowledge, and attitudes. All data were collected using electronic tablets with the SurveyCTO software³⁹.

464 The primary unit of analysis for household respondents is the manager of the cattle kraal
465 (holding pen). Researchers conducted surveys with kraal managers, rather than heads of
466 households, for three reasons. First, many kraals contain cattle owned by multiple households,
467 and decisions about grazing practices, cattle treatment, and participation in grazing groups are
468 generally made at the kraal level. Second, many cattle-owning households do not directly
469 oversee the day-to-day activities of their cattle (many live outside the GA), and so would be
470 unable to answer questions about key outcomes, such as livestock management behaviors and
471 community dynamics⁴⁰. Finally, enrollment in CBRLM occurred at the kraal, rather than
472 household, level.

473 In 2014, the research team worked with local headmen and other community members to
474 generate a complete census of kraals in every sampled Grazing Area (GA) that contained 10 or
475 more cattle at the start of the program (an eligibility requirement for enrollment in CBRLM). The
476 research team randomly sampled up to 11 community members for participation in the 2014
477 kraal manager survey. Surveys were conducted in the manager's local language and lasted
478 approximately 45 minutes. Alongside the 2014 survey, teams of two surveyors visited all grazing
479 areas where at least one respondent reported participating in a community grazing group or
480 community combined herd to corroborate reported behaviors through direct observation.

481 To assess the persistence of CBRLM's effects on behaviors, community dynamics,
482 knowledge, and attitudes, the research team conducted a follow-up survey of kraal managers in
483 2016, two years after program end. The survey team randomly sampled two additional kraals in
484 each grazing area to account for the possibility of attrition. The 2016 survey lasted
485 approximately one hour on average, and included an expanded list of questions about
486 governance, social conflict, and collective action as well as new survey modules on cattle
487 marketing, cattle movement, and livestock management. In 2017, the research team randomly
488 sampled three kraals in each grazing area to conduct direct observation audits of key rangeland
489 grazing-management behaviors.

490 To assess the effects of CBRLM on economic outcomes, the research team conducted a
491 household-level survey in 2017, three years after program end. The survey instrument asked
492 detailed questions on topics that could not be answered by kraal managers, such as household
493 consumption, income, food security, and savings. To select households for this survey, during
494 the 2016 survey the research team asked kraal managers to list all households that owned cattle
495 in the manager's kraal, then randomly selected one household from each kraal. Alongside the
496 2017 survey, the research team conducted an in-depth survey with the local headman of all 123
497 GAs in the sample. The headman survey focused on historical background about the grazing
498 area, as well as the headman's perceptions of rangeland and livestock issues.

499

500 *Cattle data*

501 The cattle component was intended to assess effects of CBRLM on cattle numbers, body
502 condition, and productivity. The variables of key interest involved the average liveweight and
503 body condition, calving rates, and average market value of cattle, as well as overall herd
504 structures.

505 The data collection protocols closely followed standards from livestock assessments
506 elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa⁴¹. The research team randomly selected up to six kraals in each
507 GA to participate in the cattle survey. The survey team mobilized selected herds during multiple
508 community visits to ensure all herds were accounted for. Herd owners were compensated for the

509 costs of rounding up animals and weighed cattle received anti-parasite treatment (“dipping”)⁴². A
510 total of 19,875 cattle from 669 herds were weighed.

511 The data-collection process for each herd proceeded in six steps. First, surveyors worked
512 with herd managers to round up all cattle that regularly stayed in the selected cattle kraal. Once
513 cattle had been brought to the designated location for data collection, they were passed through a
514 mobile crush pen and scale. As each animal passed through the crush pen, a survey team member
515 recorded the animal type (i.e., bull, ox, cow, calf) and used a SurveyCTO randomizer to calculate
516 whether the animal was randomly selected for assessment. The random number generator was set
517 to randomly select approximately 30 cattle from each herd for weighing. If the animal was
518 selected, the survey team kept the animal on the scale and recorded its weight and body
519 condition. A semi-subjective 1-5 scale, commonly used by livestock buyers in the NCAs (see
520 Supplementary Fig. 3), was adjusted to a 0-4 scale used to determine formal market pricing. The
521 team then placed the animal in a neck clamp and estimated the animal’s age by dentition (but
522 extremely young calves were aged visually). Each animal was marked as it moved through the
523 crush pen to ensure that it was assessed only once. In addition to assessing randomly selected
524 animals, the survey team weighed and aged all bulls in the herd. The cattle survey yielded
525 average cattle weight, age, and body condition for 19,875 animals across all treatment and
526 control GAs, as well as estimates of calving rates, ratios of bulls to cows, and ratios of
527 productive to unproductive animals.

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529 ***Rangeland data***

530 The rangeland ecology research was intended to assess treatment effects on vegetation
531 and soil surface conditions. Full research details, including field technician training protocols,
532 are available elsewhere⁴³. The data collection approach followed methods commonly used in
533 Africa^{44,45}. Extended definitions of variables depicted in Fig. 3 and Extended Data Table 2 are
534 available in the Supplementary Information section 1.

535 The rationale for how the ecological variables presented in Fig. 3 translate into
536 assessments of rangeland condition or health is based on forage and soil characteristics from a
537 livestock production perspective²⁶. The highest quality forages for cattle on rangelands are
538 perennial grasses, since annual grasses are more ephemeral in terms of nutritive value and
539 productivity. Herbaceous forbs often have the poorest forage quality for large grazers because of
540 their low fiber content and risks of containing toxic chemicals. When rangelands are degraded by
541 over-grazing, perennial grasses are reduced and replaced by annual grasses and forbs. This trend
542 reflects animal diet selectivity that favors consumption of the perennial plants. Reversing such
543 trends via management interventions can be difficult. The main option is to reduce grazing
544 pressure and hope that perennial grasses can outcompete annuals and become reestablished over
545 time. Another option is to implement a grazing rotation that allows perennial grasses to recover
546 after a grazing period.

547 Increases in annual grasses are documented to occur as one outcome of chronic
548 overgrazing in Namibia^{46,47}. In 2016, annual grasses were 5-times more abundant than perennial
549 grasses in our study area. When over-grazing occurs, most plant material is harvested and less is
550 available for the pool of organic matter (OM) for the topsoil. Less OM (e.g., plant litter) on the
551 soil surface means that more soil is also exposed to wind and rain, accelerating erosion. The GAs
552 in our research occur on various soil types and landscapes, some of which are more susceptible
553 to erosion than others. Silty soils on slopes are vulnerable to erosion, for example, while sandy
554 soils on level sites are less vulnerable²⁶.

555 On-the-ground sampling was conducted in all 123 selected GAs along an 800-km zone
556 running West to East. Elevations ranged from 750 to 1,700 masl (West) and 1,050 to 1,120 masl
557 (East). Within each sampled GA, up to 12 1-ha (square) sampling sites were initially chosen
558 using coordinates generated randomly from latitude and longitude coordinates in a satellite
559 image of the GA⁴⁸. About 17% of sites were later removed from the sample based on their close
560 proximity to landscape disturbances or inaccessibility by field technicians. Overall, 972 sites
561 were analyzed in the wet season and 885 in the dry season of 2016, two years after the
562 implementation phase of CBRLM had ended.

563 The geographic center-point for a sampling site was generated using a spatially
564 constrained random distribution algorithm applied to the satellite image, and the field team
565 navigated to the center-point coordinates using GPS technology. The team took photographs and
566 recorded descriptive information including elevation, slope, aspect, other landscape features,
567 vegetation type, dominant plant species, soil type, soil erosion, and degree of grazing or
568 browsing pressure, and proximity to high impact areas such as trails, water points, and villages.

569 At the center point, the survey team then established two perpendicular transects, each
570 100 m in length and crossing at the middle. The resulting four, 50-m transect lines ran according
571 to each cardinal direction (N, S, E, W) as determined with a compass. Technicians then placed 1-
572 m notched sampling sticks at randomized locations along each transect line and recorded what
573 plants or other materials (i.e., stone, wood, leaf litter, animal dung, etc.) were located under or
574 above the notches of the sampling sticks. These data points were tabulated to calculate percent
575 cover for various categories of vegetation; there were n=200 data points per site based on 40
576 stick placements and 5 notches per stick. This method enabled precise calculation of cover
577 values for herbaceous (i.e., grass, forb) and diminutive woody plants (i.e., small shrubs,
578 seedlings, saplings, etc.). Tree cover was estimated from point data collected via a small
579 adjustment in the approach⁴³. Herbaceous species were identified in wet seasons but not in dry
580 seasons due to senescence during the latter.

581 Quadrat sampling supplemented the notched stick approach. Random placements of a 1-
582 m² quadrat frame within the sampling site allowed for 20 estimates of a soil surface condition
583 score ranging from 1 (poor) to 2 (moderate) or 3 (good)⁴³. Poor was indicated by smooth soil
584 surfaces, absence of litter, having poor infiltration and signs of erosion such as rills, pedestals, or
585 terracettes; Good was indicated by rough soil surfaces, abundant litter, seedlings evident, and
586 lack of evidence of erosion. Herbaceous biomass was estimated in the quadrats and weighed to
587 estimate herbaceous biomass.

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589

590 **Statistics**

591

592 ***Index creation***

593 Index construction for socioeconomic variables was composed of several steps⁴⁹. For
594 each response variable we first signed all component variables such that a higher sign is a
595 positive outcome, i.e., in line with CBRLM's intended impacts. Then we standardized each
596 component by subtracting its control group mean and dividing by its control group standard
597 deviation. We computed the mean of the standardized components of the index and standardized
598 the sum once again by the control group sum's mean and standard deviation. When the value of
599 one component in an index was missing, we computed the index average from the remaining
600 components. See Extended Data Tables 3-6 for index components.

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Calculation of Average Treatment Effects

The estimate of interest is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), or the average change in an outcome generated by assignment to CBRLM. We estimated the ATE using standard Ordinary Least Squares regression and control for variables used in stratification. Regressions for rangeland outcome variables include a unique set of controls, including rainfall over the project period, rainfall in the year of data collection, grazing area cattle density, grazing area ecological zones, and a remote-sensing estimate of pre-project biomass. The core model takes the form:

$$\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1 T + \beta X$$

where T represents treatment assignment and X represents pre-treatment covariates used to test for balance during re-randomizations. The results capture the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect rather than the effect of treatment-on-treated (TOT). ITT is more appropriate than TOT in this context for two principal reasons. First, it is more relevant for policymakers – the effect of policies should account for imperfect compliance. Second, “uptake” is not well-defined, and certainly not a binary concept, for CBRLM since many communities and community members complied partially, complied with some but not all components, and complied for some but not all of the time.

Standard errors and p-values

We report two-tailed p-values for all analyses. For each outcome, we show the two-tailed p-value from a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with standard errors clustered at the level of the RIA, the unit of randomization⁵⁰. We also calculate two-tailed p-values using Randomization Inference (RI). To calculate RI p-values, we re-run the randomization procedure (described above) 10,000 times and generate an Average Treatment Effect (ATE) under each hypothetical randomization. The p-value is the percent of re-randomizations that generate a treatment effect that is either equal to, or larger in absolute value than, the true ATE.

Multiple hypotheses correction

We calculate q-values to account for families of outcome indices with multiple hypotheses⁵¹. The q-value represents the minimum false discovery rate at which the null hypothesis would be rejected for a given test. We pre-specified five families of indices:

- 1. Behavioral outcomes (all in 2014):** Grazing planning, Grazing-plan adherence, Herding practices, and Herder management
- 2. Behavioral outcomes (all in 2016):** Grazing planning, Grazing-plan adherence, Herding practices, and Herder management
- 3. Primary material outcomes:** Cattle herd value (2016), Herd productivity (2016), Household income (2017), Household expenditures (2017), Household livestock wealth (2017)
- 4. Secondary material outcomes:** Time use (2017), Resilience (2017), Female empowerment (2017), Diet (2017), and Herd structure (2016)
- 5. Mechanisms:** Collective Action (2014, 2016), Community Governance (2014, 2016), Community disputes (2014, 2016), Trust (2014), Self and community efficacy (2014, 2017), and Knowledge (2016)

646 ***Heterogeneous treatment effects analysis***

647 We are interested in whether the effect of CBRLM was impacted by lower rainfall in
648 some grazing areas during the project period. We evaluated heterogeneous treatment effects by
649 rainfall in grazing areas using a variety of measures of rainfall, including aggregate rainfall
650 during the project period and deviation in aggregate rainfall from the ten-year mean during the
651 project period.

652 For simplicity, Extended Data Table 7 presents the results of analysis of the interaction
653 between treatment and a binary indicator of low rainfall. To construct this indicator, for each GA
654 we first compute the absolute difference between mean rainfall during the project and mean
655 rainfall during the 10 years prior (2000 – 2010). We divide the absolute difference by mean
656 rainfall during the 10 years prior to produce a relative (%) difference. We then determine the
657 median relative difference over all GAs. For each GA, we assign the value 1 to the low rainfall
658 indicator if the relative difference for the GA is less than the median relative difference over all
659 GAs; we assign 0 otherwise. The results are consistent when we use alternative rainfall
660 measures.

661

662 ***Spillovers analysis***

663 Because CBRLM grazing areas were more likely to experience external incursions by
664 cattle herds from outside the community, we test for spillovers. Specifically, we are interested in
665 whether control grazing areas near treatment areas were affected by having a treatment grazing
666 area nearby. We conducted the spillovers analysis only on control group grazing areas. For each
667 control group grazing area, we measured the distance to the border of the nearest treatment
668 grazing area. We created a binary measure taking the value 1 if the distance between the control
669 group grazing area and nearest treatment group grazing area is below the median distance, and 0
670 otherwise. We find no evidence of spillover effects. The results are presented in Extended Data
671 Table 8.

672

673 **Ethical considerations:** Approval for this study was obtained from the Institutional Review
674 Boards at Yale University (1103008148), Innovations for Poverty Action (253.11March-001),
675 and Northwestern University (STU00205556-CR0001). The program was conceived, designed,
676 and implemented by the Millennium Challenge Account compact between the Millennium
677 Challenge Corporation and the Government of Namibia. The research team did not participate in
678 program design or implementation. Communities and individual farmers were informed that they
679 were free to withdraw from participation in evaluation activities at any time. The random
680 assignment of the program was appropriate given the uncertainty around the program’s effect,
681 and the Government of Namibia committed to implementing the program in control areas if the
682 evaluation showed positive results.

683 The research team took a number of steps to ensure the autonomy and well-being of
684 study participants. First, we designed the survey and data collection protocols after significant
685 qualitative field work to ensure that questions about sensitive issues (e.g., cattle wealth, cattle
686 losses, attitudes towards the Traditional Authority) were phrased appropriately and did not
687 engender adverse emotional or social consequences. Second, all survey activities were reviewed
688 and approved by the MCA compact, Regional Governors, and Traditional Authorities. Third,
689 surveys were conducted with informed consent and in private to ensure that information
690 remained private and respondents were as comfortable as possible during the survey. Finally, the

691 research team disseminated findings on market prices and rangeland condition to communities
692 and regional Agriculture Extension Officers.

693 We received no negative reports about the community reception of the survey from surveyors
694 during the evaluation. Two cows were injured during the cattle weighing exercise, and the owner
695 was financially compensated in line with a compensation agreement made with all farmers prior
696 to the cattle weighing exercise.

697
698 **Data availability:** Hypotheses and analytical methods for this research were pre-registered prior
699 to analysis through the American Economic Association’s RCT registry and are available online
700 (<https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2723>). Data used for this research are accessible at
701 the Millennium Challenge Corporation website
702 (<https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/138/study-description>) and will be posted on
703 the Innovations for Poverty Action dataverse. In the publicly available data, some numerical
704 outliers have been censored in order to preserve the anonymity of the survey respondents. Access
705 to uncensored data is available upon request from the corresponding author, subject to approval
706 by the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

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708 **Code availability:** Data analysis was conducted in R and Stata. All code needed to replicate the
709 figures and tables in this paper and the Supplementary Information is available, with
710 accompanying datasets, through the Millennium Challenge Corporation at
711 (<https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/138/study-description>) and will be posted on
712 the Innovations for Poverty Action dataverse.

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857 **List of extended data tables:**

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Extended Data Table 1: Treatment effect on social indices

Panel A: Behaviors												
<i>Dependent variable</i>	0 - 1 years after program end						2 - 3 years after program end					
	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Grazing planning	1.31	0.24	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,199	1.02	0.21	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,218
Grazing plan adherence	0.35	0.09	<0.001	0.034	0.001	1,199	0.32	0.06	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,240
Herding practices	0.37	0.12	0.003	0.013	0.001	1,199	0.30	0.08	0.001	0.023	0.002	1,243
Herder management	0.15	0.08	0.069	0.133	0.072	1,199	0.43	0.14	0.004	0.058	0.005	1,243
Cattle husbandry *	0.36	0.11	0.002	0.029	.	1,199	0.13	0.09	0.190	0.354	.	1,249
Herd restructuring *	0.00	0.07	0.952	0.977	.	1,199	-0.02	0.03	0.604	0.777	.	1,243
Cattle marketing *	-0.06	0.06	0.374	0.655	.	1,199	0.07	0.05	0.184	0.474	.	1,245

Panel B: Community dynamics, knowledge, and attitudes												
<i>Dependent variable</i>	0 - 1 years after program end						2 - 3 years after program end					
	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Community governance	0.75	0.14	<0.001	0.007	0.001	1,199	0.55	0.12	<0.001	0.004	0.001	1,245
Collective action	1.53	0.26	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,199	0.89	0.23	<0.001	0.002	0.002	1,245
Community disputes	0.07	0.07	0.339	0.458	0.466	1,140	-0.29	0.09	0.002	0.108	0.004	1,243
Trust	-0.02	0.07	0.729	0.786	0.803	1,198
Expertise	0.30	0.10	0.005	0.044	0.009	1,199	0.35	0.09	<0.001	0.011	0.002	1,248
Self & community efficacy	0.04	0.09	0.668	0.754	0.803	1,196	0.00	0.08	0.970	0.980	0.971	1,009

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of an index of social or behavioral outcomes on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Indices are the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of standardized components. See Materials and Methods for details of index construction. Variables for the "trust" index were not collected in the survey 2 - 3 years after program end. All p-values are two-tailed. * indicates variables for which multiple hypothesis correction was not specified in the pre-analysis plan.

Extended Data Table 2: Treatment effect on rangeland health, cattle productivity, and household economics

Panel A: Primary outcomes (indices)		2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	
Herd value	0.00	0.11	0.988	0.994	0.982	653	
Herd productivity	0.02	0.09	0.826	0.904	0.982	1,285	
Weekly household income	0.08	0.07	0.230	0.418	0.975	1,210	
Weekly household expenditure	0.02	0.05	0.663	0.608	0.975	1,210	
Household livestock wealth	-0.06	0.05	0.207	0.502	0.975	1,210	

Panel B: Secondary outcomes (indices)		2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	
Herd structure	-0.02	0.07	0.746	0.841	0.984	653	
Time use	0.04	0.10	0.703	0.818	0.984	1,210	
Resilience	-0.02	0.07	0.786	0.885	0.984	1,210	
Female empowerment	-0.01	0.08	0.880	0.909	0.984	1,210	
Meat and dairy consumption	0.00	0.04	0.990	0.993	0.997	1,210	

Panel C: Rangeland outcomes (standardized)		2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	
Erosion:							
Wet season site erosion (1 = no erosion, 0 = erosion)	-0.08	0.10	0.389	0.661	.	972	
Ground cover:							
Wet season unexposed soil surface (% , logit-transformed)	-0.21	0.10	0.051	0.160	.	972	
Wet season plant litter cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.18	0.08	0.035	0.201	.	972	
Dry season plant litter cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.09	0.12	0.444	0.715	.	885	
Herbaceous cover:							
Wet season herbaceous canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.26	0.14	0.072	0.270	.	972	
Dry season herbaceous canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.23	0.07	0.002	0.079	.	885	
Wet season fresh plant biomass at site (kg/ha, log-transformed)	-0.26	0.16	0.104	0.294	.	966	
Dry season fresh plant biomass at site (kg/ha, log-transformed)	-0.21	0.07	0.004	0.112	.	792	
Relative canopy cover of perennial and annual grasses:							
Wet season perennial to annual canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.05	0.08	0.486	0.750	.	972	
Relative canopy cover of grasses and forbs:							
Wet season grass to forb canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.23	0.10	0.025	0.260	.	972	
Weeds:							
Wet season % of shrubs that are not stinkbush (% , logit-transformed)	0.02	0.08	0.770	0.922	.	870	
Wet season grass to Aristida canopy cover ratio (log-transformed) *	-0.14	0.13	0.259	0.467	.	752	
Woody vegetation:							
Wet season shrub canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.01	0.14	0.956	0.972	.	972	
Dry season shrub canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.09	0.15	0.569	0.734	.	885	

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a physical program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Data in Panels A and B were collected from surveys of heads of household and cattle managers, and data in Panel C were collected from randomly selected transects as described in the Methods. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: quality of water source, an indicator for whether the RIA has a community based organization, vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and an indicator for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas. Indices are the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of standardized components. Monetary variables have been scaled to weekly Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. At the time of data collection (2017) the exchange rate was 13.3 NAD to 1 USD. Rangeland outcomes have been transformed as noted in parentheses to better meet assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. See Materials and Methods and the Supplementary Materials for details of index and variable construction. Multiple hypothesis correction was not specified for rangeland outcomes in the pre-analysis plan. All p-values are two-tailed. * Aristida is a genus of grasses that are undesirable forage plants in this context.

Extended Data Table 3: Treatment effect on social indices and their components (Panel A)

Panel A: Behavioral outcomes		0 - 1 years after program end						2 - 3 years after program end					
Dependent variable	coef.	SE	p-val.	RI p-val.	Ctrl mean	N	coef.	SE	p-val.	RI p-val.	Ctrl mean	N	
Index: Grazing planning	1.31	0.24	<0.001	0.002	0.00	1,199	1.02	0.21	<0.001	0.002	0.00	1,218	
Manager has grazing plan	0.08	0.04	0.032	0.215	0.67	1,199	0.13	0.03	<0.001	0.002	0.62	1,217	
Manager can show written grazing plan	0.27	0.05	<0.001	0.001	0.01	1,182	0.20	0.05	<0.001	0.002	0.03	1,218	
Manager has grazing plan for next season	0.18	0.03	<0.001	0.006	0.45	1,199	
Index: Grazing plan adherence	0.35	0.09	<0.001	0.034	0.00	1,199	0.32	0.06	<0.001	0.002	0.00	1,240	
Manager followed grazing plan *	0.17	0.03	<0.001	0.017	0.40	1,199	0.09	0.03	0.002	0.024	0.25	1,218	
Number of months followed plan (past year)	0.88	0.39	0.030	0.178	5.00	1,186	1.63	0.32	<0.001	0.005	4.03	1,181	
Index: Herding practices	0.37	0.12	0.003	0.013	0.00	1,199	0.30	0.08	0.001	0.023	0.00	1,243	
Someone herds manager's cattle	0.06	0.04	0.113	0.192	0.78	1,199	0.02	0.03	0.455	0.780	0.82	1,225	
Herder stays with cattle throughout day *	0.11	0.03	<0.001	0.020	0.40	1,199	0.09	0.03	0.002	0.024	0.25	1,218	
Cattle herded from water point in bunch	0.16	0.06	0.007	0.041	0.21	1,199	
Cattle herded in bunch when grazing	0.13	0.04	0.004	0.023	0.14	1,199	0.11	0.04	0.019	0.045	0.16	1,243	
No cattle missing from manager's herd	0.00	0.03	0.916	0.960	0.56	1,199	
(-1)*Ratio of cattle lost/stolen to cattle owned	-0.01	0.03	0.848	0.877	-0.14	1,187	-0.01	0.01	0.373	0.538	-0.06	1,234	
Grazing plan intended to protect grass	0.13	0.05	0.010	0.045	0.19	819	
Index: Herder management	0.15	0.08	0.069	0.133	0.00	1,199	0.43	0.14	0.004	0.058	0.00	1,243	
Manager communicates weekly with herders	0.05	0.04	0.203	0.442	0.67	1,198	
Manager pays herders in cash	0.09	0.04	0.019	0.106	0.28	1,198	0.04	0.05	0.405	0.725	0.55	1,243	
Total cash & in-kind payment to herders (NAD)	64.97	35.64	0.076	0.132	252.95	1,196	60.45	69.11	0.387	0.585	463.78	1,204	
Total spent on gear provided to herders (NAD)	-4.93	102.86	0.962	0.975	462.14	994	
Total gear provided to herders (# of items)	-0.04	0.09	0.651	0.781	1.00	1,195	
Index: Cattle husbandry	0.36	0.11	0.002	0.029	0.00	1,199	0.13	0.09	0.190	0.354	0.00	1,249	
Cattle visit water point at least once per day	0.17	0.05	<0.001	0.020	0.18	1,199	
Any non-mandatory cattle vaccination	0.07	0.05	0.158	0.366	0.54	1,199	0.04	0.05	0.416	0.603	0.59	1,242	
Cumulative number of cattle vaccinations	0.17	0.09	0.071	0.257	0.83	1,199	
Total spent on cattle vaccines (NAD)	163.86	71.88	0.028	0.146	603.19	1,220	
Cattle have been dewormed	0.08	0.04	0.032	0.124	0.17	1,199	0.02	0.04	0.608	0.652	0.30	1,243	
Number of cattle dietary supplements provided	0.11	0.09	0.236	0.464	0.93	1,199	0.18	0.12	0.165	0.345	1.39	1,242	
Cattle checked for ticks at least monthly	0.04	0.03	0.172	0.512	0.35	1,199	-0.02	0.04	0.636	0.770	0.38	1,243	
Total investment in animal treatment (NAD)	-50.68	95.97	0.601	0.809	462.07	1,222	
Fraction of cattle eartagged	0.04	0.03	0.172	0.276	0.84	653	
Index: Herd restructuring	0.00	0.07	0.952	0.977	0.00	1,199	-0.02	0.03	0.604	0.777	0.00	1,243	
Sold cattle to improve herd structure	0.00	0.03	0.952	0.977	0.30	1,199	0.00	0.01	0.604	0.777	0.05	1,243	
Index: Cattle marketing	-0.06	0.06	0.374	0.655	0.00	1,199	0.07	0.05	0.184	0.474	0.00	1,245	
Any live cattle sold (past year)	0.00	0.03	0.978	0.990	0.58	1,199	0.04	0.02	0.067	0.226	0.36	1,243	
Total number of live cattle sold (past year)	-0.47	0.41	0.263	0.614	3.66	1,190	0.18	0.26	0.506	0.698	1.67	1,245	
Total value of live cattle sold (NAD, past year)	-2,321	1,809	0.208	0.567	11,471	1,157	1,246	1,055	0.245	0.561	7,108	1,226	

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a behavioral program outcome, as measured in a survey of grazing area managers, on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Each index is the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of the standardized components listed below it; see Materials and Methods for a complete description of index creation. Empty cells indicate that a variable was not collected in that survey round. Monetary variables are in Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. 0 - 1 years after program end (2014), the exchange rate was 10.8 NAD to 1 USD, and 2 - 3 years after program end was 14.7 NAD to 1 USD. Component variables without description of units are binary, with positive responses coded as 1. All p-values are two-tailed. * indicates that the survey question used to construct the variable asked about behaviors during the past rainy season in the survey conducted 0-1 years after program end, and behaviors during the past year in the survey conducted 2-3 years after program end.

Extended Data Table 4: Treatment effect on social indices and their components (Panel B)

Panel B: Community dynamics, knowledge, and attitudes		0 - 1 years after program end						2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Community governance	0.75	0.14	<0.001	0.007	0.00	1,199	0.55	0.12	<0.001	0.004	0.00	1,245	
GA community groups, past 5 yrs (# of groups)	0.36	0.06	<0.001	0.010	1.54	1,243	
GA community groups currently (# of groups)	0.32	0.08	<0.001	0.049	1.47	1,243	
Manager's cumulative membership (# of groups)	0.46	0.09	<0.001	0.026	0.70	1,199	0.30	0.08	<0.001	0.060	0.78	1,244	
Group performance (# of satisfying groups)	0.86	0.21	<0.001	0.041	3.69	1,243	
Farmers enforce water point payments	0.03	0.05	0.578	0.742	0.65	1,243	
Farmers pay for water according to usage	0.02	0.06	0.759	0.821	0.19	1,239	
Grazing plan formally enforced	0.05	0.02	0.010	0.083	0.04	1,243	
Someone personally enforces grazing plan *	0.30	0.05	<0.001	0.004	0.13	1,198	0.26	0.05	<0.001	0.003	0.13	1,217	
Non-community grazing not allowed	0.07	0.02	0.005	0.070	0.16	1,230	
Conflict resolution is group-based	0.09	0.02	<0.001	0.041	0.60	1,243	
Satisfied with group conflict resolution (1 - 3 scale)	-0.07	0.04	0.147	0.235	2.67	1,225	
Approves of traditional authority	-0.01	0.03	0.681	0.845	0.25	1,175	
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Collective action	1.53	0.26	<0.001	0.002	0.00	1,199	0.89	0.23	<0.001	0.002	0.00	1,245	
Manager pays herders communally	0.08	0.01	<0.001	0.023	0.02	1,199	0.11	0.03	<0.001	0.036	0.28	1,240	
Pays for vaccines communally	0.15	0.04	<0.001	0.013	0.03	1,199	
Pays for cattle care communally	0.05	0.07	0.457	0.646	0.32	1,243	
Attended water committee >4x yearly *	0.05	0.03	0.098	0.162	0.11	1,199	0.04	0.02	0.094	0.156	0.12	1,239	
Contributed money to water committee	0.11	0.03	<0.001	0.025	0.19	1,199	0.04	0.04	0.320	0.503	0.25	1,243	
Water committee contribution amt (NAD)	43.72	67.97	0.524	0.609	138.89	1,230	
Attended development committee >4x yearly	0.01	0.01	0.343	0.609	0.06	1,199	0.02	0.01	0.185	0.498	0.05	1,238	
Contributed money to development committee	0.04	0.01	<0.001	0.070	0.05	1,196	
Development committee contribution amt (NAD)	-0.14	1.57	0.930	0.967	5.25	1,233	
Practiced rainy season combined herding *	0.34	0.04	<0.001	0.004	0.38	1,188	0.19	0.07	0.008	0.033	0.36	1,217	
Intentionally combined cattle with specific herd *	0.34	0.06	<0.001	0.004	0.20	1,199	
Ratio of GA herds to herds in combined herd *	0.23	0.05	<0.001	0.003	0.05	1,089	0.12	0.04	0.001	0.011	0.04	1,216	
Ratio of manager cattle to cattle in combined herd *	0.21	0.06	<0.001	0.007	0.03	1,039	0.12	0.03	<0.001	0.009	0.03	1,186	
Grazing plan is decided on by group *	0.28	0.05	<0.001	0.004	0.22	1,189	0.24	0.05	<0.001	0.006	0.26	1,218	
Shared grazing plan exists for rainy season *	0.19	0.04	<0.001	0.012	0.32	1,199	
Ratio of farmers in group grazing plan to GA herds *	0.18	0.04	<0.001	0.020	0.13	1,171	0.16	0.05	0.002	0.018	0.15	1,218	
Attended grazing committee >4x yearly	0.16	0.03	<0.001	0.009	0.03	1,199	0.10	0.02	<0.001	0.002	0.02	1,243	
Contributed money to grazing committee	0.16	0.04	<0.001	0.007	0.02	1,197	0.05	0.01	<0.001	0.013	0.02	1,243	
Grazing committee contribution amt (NAD)	11.12	4.85	0.028	0.157	4.90	1,239	
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Community disputes	0.07	0.07	0.339	0.458	0.00	1,140	-0.29	0.09	0.002	0.108	0.00	1,243	
Community conflicts decreased (past 3 yrs) *	0.03	0.03	0.339	0.458	0.30	1,140	
Conflicts w/ farmers inside GA (-1*#[# conflicts])	-0.12	0.03	<0.001	0.082	-1.15	1,243	
Conflicts w/ farmers outside GA (-1*#[# conflicts])	-0.08	0.03	0.012	0.182	-1.08	1,243	
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Trust	-0.02	0.07	0.729	0.786	0.00	1,198	
Manager believes people can be trusted	-0.05	0.04	0.249	0.414	0.49	1,188	
No decrease in # of people manager trusts	0.03	0.03	0.351	0.603	0.64	1,177	
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Expertise	0.30	0.10	0.005	0.044	0.00	1,199	0.35	0.09	<0.001	0.011	0.00	1,248	
Cattle expert available for disease questions	0.18	0.05	<0.001	0.025	0.43	1,199	0.17	0.06	0.003	0.020	0.31	1,234	
Cattle expert available for general questions	0.14	0.06	0.017	0.034	0.19	1,199	
Correctly ages cow based on dental condition	0.08	0.02	<0.001	0.036	0.13	1,243	
Manager identifies ideal bull to cow ratio	-0.03	0.03	0.331	0.405	0.20	1,198	0.02	0.02	0.386	0.596	0.85	1,243	
Cattle weight guess (-1*[% error])	0.27	0.10	0.010	0.142	-0.54	416	
Cattle market price guess (-1*[% error])	-0.02	0.02	0.418	0.587	-0.33	409	
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Self & community efficacy	0.04	0.09	0.668	0.754	0.00	1,196	0.00	0.08	0.970	0.980	0.00	1,009	
Own actions affect cattle health & value	0.00	0.03	0.903	0.928	0.78	1,196	0.01	0.03	0.776	0.863	0.58	1,009	
Own actions affect rangeland quality	0.03	0.05	0.471	0.642	0.61	1,195	-0.02	0.03	0.576	0.637	0.49	1,009	
Community engagement affects cattle health	-0.02	0.04	0.683	0.820	0.64	1,009	
Community actions affect rangeland	0.03	0.04	0.455	0.682	0.64	1,009	

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a behavioral program outcome, as measured in a survey of grazing area managers, on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Each index is the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of the standardized components listed below it; see Materials and Methods for a complete description of index creation. Empty cells indicate that a variable or index was not collected in that survey round. Monetary variables are in Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. 0 -1 years after program end (2014), the exchange rate was 10.8 NAD to 1 USD, and 2 - 3 years after program end was 14.7 NAD to 1 USD. Component variables without description of units are binary, with positive responses coded as 1. All p-values are two-tailed. * indicates that the survey question used to construct the variable asked about behaviors during the past rainy season in the survey conducted 0-1 years after program end, and behaviors during the past year in the survey conducted 2-3 years after program end.

Extended Data Table 5: Treatment effect on indices of rangeland health, cattle productivity and household economics, and their components (Panel A)

Panel A: Primary outcomes		2 - 3 years after program end				
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Index: Herd value	0.00	0.11	0.988	0.994	0.00	653
Total number of cattle per kraal	0.23	3.61	0.950	0.971	34.15	653
Total meat production per kraal (kg)	-33	1,083	0.976	0.984	9,010	653
Total herd market value (NAD)	-8,953	116,241	0.939	0.960	1,007,571	653
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Index: Herd productivity	0.02	0.09	0.826	0.904	0.00	1,285
Calving rate among productive calves	0.00	0.03	0.940	0.961	0.74	641
Change in herd size (# of cattle, rainy season)	0.47	1.27	0.715	0.780	-8.23	1,243
Weekly milk products produced (kg, rainy season)	4.71	6.55	0.477	0.578	26.06	1,153
Sub-index: cattle weight	-0.06	0.09	0.480	0.622	0.00	653
Sub-index: cattle condition	-0.31	0.21	0.145	0.463	0.00	653
Sub-index: Cattle weight	-0.06	0.09	0.480	0.622	0.00	653
Average cow weight (kg)	0.13	4.96	0.978	0.987	299.60	641
Average ox weight (kg)	4.66	7.25	0.524	0.623	380.38	587
Average male calf weight (kg)	1.95	2.36	0.415	0.724	118.65	564
Average female calf weight (kg)	-2.17	2.58	0.407	0.580	116.84	578
Average heifer weight (kg)	-6.68	4.47	0.144	0.323	245.58	576
Average steer weight (kg)	-11.15	6.04	0.073	0.271	241.01	363
Average bull weight (kg)	16.11	12.59	0.209	0.343	386.04	361
Sub-index: Cattle body condition	-0.31	0.21	0.145	0.463	0.00	653
Average cow body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.12	0.08	0.139	0.450	0.44	641
Average ox body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.15	0.11	0.195	0.520	0.98	587
Average male calf body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.04	0.05	0.437	0.711	0.27	564
Average female calf body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.10	0.06	0.072	0.354	0.26	577
Average heifer body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.19	0.11	0.090	0.385	0.65	576
Average steer body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.28	0.11	0.013	0.232	0.69	364
Average bull body condition (0 - 5 scale)	-0.09	0.15	0.539	0.705	1.03	362
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Additive index: Weekly per capita household income (NAD)	39.81	32.59	0.230	0.418	201.09	1,210
Total crop revenue (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	2.76	2.43	0.263	0.393	4.32	1,210
Total formal employment profits (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	43.53	67.14	0.521	0.738	340.82	1,210
Total value of all food produced at home (NAD, weekly)	-2.80	33.72	0.934	0.970	201.48	1,210
Total value of non-sold byproducts (NAD, weekly)	-0.04	0.05	0.349	0.349	0.19	1,210
Value of own cattle used for plowing (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	-2.35	3.27	0.477	0.641	33.15	1,195
Total cattle sale revenue (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	6.24	27.83	0.824	0.881	79.24	1,210
Total cattle byproduct sale revenue (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	0.48	0.51	0.354	0.679	1.94	1,210
Amount of remittances received (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	4.73	2.29	0.046	0.237	15.20	1,172
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Additive index: Weekly per capita household expenditure (NAD)	28.66	65.17	0.663	0.608	402.70	1,210
Total amount borrowed (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	-46.94	24.29	0.061	0.373	77.25	1,210
Total nonfood expenditure (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	-40.91	74.52	0.586	0.743	306.23	1,210
Total nonfood expenditure (NAD, scaled from 30 days)	125.20	61.57	0.049	0.144	426.57	1,210
Total crop expenditure (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	0.54	0.40	0.181	0.495	3.32	1,183
Expenditure hiring animals for plowing (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	0.09	0.22	0.691	0.826	1.20	1,210
Amount sent in remittances (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	5.06	3.67	0.176	0.432	21.89	1,210
Total expenditure on water (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	0.08	0.91	0.927	0.967	6.60	1,176
Total value of food purchased (NAD)	4.67	90.06	0.959	0.970	314.33	1,210
Amount spent purchasing cattle (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	0.54	6.89	0.938	0.972	29.93	1,210
Amount spent transporting sold cattle (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	0.07	0.13	0.620	0.654	0.13	1,210
Total cattle upkeep expenditure (NAD, scaled from 12 months)	9.90	20.99	0.640	0.817	176.18	1,210
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Index: Household livestock wealth	-0.06	0.05	0.207	0.502	0.00	1,210
Total cattle wealth (livestock units)	-4.40	3.13	0.168	0.391	30.62	1,176
Total non-cattle wealth (livestock units)	-0.07	0.49	0.885	0.935	6.35	1,210

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a behavioral program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Herd value, herd productivity, and household livestock wealth indices are the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of the standardized components listed below each index. Income and expenditure indices are the sum of components, adjusted for household size. See Materials and Methods for a complete description of index creation. Monetary variables are in Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. 0 -1 years after program end (2014), the exchange rate was 10.8 NAD to 1 USD, and 2 - 3 years after program end was 14.7 NAD to 1 USD. Cattle body condition scores are on a 0 - 5 scale used by Meat Corporation of Namibia, with 0 being low fat content and 5 being high. Component variables without description of units are binary, with positive responses coded as 1. All p-values are two-tailed.

Extended Data Table 6: Treatment effect on indices of rangeland health, cattle productivity and household economics, and their components (Panel B & C)

Panel B: Secondary outcomes	2 - 3 years after program end						
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>	
Index: Herd structure	-0.02	0.07	0.746	0.841	0.00	653	
Ratio of bulls to cows is higher than 1:40	-0.10	0.03	0.001	0.104	0.61	646	
(-1)*Ratio of oxen to total cattle	0.01	0.01	0.649	0.742	-0.15	653	
(-1)*Ratio of unproductive cattle to total cattle	0.02	0.01	0.206	0.586	-0.13	653	
Index: Time use	0.04	0.10	0.703	0.818	0.00	1,210	
Days spent herding (typical week scaled to annual, adult)	-8.40	10.49	0.429	0.558	81.70	1,210	
Days spent working on crops (past year, adult)	2.91	2.37	0.228	0.460	0.88	1,210	
Days formally employed (past year, adult)	3.62	4.57	0.433	0.586	34.74	1,210	
(-1)*Days spent herding (typical week scaled to annual, child)	-2.76	4.50	0.543	0.680	-15.43	970	
(-1)*Days spent working on crops (past year, child)	-0.27	0.30	0.381	0.594	-0.17	970	
(-1)*Days formally employed (past year, child)	-0.24	0.33	0.461	0.773	-0.22	970	
Index: Resilience	-0.02	0.07	0.786	0.885	0.00	1,210	
FAO food security index (-3 - 0; -3 = severely insecure)	-0.12	0.09	0.205	0.572	-1.62	1,207	
Did not lack money for school fees (past year)	0.02	0.02	0.343	0.622	0.89	1,210	
Savings available to cover emergency expense (NAD)	-31.05	211.14	0.884	0.929	1,486	1,210	
Savings and credit available to cover emergency expense (NAD)	-341.20	216.17	0.123	0.407	2,829	1,210	
Household saves money	0.04	0.05	0.390	0.636	0.70	1,165	
Total household savings (NAD)	-1,189	2,279	0.605	0.731	6,720	1,034	
Index: Female empowerment	-0.01	0.08	0.880	0.909	0.00	1,210	
Any female HH member owns cattle	-0.03	0.04	0.382	0.597	0.48	1,210	
Fraction of HH cattle owned by women	-0.01	0.03	0.681	0.798	0.25	1,111	
Any new female goat owner in HH (past 3 years)	0.02	0.02	0.457	0.616	0.13	1,210	
Index: Meat and dairy consumption	0.00	0.04	0.990	0.993	0.00	1,210	
Per capita meat consumption (kg, past week)	-1.12	2.00	0.579	0.684	6.77	1,210	
Per capita dairy consumption (kg, past week)	0.09	0.31	0.763	0.868	1.15	1,197	
Panel C: Rangeland outcomes	2 - 3 years after program end						
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Erosion:							
Wet season site erosion (1 = no erosion, 0 = erosion)	-0.04	0.05	0.389	0.661	0.517	0.434	972
Ground cover:							
Wet season protected soil surface (%; logit-transformed)	-0.34	0.17	0.051	0.160	0.807	0.762	972
Wet season plant litter cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.22	0.10	0.035	0.201	0.547	0.514	972
Dry season plant litter cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.18	0.23	0.444	0.715	0.620	0.573	885
Herbaceous cover:							
Wet season herbaceous canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.53	0.29	0.072	0.270	0.446	0.369	972
Dry season herbaceous canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.52	0.16	0.002	0.079	0.216	0.171	885
Wet season fresh plant biomass at site (kg/ha; log-transformed)	-0.45	0.27	0.104	0.294	459	338	966
Dry season fresh plant biomass at site (kg/ha; log-transformed)	-0.48	0.16	0.004	0.112	233	227	792
Relative canopy cover of perennial and annual grasses:							
Wet season perennial to annual canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.18	0.26	0.486	0.750	22.800	16.816	972
Relative canopy cover of grasses and forbs:							
Wet season grass to forb canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.33	0.14	0.025	0.260	43.329	33.563	972
Weeds:							
Wet season % of shrubs that are not stinkbush (%; logit-transformed)	0.02	0.07	0.770	0.922	0.991	0.964	870
Wet season grass to Aristida canopy cover ratio (log-transformed) *	-0.18	0.16	0.259	0.467	12.962	12.935	752
Woody vegetation:							
Wet season shrub canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.01	0.19	0.956	0.972	0.084	0.074	972
Dry season shrub canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.13	0.23	0.569	0.734	0.108	0.089	885

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Each index is the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of the standardized components listed below it; see Materials and Methods for a complete description of index creation. Monetary variables are in Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. 0 -1 years after program end (2014), the exchange rate was 10.8 NAD to 1 USD, and 2 - 3 years after program end was 14.7 NAD to 1 USD. Component variables without description of units are binary, with positive responses coded as 1. Rangeland outcomes have been transformed (but not standardized as in Extended Data Table 2) as noted in parentheses to better meet assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance; treatment and control means are sample means computed from data on untransformed scales. All p-values are two-tailed. * Aristida is a genus of grasses that are undesirable forage plants in this context.

Extended Data Table 7: Treatment effect heterogeneity by rainfall for rangeland health, cattle productivity and household economics

Panel A: Physical outcomes (2 - 3 years)	Treatment			Low rainfall indicator			Treatment x low rainfall indicator				Ctrl mean	N
	coef.1	SE	p-val.	coef.2	SE	p-val.	coef.3	SE	p-val.	RI p-val		
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.1</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.2</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.3</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val</i>		
Herd value	0.12	0.11	0.271	-0.18	0.18	0.318	-0.17	0.16	0.314	0.521	0.00	653
Herd productivity	-0.12	0.09	0.212	-0.31	0.15	0.044	0.20	0.16	0.224	0.477	0.00	653
Weekly household income	58.22	38.66	0.141	40.78	52.69	0.444	-37.12	63.03	0.560	0.755	201.1	1,210
Weekly household expenditure	-33.96	74.49	0.651	-23.77	113.8	0.836	118.5	127.5	0.359	0.549	402.7	1,210
Household livestock wealth	-0.03	0.06	0.624	-0.03	0.16	0.841	-0.05	0.09	0.565	0.749	0.00	1,210
Herd structure	-0.12	0.09	0.212	-0.31	0.15	0.044	0.20	0.16	0.224	0.477	0.00	653
Time use	0.27	0.16	0.089	0.62	0.29	0.037	-0.48	0.26	0.068	0.168	0.00	1,210
Resilience	-0.17	0.09	0.076	0.00	0.13	0.969	0.28	0.12	0.028	0.177	0.00	1,210
Female empowerment	0.06	0.13	0.666	0.08	0.14	0.591	-0.14	0.14	0.347	0.521	0.00	1,210
<hr/>												
Panel B: Rangeland outcomes (2 - years)	Treatment			Low rainfall indicator			Treatment x low rainfall indicator				Ctrl mean	N
	coef.1	SE	p-val.	coef.2	SE	p-val.	coef.3	SE	p-val.	RI p-val		
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.1</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.2</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.3</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val</i>		
Erosion:												
Wet season site erosion (1 = no erosion, 0 = erosion)	0.01	0.08	0.887	0.01	0.10	0.877	-0.14	0.09	0.129	0.319	0.52	972
Ground cover:												
Wet season protected soil surface (%; logit-trans.)	-0.53	0.22	0.019	-0.28	0.17	0.103	0.43	0.25	0.099	0.295	0.81	972
Wet season plant litter cover (%; logit-trans.)	-0.24	0.13	0.075	0.32	0.11	0.008	0.11	0.17	0.543	0.632	0.55	972
Dry season plant litter cover (%; logit-trans.)	0.00	0.42	0.994	0.02	0.31	0.950	-0.31	0.49	0.531	0.687	0.62	885
Herbaceous cover:												
Wet season herbaceous canopy cover (%; logit-trans.)	-1.22	0.36	0.002	-0.79	0.26	0.004	1.26	0.47	0.011	0.141	0.45	972
Dry season herbaceous canopy cover (%; logit-trans.)	-0.84	0.21	<0.001	-0.84	0.22	<0.001	0.58	0.20	0.007	0.126	0.22	885
Wet season fresh plant biomass at site (kg/ha; log-trans.)	-0.67	0.28	0.024	-0.47	0.29	0.113	0.41	0.32	0.209	0.455	459.37	966
Dry season fresh plant biomass at site (kg/ha; log-trans.)	-0.78	0.20	<0.001	-0.67	0.11	<0.001	0.68	0.26	0.014	0.124	232.59	792
Relative canopy cover of perennial and annual grasses:												
Wet season perennial to annual canopy ratio (log-trans.)	0.44	0.46	0.347	0.17	0.50	0.730	-0.87	0.64	0.184	0.294	22.80	972
Relative canopy cover of grasses and forbs:												
Wet season grass to forb canopy ratio (log-trans.)	-0.43	0.23	0.068	-0.09	0.32	0.783	0.21	0.33	0.530	0.640	43.33	972
Weeds:												
Wet season % of shrubs that are not stinkbush (%; logit-trans.)	0.05	0.09	0.567	0.28	0.15	0.065	-0.03	0.15	0.853	0.852	0.99	870
Wet season grass to Aristida canopy cover ratio (log-trans.) *	-0.26	0.19	0.186	-0.49	0.18	0.011	0.08	0.19	0.698	0.873	12.96	752
Woody vegetation:												
Wet season shrub canopy cover (%; logit-trans.)	0.01	0.26	0.967	-0.38	0.18	0.039	-0.10	0.32	0.747	0.811	0.08	972
Dry season shrub canopy cover (%; logit-trans.)	-0.09	0.33	0.794	-0.48	0.33	0.162	-0.03	0.40	0.934	0.942	0.11	885

Notes: Each row displays results from a separate regression in which the dependent variable is a rangeland outcome and the independent variables are treatment status and an indicator variable for low rainfall. Coef. 1 indicates the coefficient on treatment, which is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to control. Coef. 2 indicates the coefficient on an indicator variable for low rainfall, which is equal to 1 if a grazing area was below the median of all grazing areas in terms of percent difference in the grazing area's rainfall during the project period relative to the mean of the grazing area's rainfall over the 10 years prior to the program. Coef. 3 shows the interaction of the low-rainfall indicator with treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. See Materials and Methods for additional details of this analysis. All p-values are two-tailed.

Extended Data Table 8: Geographic spillover effects, rangeland health

Rangeland outcomes (2 - 3 years after program end)	Effect of control GA being located < median distance from a treatment GA					
	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>Distant mean</i>	<i>Near mean</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Dependent variable</i>						
Erosion:						
Wet season site erosion (1 = no erosion, 0 = erosion)	-0.03	0.06	0.627	0.47	0.56	553
Ground cover:						
Wet season protected soil surface (% , logit-transformed)	-0.52	0.32	0.126	0.79	0.82	553
Wet season plant litter cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.31	0.21	0.164	0.54	0.55	553
Dry season plant litter cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.24	0.42	0.582	0.60	0.63	499
Herbaceous cover:						
Wet season herbaceous canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.29	0.34	0.409	0.41	0.48	553
Dry season herbaceous canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.32	0.43	0.475	0.17	0.25	499
Wet season fresh plant biomass (kg/ha, log-transformed)	0.12	0.22	0.589	459	463.82	550
Dry season fresh plant biomass (kg/ha, log-transformed)	-0.52	0.24	0.042	265	207.94	445
Relative canopy cover of perennial and annual grasses:						
Wet season perennial to annual canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.33	0.80	0.683	27.28	19.07	553
Relative canopy cover of grasses and forbs:						
Wet season grass to forb canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.53	0.23	0.038	42.97	44.19	553
Weeds:						
Wet season % of shrubs that are not stinkbush (% , logit-transformed)	0.07	0.14	0.627	0.98	1.00	498
Wet season grass to <i>Aristida</i> canopy cover ratio (log-transformed) *	-0.19	0.20	0.364	11.06	15.00	443
Woody vegetation:						
Wet season shrub canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	0.14	0.15	0.367	0.09	0.08	553
Dry season shrub canopy cover (% , logit-transformed)	-0.08	0.27	0.783	0.13	0.09	499

Notes: Each row displays results from a separate regression in which the sample is all rangeland data collection sites in control GAs and the dependent variable is a rangeland outcome. The independent variable is an indicator of whether the distance between the GA in which the site is located and the nearest treatment GA is less than median distance to the nearest treatment GA among all control GAs; the coef. column shows the estimated effect of a site's GA being closer to a treatment GA than the median. The distant mean column shows the endline mean for distant control GAs. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Rangeland outcomes have been transformed as noted in parentheses to better meet assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance; distant and near means are sample means of the untransformed variables. See Materials and Methods for additional details of this analysis. All p-values are two-tailed. * *Aristida* is a genus of grasses that are undesirable forage plants in this context.

Extended Data Table 9: Mechanisms

Panel A: Direct evidence of grazing intensity	Treatment effect 2 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Evidence of heavy grazing on herbaceous plants (wet season)	0.12	0.04	0.003	0.032	0.13	972
Evidence of heavy grazing on herbaceous plants (dry season)	0.10	0.04	0.016	0.106	0.46	972
Evidence of any grazing on herbaceous plants (wet season)	0.04	0.03	0.151	0.336	0.92	972
Evidence of any grazing on herbaceous plants (dry season)	0.00	0.03	0.953	0.980	0.87	972

Panel B: Potential causes of increased grazing intensity	Treatment effect 2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Cattle numbers						
Number of herds currently in GA	-1.49	1.80	0.413	0.580	21.94	1,210
Number of cattle currently in GA	-178	130	0.178	0.433	1,011	1,245
Reduced farmer movement						
Manager moved cattle outside GA in past year	-0.04	0.03	0.290	0.549	0.20	1,242
Fraction of herd that manager moved outside GA in past year	-0.04	0.04	0.295	0.567	0.19	1,238
Number of months in which manager moved cattle outside GA (past 12 months)	-0.19	0.17	0.273	0.535	0.92	1,243
Number of years in which manager moved cattle outside GA (past 6 years)	-0.08	0.16	0.636	0.782	0.76	1,243
Outside encroachment						
Outside farmers brought cattle to GA in past year	0.05	0.03	0.105	0.408	0.37	1,207
Outside farmers brought cattle to GA in past year without permission	0.07	0.02	0.005	0.070	0.16	1,230
Freq. at which herders saw outside herders in GA in past wet season (1 - 6 scale)	0.15	0.30	0.617	0.785	2.69	280
Freq. at which herders saw outside herders in GA in past dry season (1 - 6 scale)	0.40	0.27	0.151	0.241	2.77	277
Herders saw outside herder in GA more than once a week in past wet season	0.07	0.07	0.326	0.550	0.28	280
Herders saw outside herder in GA more than once a week in past dry season	0.13	0.07	0.056	0.196	0.31	277

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. The 1 - 6 scale used to measure frequency at which herders saw outside herders in the GA is as follows: 0 = "never", 1 = "less than once a month", 2 = "once a month", 3 = "multiple times per month", 4 = "once a week", 5 = "multiple times per week", 6 = "daily". Variables without description of units are binary. All p-values are two-tailed.

Extended Data Table 10: Audits

Panel A: 0 - 1 years after program end	Treatment effect					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Combined herding observed in GA	0.28	0.08	<0.001	0.010	0.10	123
Number of herds in combined herd	2.47	0.74	0.002	0.020	0.35	123
Number of cattle in combined herd	52.85	17.10	0.004	0.020	14.15	122
Combined herd herded in bunched shape	0.20	0.09	0.033	0.010	0.04	123
Combined herd is accompanied by herders	0.37	0.09	<0.001	0.000	0.06	123
Number of herd owners listed in grazing group meeting minutes	2.60	0.70	<0.001	0.010	0.96	123
Number of herd owners listed in grazing group contribution list	1.92	0.54	0.001	0.020	0.39	123
Number of herd owners in water group meeting minutes	-1.03	1.54	0.509	0.770	3.41	123
Number of herd owners in water group contribution list	1.31	0.81	0.112	0.140	2.93	123
Number of herd owners in development group meeting minutes	0.86	0.73	0.247	0.550	2.10	123
Number of herd owners in development group contributions list	0.97	0.46	0.040	0.180	0.55	123

Panel B: 3 years after program end	Treatment effect					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Herders observed combined herding	0.12	0.06	0.047	0.100	0.16	358
Herders observed returning from grazing with cattle	0.09	0.05	0.072	0.220	0.40	357
Herders observed actively herding cattle while grazing	0.05	0.04	0.252	0.320	0.26	358
# Herders observed actively herding cattle during grazing	0.18	0.10	0.075	0.120	0.29	358
Herders report following grazing plan	0.12	0.05	0.013	0.120	0.49	345
Herders report following written grazing plan	0.12	0.04	0.009	0.130	0.06	355
Herders report following group grazing plan	0.12	0.05	0.015	0.100	0.20	355
Combined cash and in-kind payments each herder receives	123.10	87.79	0.169	0.430	631.93	261
Herd owner listed in grazing group meeting minutes	0.10	0.05	0.029	0.100	0.04	1,359
Herd owner listed in grazing group contributions list	0.09	0.05	0.090	0.220	0.06	1,359
Herd owner listed in water group meeting minutes	0.07	0.06	0.250	0.470	0.17	1,359
Herd owner listed in water group contributions list	0.09	0.06	0.150	0.340	0.26	1,359
Herd owner listen in development group meeting minutes	-0.01	0.02	0.472	0.750	0.06	1,359
Herd owner listed in development group contributions list	-0.03	0.02	0.187	0.430	0.07	1,359

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Variables without description of units are binary, with positive responses coded as 1. See Materials and Methods for additional details. All p-values are two-tailed.

Supplementary Information for:

Cooperation in the commons: Community-based rangeland management in Namibia

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
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
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1. Supplementary Methods

a. Study timelines



Supplementary Fig. 1. Timelines for community-based rangeland management (CBRLM) mobilization, implementation, and the research components.



Supplementary Fig. 2. Timelines for grazing area (GA) mobilization, enrollment, and visits by implementation staff.

b. Data collection

i. Primary outcome variable definitions

Definitions of social variables depicted in Fig. 2 (see Main Text) and Extended Data Table 1 are as follows:

- (a) *Grazing planning* is an index of three variables measuring whether the manager has a grazing plan and whether the grazing plan is written.
- (b) *Grazing plan adherence* is an index of two variables measuring whether and for how long the herd manager followed a pre-defined grazing plan while herding cattle.
- (c) *Herding practices* is an index of seven variables measuring whether the herd manager follows herding practices recommended by the program, such staying with the cattle throughout the day and herding cattle in a bunch.
- (d) *Herder management* is an index of five variables measuring the extent to which the herd owner provides oversight and material support to herders.
- (e) *Cattle husbandry* is an index of nine variables measuring whether the herd manager follows cattle husbandry practices recommended by the program, such as vaccinating and deworming cattle.
- (f) *Herd restructuring* is a measure of whether herd owners have made any decisions to buy or sell cattle in order to change the structure of their herd, as opposed to reasons such as immediate financial need or sick cattle.
- (g) *Livestock marketing* is an index of three variables measuring whether the herd owners sold any cattle, the number of cattle sold, and the total value of cattle sold.
- (h) *Community governance* is an index of 12 variables measuring whether respondent perceives their community to be governed by institutional rules.
- (i) *Collective action* is a measure of 19 variables measuring whether respondents engaged in collective management behaviors, such as group grazing planning, combined herding, group payment for vaccines.
- (j) *Community disputes* is an index of three variables measuring the number of unresolved community disputes with other farmers inside and outside of the grazing area.
- (k) *Trust* is an index of two variables measuring whether the respondent trusts other individuals in the community.
- (l) *Expertise* is an index of six variables measuring herd manager expertise and access to expertise about cattle husbandry and marketing.
- (m) *Self and community efficacy* is an index of four variables measuring herd manager's beliefs that their actions or the actions of their community can influence cattle and rangeland outcomes.

Definitions of social variables depicted in Fig. 3 (see Main Text) and Extended Data Table 2 are as follows:

- (a) *Income* is the total income earned by the household per week.
- (b) *Expenditure* is the total consumption and expenditure by the household per week.
- (c) *Household livestock wealth* is an index of cattle and non-cattle livestock units owned by the household.

- (d) *Time use* is an index of six variables representing time spent on economically productive activities by adults in the household (positive) and children in the household (negative).
- (e) *Resilience* is an index of six variables measuring the household's resilience to economic hardship, including food security and savings.
- (f) *Female empowerment* is an index of three variables measuring economic empowerment of women in the household.
- (g) *Meat/dairy consumption* is an index of two variables measuring household consumption of meat and dairy products.

Definitions of cattle variables depicted in Fig. 3 (see Main Text) and Extended Data Table 2 are as follows:

- (h) *Cattle herd value* is an index of three variables measuring the value of the cattle herd in total number, total weight, and total market value.
- (i) *Herd productivity* is an index of seven variables measuring the health and productivity of the cattle herd, including calving rate, herd expansion, milk production, and average weight and body condition.
- (j) *Herd structure* is an index of three variables measuring whether the herd has a higher ratio of bulls to cows, total cattle to oxen, and total cattle to old and unproductive cattle.

Definitions of variables depicted in Fig. 3 (see Main Text) and Extended Data Table 2 are as follows, and methods are reviewed below:

- (a) *No site erosion* is the estimated degree of soil surface disturbance;
- (b) *Protected soil surface* is the percentage of ground area shielded by plant material or rock;
- (c) *Plant litter cover* is the percentage of ground area shielded by dead plant material;
- (d) *Herbaceous canopy cover* is the percentage of ground area shaded by grass and forb foliage;
- (e) *Perennial to annual ratio* is the ratio of respective canopy coverages for perennial and annual grasses;
- (f) *Grass to forb ratio* is the ratio of total grass canopy cover to total forb canopy cover;
- (g) *No stinkbush* (*Pechuel-Loeschea leubnitziae*) is an indicator of noxious weedy species, as measured by percent canopy coverage;
- (h) *Grass to Aristida ratio* is the ratio of respective canopy coverages for total grasses excluding Aristida and all Aristida species—Aristida in this context are undesirable forage plants; and
- (i) *Shrub canopy cover* is the percentage of ground surface shaded by shrub foliage.

ii. Cattle scoring key



(A)

	At birth to 1 month	Two or more of the temporary incisor teeth present. Within first month, entire 8 temporary incisors appear.
	2 years	As a long-yearling, the central pair of temporary incisor teeth or pinchers is replaced by the permanent pinchers.
	2-1/2 years	Permanent first intermediates, one on each side of the pinchers, are cut.
	3-1/2 years	The second intermediates or laterals are cut.
	4-1/2 years	The corner teeth are replaced.
	5 to 6 years	The permanent pinchers are leveled, both pairs of intermediates are partially leveled, and the corner incisors show wear.
	7 to 10 years	At 7 or 8 years the pinchers show noticeable wear; at 8 or 9 years the middle pairs show noticeable wear; and at 10 years, the corner teeth show noticeable wear.
	12 years	the teeth gradually become triangular in shape, distinctly separated, and show progressive wearing to stubs. These conditions become more marked with increasing age.

(B)

Supplementary Fig. 3. Field guides for (A) assessing cattle body condition scores (1-5) and (B) cattle age¹.

2. Supplemental Text

a. Context

i. Historical context

The Community-Based Rangeland and Livestock Management (CBRLM) program was implemented in Namibia's Northern Communal Areas (NCAs)². Pastoral livestock production is the predominant agricultural system in the NCAs³, although higher rainfall allows for mixed crop and livestock farming in the NCA's central and eastern regions. Today, the NCAs contain approximately 20% of Namibia's 840,000 square km of land but 45% of Namibia's 2.6 million cattle, and 55% of Namibia's 2.1 million citizens⁴.

Most arable land in the NCAs is communally owned, meaning that it is the formal property of the state and fencing it is illegal, except for a limited allowance for homesteads and cultivated fields³. In recent years, population pressure, illegal fencing, and proliferation of boreholes have accelerated degradation of an already fragile ecosystem⁵. However, the resource governance challenges facing communal lands in Namibia should be understood in the context of Namibia's history, from pre-colonial to colonial to post-independence.

The origins of the Northern Communal Areas are traceable to two distinct systems of economic production and political authority in pre-colonial Namibia⁶. Southern, central, and

northwestern Namibia was predominantly inhabited by transhumant pastoral communities with limited political centralization^{5,7}. In contrast, populations in north-central and north-eastern Namibia, most of what we call the Northern Communal Areas today, combined settled agriculture and animal husbandry and were ruled by centralized tribal kingdoms⁷.


Under German colonialism, the differences between northern and southern systems of economic production were formalized into distinct systems of legal land ownership and political authority⁸. German colonists arrived in Namibia in 1883 and by 1902 had seized most of Namibia's southern and central territory⁷. However, German colonizers did not move into northern Namibia, both because colonial authorities did not think northern Namibia contained valuable natural resources and because Ovambo tribal authorities in northern Namibia were more politically powerful than the Southern, decentralized pastoralist groups⁶. In 1897, Germany formally demarcated the border between southern Namibia and the Northern Communal Areas by establishing a Veterinary Cordon Fence (VCF) to contain a Rinderpest epidemic⁸. A decade later, Germany prohibited white land settlement in the NCAs, and Germany's political influence in the NCAs remained restricted to indirect arrangements with traditional authorities⁹.

When South Africa began administering Namibia after World War I, it maintained and expanded Germany's policy of land expropriation in the south and indirect rule in the north. South Africa also relocated large portions of the indigenous population living south of the VCF onto marginal communal lands called "native reserves" that were governed by indigenous authorities^{10,11}. Native reserves were located both north and south of the VCF. The South African government did not support, and in some cases actively hindered, agriculture and animal husbandry development on native reserves in order to ensure a reservoir of cheap indigenous migratory laborers for white-owned farms, mines, and businesses^{10,11}. The native reserve policy has left a lasting legacy on livestock farmers in the central and eastern NCAs, who still suffer from low quality grazing land, underdeveloped livestock markets, and limited training in animal husbandry.

While communal land policy in the NCAs is traceable to colonial policy in the first half of the twentieth century, the present ecological crisis facing the NCAs is also influenced by South African policy changes initiated in the 1960s in response to the emergence of indigenous resistance to South African apartheid^{5,6}. In 1962, the Odendaal Commission recommended that the South African government consolidate scattered native reserves into ethnic homelands and increase investment in economic development in communal areas⁷. In the NCA's, the Odendaal Commission led to the dramatic expansion of investments in borehole drilling and road networks, especially in north-western Namibia, and the first steps towards privatization of communal lands in Oshikoto and Kavango West^{5,9}. These changes upended existing systems of grazing and water management by delinking grazing patterns from the availability of natural water sources and enabling growth of human and livestock populations⁵. However, the South African government failed to establish a framework of customary rights for regulating access to land, water, and grazing resources to manage to these dynamics^{5,9}.

Debates around the development of livestock markets, land tenure reform, and natural resource conservation continued after Namibian independence in 1990. For example, laws restricting the movement and sale of livestock from the NCAs south of the VCF remain deeply contested because they are perceived to limit the economic potential of livestock production in communal areas¹². The Communal Land Reform Act of 2002 acknowledged the authority of traditional leaders to manage customary land rights and established Communal Land Boards to register new and customary land allocations. However, progress in registration in the ensuing

decades has been slow and current customary land rights focus narrowly on grazing access to the exclusion of other communal resources, such as water and fire wood⁹. In the absence of group land rights, many communities in the NCAs have developed resource government strategies using conservancies, community forests, and Water Point Associations, but the powers of these organizations are severely circumscribed⁹. The ecological and economic challenges facing the livestock sector in the NCAs at the time CBRLM was introduced should be understood in this historical context. Far from a static socio-economic and ecological system, the NCAs have been deeply influenced by pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence land administration.



Supplementary Fig. 4. CBRLM project regions and human population density (20).

ii. Program context

The CBRLM was funded under the auspices of the Millennium Challenge Account-Namibia, and was implemented by a consulting firm called *Gesellschaft für Organisation, Planung und Ausbildung* (GOPA)². The CBRLM spanned seven administrative regions including: Kunene, Omusati, Oshana, Oshikoto, Ohangwena, Kavango West and Kavango East. Together these cover an area of about 170,000 km² (Supplementary Fig. 4). The area can be approximated by a rectangle that is 800 km long (East to West) and 200 km wide (South to North). The NCAs have a predominantly warm and dry climate with a pronounced seasonal distribution of precipitation. Ecological details are reviewed later in this section.

Within the seven administrative regions listed above, the CBRLM operated across 11 areas governed by Traditional Authorities (TAs)². TAs allocate communal land, regulate communal land use, and formulate and enforce customary law⁴. Within each TA the GOPA implementation team mapped Rangeland Intervention Areas (RIAs) where CBRLM could be implemented. Wherever possible, RIAs conformed to the boundaries of pre-existing Communal Area Conservancies or Community Forests². Where no Communal Area Conservancy or Community Forest existed, the implementation team worked with TAs to map appropriately sized intervention areas in their jurisdiction¹³. Each RIA contains five to 15 Grazing Areas (GAs). The GAs are communal rangeland parcels used by five to 50 cattle kraals; herd owners in each GA share forage and water resources. The cattle kraals are overnight holding pens for cattle herds owned by one to five households (usually extended family members). Households that

share a kraal usually designate or hire a herd manager who is responsible for day-to-day management of cattle but does not generally make decisions with regards to buying, selling, or health treatments without the consent of the cattle owners. The size, makeup, and economic status of herding households varies greatly across Northern Namibia¹⁴. Most GAs have a local headman who is a member of the TA and is responsible for admission of new herd owners to the GA as well as the management of community disputes. In practice, the extent of the power of the local headman varies substantially among GAs.

CBRLM was intended to improve cattle raising by facilitating herd restructuring, animal husbandry, and cattle marketing. GOPA hoped that the intervention would improve the productivity and economic viability of cattle rearing in the NCAs¹⁵. Previous research points to low bull-to-cow ratios, low calving rates, and inadequate weaning practices as causes for poor productivity^{16,17}. Others have argued that greater integration between small-scale communal pastoralism and livestock markets could also alleviate such problems. However, there are significant practical barriers to raising cattle for profit in northern Namibia; many cattle producers are absentee owners and marketing transaction costs can be a hindrance¹⁸.

Such challenges are reflected in the broader literature on African pastoral development. Some critics of cattle commercialization projects argue that raising cattle for the formal market on communal land is not economically viable, and that development interventions should enhance herd productivity for its own sake¹⁵. There is also debate over factors that keep communal pastoralists from selling cattle in the formal economy. One argument is that for pastoralists the primary economic value of cattle comes not from income-generating potential but rather from their use as insurance¹⁹. In this view, cattle are a reliable store of wealth and animals are primarily sold during crisis. Others argue that reluctance to sell cattle comes from their value as social capital²⁰.

Water development is another key issue. The question of how to protect and sustainably maintain water resources is urgent in Namibia. Like many developing countries, the Namibian government has adopted a community-management approach to the maintenance of boreholes in rural areas^{21,22}. However, water users often fail to pay their fees, especially in areas where governance is weak. Moreover, during times of drought water users often ignore externally imposed regulations in favor of traditional customs of reciprocity^{21,22}.

As will be described, the CBRLM project was conceived not only as a check on environmental degradation, but as a means of community self-help. New GA committees were created and incentivized to pool financial resources to fund cattle production inputs like vaccines, feed supplements, and herder salaries; CBRLM also invested in the development of local marketing cooperatives. As such, the CBRLM is an example of a partnership to create processes referred to as community-driven development. This is an increasingly popular concept in international development (see Main Text), but the literature on its efficacy is mixed²³. Related evidence from recent randomized evaluations suggests that community-driven development can successfully deliver infrastructure and economic returns, but has less success sustainably affecting community governance and creation of social capital^{24,25} and may even crowd-out pre-existing local institutions dependent on the beliefs of constituents with respect to local politics²⁶.

The Namibian government has previously pursued several projects meant to reduce rangeland degradation and improve livestock production in the NCAs. A project called the Northern Regions Livestock Development Project (NOLIDEP) took place from 1995-2003 and had a general focus on commercialization of livestock production, with specific attention to

community capacity building and provision of strategic inputs such as rural veterinary clinics and water points²⁷. Another effort, referred to as the Sustainable Animal and Rangeland Development Program (SARDEP), has existed in Namibia for over two decades with a focus on creating more sustainable linkages between rural producers and service institutions, as well as supporting dialogue to create national policies regarding sustainable use of natural resources²⁸.


iii. Ecological context

In terms of ecological systems, the NCAs are diverse³. The topography is generally flat with only the extreme western region exhibiting topographic variation towards the Great Escarpment in Kunene (Supplementary Fig. 4). Precipitation has a distinct East to West gradient, with the West being drier than the East³. Across the entire study region, annual precipitation averages just under 400mm with high variability³. The main wet season occurs from January to March with precipitation steadily dropping after April. A distinct dry period occurs from May to September. During June through August the study region typically receives only scant precipitation³.


Soils are diverse and are dominated by sandy, silty, or clay substrates³. Vegetation community types include grasslands, shrublands, bushlands, and savannas³. Localized heavy livestock grazing over many years is associated with the sedentarization of human settlement and borehole development^{29,30}. Woody encroachment and conversion of herbaceous perennial communities to annual plants are common ecological responses to overuse of these rangelands^{29,30}.

As with most drylands of the world, low and highly variable precipitation is the norm in northern Namibia. Drought, defined here as one or more years of below-average precipitation that negatively affect socioeconomic attributes, is common. Resource use systems such as pastoralism have evolved to cope with drought.

Our study region in northern Namibia has experienced a significant decline in rainfall in the past eight years (e.g., 2013 to 2020) when compared to the previous 31 years beginning in 1981. This is illustrated by superimposing the monthly rainfall distributions in Supplementary Fig. 5. Precipitation data are based on the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station (CHIRPS) data set consisting of daily modeled precipitation from January 1981 to the present with a ground resolution of 5.5 km. The overall decline in precipitation is on the order of 36%, with notable decreases from the main wet season months of January, February, and March. Annual variation has been substantial over the past 39 years—and possibly increasing—as illustrated in Supplementary Fig. 6. These data suggest that CBRLM was implemented and evaluated during a particularly dynamic period. The project implementation phase of 2010 to 2014 may have been wetter than average, while the evaluation phase of 2014 to 2017 may have been drier than average. The implications of such dynamism for pastoral development outcomes from CBLRM are explored in subsequent sections.



Supplementary Fig. 5. Average monthly precipitation in northern Namibia for two periods, 1981 to 2012 and 2013 to 2020. Data are organized according to water year that commences October 1³¹.



Supplementary Fig. 6. Annual precipitation patterns from 1981 to 2020 for northern Namibia³¹.

b. Scientific rationale for planned grazing

Rotational grazing (often lumped into the category of ‘planned grazing’ or ‘prescribed grazing’) has become a popular resource management strategy for averting environmental degradation and increasing sustainable levels of forage and livestock production. The essential practice of rotational grazing consists of combining herds that would otherwise graze independently into one or more large herds. Herders then move these large herds around the landscape, spending a short period in one location before moving to a new location. Allan Savory^{32,33} espoused the idea that this form of intensively managed grazing replicates co-evolved, sustainable relationships between grasses and large grazing animals, and that such interactions can be used to restore damaged rangelands.

The core idea is that grasses have evolved to withstand frequent herbivory and will be most productive when defoliated at a judicious frequency. Therefore, grasses in any given area should be subjected to intensive, short bursts of heavy defoliation and then allowed time to recover before subsequent waves of grazing. In a planned grazing rotation, livestock may occupy a grazing location for just a few days to a week or so—in some forms of rotational grazing the grazing period is just one day—and are herded together at high stocking density. This high-density grazing creates a ‘herd effect’ imposing concentrated disturbance to the soil that Savory believes is an important factor contributing to rangeland rehabilitation³². Savory has been one of the more high-profile advocates of rotational grazing since 1978 when he first presented his ideas, most of which were based on a book by French agronomist André Voisin³⁴ at the First International Rangeland Congress. Voisin pointed out that the concept of rotational grazing has been around since at least the late 18th century, but it has become common practice for ranchers and pastoralists on a global scale during only the last few decades.

Practitioners of rotational grazing see the benefits occurring more in terms of extended rest periods that allow the vegetation to recover from defoliation, rather than the impact of animal hooves disturbing the soil and breaking up dead plant material on the surface. They also observe changes in plant composition of the pasture or rangeland in which palatable species tend to increase at the expense of less palatable and weedy plants. In his review of relevant literature, Norton³⁵ noted that the rest periods protecting plants from grazing allow greater total forage production, and that increased above-ground photosynthetic biomass builds a larger root system penetrating deeper into the soil profile. However, Briske et al.³⁶ reported that while there has long been widespread concurrence among range scientists, federal land managers, and commercial ranchers regarding the efficacy of rotational grazing on US rangelands relative to continuous grazing, this distinction has not been supported by hard scientific evidence from grazing trials on research stations.

Many research trials comparing rotational grazing to continuous grazing have failed to find a consistent and significant benefit to either forage yield or livestock production^{36,37}. Trials were conducted on research stations where the experimental paddocks were small and research herds likewise small, sometimes only 3-4 head of cattle. Another feature of research grazing trials is that the number of paddocks in the rotation was often as low as 3 (in deferred rotations) and rarely more than 14. Following the guidelines in Voisin³⁴, grazing periods should be limited to around seven days followed by a rest period of 30 days, which defines a rotation around just five paddocks. As the grazing period is reduced and the rest period increased, the number of paddocks required by the rotation rises. A grazing period of two days in a rotation of 60 paddocks means that livestock spend on average only six days grazing per year in each paddock,

and the paddock is rested for almost 360 days per year, which can lead the biological mechanics of rotational grazing to cause a doubling of sustainable stocking rate and greater tolerance of low rainfall seasons or years³⁸. Voisin³⁴ worked on dairy farms in temperate France; in a rangeland setting, on the other hand, for most of the year rest periods need to be much longer than 30 days to allow adequate time for recovery under the irregular and sparse rainfall patterns of a semi-arid environment. Similarly, herds need to consist of dozens of animals or more to achieve a grazing herd's natural cohesive social behavior.

A key factor of livestock management is missing from grazing research in small experimental units, namely, the spatial dimension: scientists could assume that both available forage and forage utilization by grazing animals were spatially homogeneous, which is untrue in a landscape context. When the distribution of grazing livestock across a spatially heterogeneous landscape is entered into the discussion, rotational grazing is clearly superior to continuous grazing^{39,40}. Even Briske et al. have admitted that research station results could not apply to a commercial-scale operation⁴¹. Livestock in a small paddock can explore the entire area of available pasture on a daily basis, and forage utilization is spatially more even than across a landscape where patch-grazing is usually the norm if animal movement is unconstrained. One would expect the simple factor of small paddocks to enhance livestock production, and it does. Norton³⁵ reported examples where he compared the experimental stocking rates to the stocking rates for livestock on commercial ranches near the station: rates approaching twice the recommended commercial rate could be sustained on the research station for many years without adverse ecological consequences to either the continuous or the rotation treatment. Alternatively, in a much larger paddock the livestock concentrate their grazing activity in preferred patches and much of the pasture is neglected. The stocking rate calculated for the entire paddock is much lower than the *de facto* stocking rate imposed on the preferred patches or zones where most of the grazing is taking place. A critical aspect of rotational grazing is to prevent patch grazing that opens up pastures to patch degradation (i.e., localized overgrazing), weed invasion, and erosion.

In a nutshell, the theory of rotational grazing has three elements: 1) Controlled defoliation frequency achieved by short grazing periods followed by long rest periods; 2) high-density grazing forcing even utilization by using combined herds for short grazing periods, with stocking rate calculated for the entire rotation area; and 3) even spatial distribution of grazing animals in a rotational sequence around landscape units. The outcomes comprise: 1) Greater forage production; 2) higher livestock productivity from bigger animals or higher fecundity or both; and 3) increased ecological health of the pasture in terms of biodiversity and drought tolerance. A good illustration of the benefits of rotational grazing that incorporates a number of dimensions of the livestock management/pasture interaction was published by Odadi et al. from work in Kenya.

Odadi et al.⁴² describe an ecological assessment of rotational grazing conducted within a communal pastoral area in northern Kenya divided into unfenced 'paddocks'. The assessment followed five years of planned rotational grazing and employed an experimental approach with three pairs of sites. One of each site pair was subjected to rotational "planned grazing," while the other consisted of unplanned grazing (i.e., control). The planned system included bunched grazing of livestock, multiple unfenced paddocks, and a 50% recommended level of forage utilization prior to moving animals among paddocks. Overall, they concluded that the planned grazing system had positive effects on all plant and animal indicators⁴².

In a later paper, Odadi et. al.⁴³ focused specifically on the effectiveness of bunched herds in a low-level rotation. Odadi and his colleagues compared herds that grazed in loose bunches managed by one herder with herds that grazed in tight bunches enforced by three herders. All

other aspects of the grazing system were similar for both types of herding. The results were noteworthy. Cattle herded in tight bunches traveled shorter distances, had higher nutrient intake per unit of distance traveled, grazed less selectively consuming less of the preferred species with intake spread over a wider array of species, but had higher weight gain. The higher cattle live weights generated more income greater than the extra cost of herding. The benefits of herding in tight bunches were financial as well as ecological.

Herding for rotational grazing as practiced in the CBRLM GAs was much looser and often abandoned once the herd had been shepherded to a designated grazing site. In general, rotational grazing in the GAs was implemented less rigorously by communities than by the trained staff implementing the program described in Odadi et al. The CBRLM program should be understood as an evaluation of a program designed to mobilize best practices in rotational grazing through external support, rather than an evaluation of rotational grazing when applied rigorously.

c. Comparing CBRLM and holistic management approaches

The approach to grazing management in the CBRLM proposal for the NCAs¹⁵ was inspired by the Holistic Management (HM) model of Allan Savory^{32,33}. In his 1988 textbook³³, Savory emphasizes the need to first identify community or household goals and then make detailed plans to achieve those goals, which should include financial and life-style goals as well as resource productivity, socio-economic sustainability, and household welfare. Furthermore, Savory stresses that resource managers should be flexible, monitoring performance and revising plans and activities on a regular basis. This flexibility and process of revising plans and actions is an essential component of the HM strategy.

In the case of CBRLM, although it adopted rotational grazing and socio-economic integration and household prosperity in project design¹⁵, the overarching goals were largely determined by external development agents instead of being generated by recipient communities, and full-scale revision of plans and activities was not possible within the short time-frame of project implementation, even if it had been accommodated in CBRLM design. Therefore, CBRLM did not employ the full HM template, although it followed some aspects of HM. It also transpired that communities were unable to strictly enforce grazing management protocols of combined herds and planned grazing; independent herder actions and trespassing by external herds that poached conserved forage compromised the recommended rotational grazing practice (see Main Text). Insofar as CBRLM is a test of well-executed rotational grazing at community and landscape scales, testing the efficacy of planned grazing management was frustrated and anticipated outcomes thwarted. CBRLM also failed as an example of HM because key features of HM were omitted, but even if CBRLM had faithfully followed HM, there was insufficient project time for adequate execution and evaluation of the full HM approach. This evaluation should be considered a test of external inducements to engage in rotational grazing at community and landscape scales, rather than a direct test of rigorously implemented HM.

In general, CBRLM, however, can be lauded for pursuing a development effort that connected many elements of a complex social-ecological system (SES) in a core theory of change (TOC) (see previous section). The study of outcomes—very unusual in development programs—was thus a means to assess lessons learned. Our research has indicated that while persistent changes in many social features of this pastoral community occurred with respect to commons management planning, changes in the household economy, cattle production system,

and rangeland condition were not observed. This is not surprising, however, given the relatively short time frame for assessment and bio-physical time lags in a setting strongly affected by variable rainfall and other perturbations (see Main Text).

How a complex SES responds to externally generated intervention has received little detailed study, particularly in the context of dryland settings. Rangeland management scholars note anecdotally that while practitioners (e.g., ranchers) adopting HM paradigms in the western US often perceive positive outcomes with regards to social or psychological aspects of their increased investments in resource planning, hard evidence of associated improvements in the natural environment as a result of treatment is often lacking⁴⁴. A similar perspective is voiced by Gosnell et al. in their recent meta-analysis of global studies on HM⁴⁵. Although they note the dearth of truly integrated SES research, their review points to a distinct dichotomy between the ecological and social domains of HM; namely, that while many controversies prevail over the pros and cons of ecological impacts arising from HM, far more consensus exists concerning the positive benefits in the social sphere including attention to goal setting, human capacity building, enhanced social networking, and creating social resilience. Our research findings generally conform to this perspective.

i. Community governance

One of the key assumptions of CBRLM was that community governance needed to be fortified to help combat environmental degradation as related to poor grazing management. There is a growing agreement among researchers and development practitioners that a weakening of traditional community governance is a major problem in the world's dry lands. Traditional governance in pastoral areas includes efforts to mitigate social disputes, allocate natural resources, and organize labor to address community challenges²⁰. When these attributes are lost social cohesion can suffer and resource degradation occurs. Population growth, shifts in cultural norms, increases in resource-based conflicts, emergence of local, ultra-wealthy elites (who do as they please), expansion of absentee herd-ownership, and an undermining of local traditional authorities by regional or national governments are some of the major internal and external factors involved⁴⁶⁻⁴⁹. The problem is recognized by development agencies, who have increasingly focused on restoring aspects of traditional governance in local situations to improve natural resource management. Such processes include efforts to strengthen governance via participatory combinations of traditional and contemporary leadership that reflects differing knowledge bases and access to resources⁴⁸.

ii. Commercialization of livestock production

Another key assumption of CBRLM was that the communities would be responsive to efforts to boost cattle productivity via changes in animal husbandry, with an eye towards more marketed offtake and increased producer incomes. While this presumed process makes perfect sense to an outside expert trained in livestock development, there are false assumptions concerning cultural values and differing economic goals for traditional producers that undermine such plans in places like the NCAs of Namibia.

The struggles of pushing for more commercialized animal offtake from pastoral areas have been well known for decades, but largely ignored by project donors who follow top-down models of project design and implementation from a western perspective⁴⁸. Cattle marketing is

often pursued by governments seeking exports to boost foreign exchange coffers⁴⁸. New projects based on false assumptions thus keep coming down the pipeline. The fundamental, inimical nature of subsistence pastoralism versus commercial livestock production is best depicted by Behnke⁵⁰. Major differences occur in terms of inputs, outputs, goals, and even human demographics. While indeed pastoral systems are changing^{46,51}, it continues to be a truism that traditional herdowners (e.g., men) typically aspire to accumulate large stock such as cattle. More cattle may allow for a higher likelihood of surviving droughts or other crises, and there is little doubt that large herds can convey high social status to herd owners in many cultures⁴⁸. The flip side is that large herds can dominate local resource consumption, thus exacerbating household wealth stratification⁴⁶. Large herds can also suffer enormous death losses during droughts^{20,46}.

In contrast to cattle, however, small stock such as goats or sheep are more routinely sold by pastoralists to meet modest cash needs. Small stock are also more readily produced in more ecologically degraded environments²⁰. Commercialization will thus tend to be more successful for small stock when compared to that for cattle, and this can have a gender dimension as women are then more likely to market these animals and use the proceeds to improve the livelihoods of themselves and their children⁵². Such processes are more aligned with the rural-development ambitions of project donors and development experts. Traditional pastoral systems are low-input, high-risk enterprises. For cattle, they are not “cow-calf” operations as seen in modern commercialized ranching. In pastoral systems, immature animals are typically retained and matures are sold at advanced ages when they have attained a maximum body size. And when mature cattle are sold the objective is often to use the proceeds to buy more immatures to meet herd-building goals²⁰.

Veterinary interventions for cattle are often embraced by producers because they facilitate herd-building goals, not commercialization or cash-generation goals. Alternative investments to large stock such as cattle are needed to diversify assets in support of household resilience and improvement in rangeland management, and this can include bank accounts, urban investments such as real estate or small businesses, and support for children who leave the traditional system and become formally educated. Such options become more attractive when “boom and bust” cycles for cattle productivity tilt the portfolio choices against more re-investment in livestock versus the relative stability of investments in non-pastoral options less connected to stocking rates or the weather⁴⁶. A robust mix of different investments is the key for managing risk.

Besides socioeconomic barriers, the cattle producers of northern Namibia also face significant operational or structural barriers for marketing. These may include weak trading networks and low farm-gate prices¹⁵. The Veterinary Cordon Fence, imposed by colonial authorities and still enforced to manage the risks of epidemic diseases, limits access of producers in the NCAs to more lucrative markets in the southern parts of Namibia¹².

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4. Supplementary Tables 1 – 5 (following pages)

Supplementary Table 1: Randomization balance

Panel A: Data collected at RIA level	RIA-level statistics (pre-program)					
<i>RIA characteristic</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>% missing</i>	<i>N</i>
Log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households *	4.47	4.61	0.445	0.307	0.00	38
RIA has good water source *	0.79	0.74	0.674	0.658	0.00	38
RIA has community-based organizations *	0.74	0.79	0.568	0.545	0.00	38
Forest present in RIA	0.42	0.42	1.000	0.870	0.00	38
Grassland present in RIA	0.11	0.11	1.000	0.980	0.00	38
Livestock density (kg/ha) *	16.79	16.88	0.939	0.953	0.00	38
Number of livestock *	17,380	16,497	0.903	0.824	0.00	38
RIA overlaps geographically with prior interventions *	0.37	0.42	0.530	0.456	0.00	38
			p-value, joint F-test: 0.998	p-value, joint F-test, RI: >0.999		
Panel B: Data collected at GA level	RIA-level statistics (pre-program)					
<i>GA characteristic</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>% missing</i>	<i>N</i>
Community is willing to change	0.76	0.88	0.186	0.193	2.63	38
Traditional authority is ready for change	0.54	0.67	0.995	0.995	13.16	38
Community has social cohesion	0.63	0.67	0.756	0.721	0.00	38
Community is worried about spillover/grass poaching	0.49	0.65	0.166	0.094	2.63	38
Community perceives herder turnover as high	0.25	0.40	0.389	0.342	7.89	38
GA has cell phone reception	0.20	0.13	0.331	0.315	5.26	38
Community believes herders perform well	0.42	0.21	0.159	0.090	0.00	38
Cattle carrying capacity at or above regional norm	0.84	0.88	0.356	0.430	0.00	38
Proportion of HHs near water point made of mud/clay/brick	0.06	0.03	0.206	0.116	5.26	38
Full water point installed	0.72	0.66	0.754	0.771	7.89	38
Himba people live in community	0.25	0.36	0.454	0.381	5.26	38
Vegetation biomass production (1-9; 9 = extremely high production)	6.88	6.89	0.854	0.840	0.00	38
Non-cattle livestock density (mean #/square km)	1.12	1.27	0.874	0.834	0.00	38
Cattle density (mean #/square km)	7.63	8.01	0.925	0.904	0.00	38
Annual rainfall deficit (evaporation minus rainfall, in mm)	9.18	9.32	0.323	0.264	0.00	38
GA area (square km)	7,540.76	6,321.75	0.185	0.184	0.00	38
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (inverted Herfindahl index)	0.00	0.01	0.380	0.247	0.00	38
Number of kraals per grazing area	25.25	22.84	0.452	0.326	0.00	38
Proportion plant cover of any kind	0.84	0.85	0.750	0.636	0.00	38
Rainfall (mm) in year ending in August 2016	353.30	355.33	0.753	0.698	0.00	38
			p-value, joint F-test: 0.662	p-value, joint F-test, RI: >0.999		
Panel C: Data collected from herd managers	Individual-level statistics (0 - 1 years after program end)					
<i>Herd owner characteristic</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>% missing</i>	<i>N</i>
Herd owner age (years)	54.46	54.32	0.178	0.125	1.92	1,176
Herd owner completed primary education	0.39	0.44	0.804	0.773	0.00	1,199
			p-value, joint F-test: 0.396	p-value, joint F-test, RI: 0.557		
Panel D: Data collected from heads of household	Individual-level statistics (3 years after program end)					
<i>Household characteristic</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>% missing</i>	<i>N</i>
Household head is male	0.80	0.79	0.783	0.784	11.04	1,209
Household head age (years)	55.94	57.47	0.927	0.917	11.63	1,201
Household head education level (0 - 9 scale; 0=none)	2.13	2.42	0.555	0.549	11.04	1,209
Household speaks Rukwangli	0.17	0.19	0.120	0.125	11.04	1,209
Household speaks Herero	0.30	0.27	0.920	0.910	11.04	1,209
			p-value, joint F-test: 0.551	p-value, joint F-test, RI: 0.837		

Notes: Treatment and control means are sample means for each subgroup. Each p-value is two-tailed and comes from an OLS regression of treatment on the associated balance variable, and indicates the probability of observing a test statistic as extreme or more extreme than the observed test statistic given a true null hypothesis of no treatment effect. In each joint F-test, treatment status is regressed on all the variables in the associated panel of the table. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Standard errors are not clustered in Panels A and B because RIAs are the unit of observation and the unit of randomization, but in Panels C and D are clustered at the RIA level. Each regression in Panels A and B controls for a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification. Panels C and D include as controls this categorical variable for traditional authority and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. RIA-level regressions in Panels A and B do not include this full set of randomization controls to avoid having more predictors than observations. In Panel B, missing values are coded as 0. In Panels C and D, missing values are coded as zeros and regressions include a binary variable equal to 1 for observations in which the balance variable was missing and zero otherwise. Variables without description of units are binary. * indicates that a variable was used for re-randomization to ensure balance.

Supplementary Table 2: Program participation and attrition

Panel A: GA-level participation

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
GA formally enrolled in CBRLM	0.00	0.71	<0.001	<0.001	123

Panel B: GA manager-level participation

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Manager has heard of CBRLM program	0.63	0.91	<0.001	0.002	1,234
Manager was offered chance to participate in CBRLM	0.13	0.67	<0.001	<0.001	1,208
Manager participated in CBRLM	0.05	0.56	<0.001	<0.001	1,222

Panel C: Attrition

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Ctrl mean</i>	<i>Treat mean</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Attrited 0 - 1 years after end (behavioral survey 1)	0.03	0.04	0.336	0.407	1,241
Attrited 2 - 3 years after end (behavioral survey 2)	0.08	0.07	0.476	0.608	1,348
Attrited 2 - 3 years after end (cattle survey)	0.12	0.09	0.193	0.294	730
Attrited 3 years after end (household survey)	0.10	0.10	0.465	0.627	1,345

Notes: Each p-value is two-tailed and comes from an OLS regression of a variable measuring participation in the CBRLM program on treatment status, and indicates the probability of observing a test statistic as extreme or more extreme than the observed test statistic given a true null hypothesis of no treatment effect. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Variables without description of units are binary.

Supplementary Table 3: Treatment effect on social and behavioral indices, with inverse probability weighting

Panel A: Behaviors							0 - 1 years after program end						2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Grazing planning	1.36	0.23	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,199	1.04	0.20	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,218	0.32	0.06	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,240
Grazing plan adherence	0.38	0.08	<0.001	0.027	0.001	1,199	0.32	0.06	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,240	0.32	0.06	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,240
Herding practices	0.40	0.12	0.001	0.014	0.002	1,199	0.31	0.08	<0.001	0.023	0.001	1,243	0.31	0.08	<0.001	0.023	0.001	1,243
Herder management	0.17	0.08	0.044	0.101	0.045	1,199	0.43	0.14	0.003	0.058	0.004	1,243	0.43	0.14	0.003	0.058	0.004	1,243
Cattle husbandry *	0.38	0.11	<0.001	0.029	.	1,199	0.12	0.09	0.186	0.341	.	1,249	0.12	0.09	0.186	0.341	.	1,249
Herd restructuring *	-0.01	0.07	0.927	0.960	.	1,199	-0.02	0.04	0.506	0.746	.	1,243	-0.02	0.04	0.506	0.746	.	1,243
Cattle marketing *	-0.05	0.06	0.378	0.649	.	1,199	0.07	0.05	0.210	0.484	.	1,245	0.07	0.05	0.210	0.484	.	1,245

Panel B: Community dynamics, knowledge, and attitudes							0 - 1 years after program end						2 - 3 years after program end					
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Community governance	0.78	0.14	<0.001	0.008	0.001	1,199	0.55	0.11	<0.001	0.006	0.001	1,245	0.55	0.11	<0.001	0.006	0.001	1,245
Collective action	1.59	0.24	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,199	0.89	0.22	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,245	0.89	0.22	<0.001	0.002	0.001	1,245
Community disputes	0.07	0.07	0.303	0.444	0.418	1,140	-0.28	0.08	<0.001	0.088	0.002	1,243	-0.28	0.08	<0.001	0.088	0.002	1,243
Trust	-0.03	0.06	0.641	0.715	0.784	1,198
Knowledge	0.30	0.10	0.007	0.054	0.012	1,199	0.37	0.09	<0.001	0.009	0.001	1,248	0.37	0.09	<0.001	0.009	0.001	1,248
Self & community efficacy	0.03	0.10	0.783	0.831	0.858	1,196	-0.01	0.07	0.857	0.916	0.858	1,009	-0.01	0.07	0.857	0.916	0.858	1,009

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a behavioral program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. Regressions are corrected for differences in probability of treatment assignment within stratification blocks using inverse probability weighting, and RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference; see Methods for explanations of these methods. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Indices are the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of standardized components. Variables for the "trust" index were not collected in the survey 2 - 3 years after program end. All p-values are two-tailed. * indicates variables for which multiple hypothesis correction was not specified in the pre-analysis plan.

Supplementary Table 4: Treatment effect on rangeland health, cattle productivity and household economics, with inverse probability weighting

Panel A: Primary outcomes (indices)		2 - 3 years after program end				
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Herd value	0.01	0.11	0.955	0.969	0.955	653
Herd productivity	0.03	0.08	0.748	0.874	0.935	1,285
Weekly household income	0.10	0.07	0.163	0.353	0.408	1,210
Weekly household expenditure	0.03	0.05	0.567	0.506	0.935	1,210
Household livestock wealth	-0.07	0.05	0.121	0.423	0.408	1,210
Panel B: Secondary outcomes (indices)		2 - 3 years after program end				
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Herd structure	-0.01	0.07	0.875	0.932	0.945	653
Time use	0.04	0.10	0.699	0.832	0.945	1,210
Resilience	-0.03	0.07	0.642	0.806	0.945	1,210
Female empowerment	-0.02	0.08	0.804	0.849	0.945	1,210
Meat and dairy consumption	0.00	0.04	0.945	0.965	0.945	1,210
Panel C: Rangeland outcomes (standardized)		2 years after program end				
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	<i>q-val.</i>	<i>N</i>
Erosion:						
Wet season site erosion (1 = no erosion, 0 = erosion)	-0.09	0.10	0.360	0.646	.	972
Ground cover:						
Wet season protected soil surface (%; logit-transformed)	-0.21	0.11	0.061	0.184	.	972
Wet season plant litter cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.18	0.08	0.029	0.191	.	972
Dry season plant litter cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.08	0.11	0.466	0.729	.	885
Herbaceous cover:						
Wet season herbaceous canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.23	0.13	0.092	0.303	.	972
Dry season herbaceous canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.23	0.07	0.002	0.076	.	885
Wet season fresh plant biomass (kg/ha; log-transformed)	-0.23	0.15	0.142	0.326	.	966
Dry season fresh plant biomass (kg/ha; log-transformed)	-0.21	0.07	0.004	0.116	.	792
Relative canopy cover of perennial and annual grasses:						
Wet season perennial to annual canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.06	0.07	0.389	0.710	.	972
Relative canopy cover of grasses and forbs:						
Wet season grass to forb canopy ratio (log-transformed)	-0.21	0.10	0.037	0.289	.	972
Weeds:						
Wet season % of shrubs that are not stinkbush (%; logit-transformed)	0.00	0.08	0.980	0.993	.	870
Wet season grass to Aristida canopy cover ratio (log-transformed) *	-0.12	0.13	0.358	0.554	.	752
Woody vegetation:						
Wet season shrub canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	0.02	0.15	0.866	0.917	.	972
Dry season shrub canopy cover (%; logit-transformed)	-0.06	0.15	0.704	0.822	.	885

Notes: Each coef. is the coefficient on the treatment variable in an OLS regression of a program outcome on treatment status. It is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to the control group. Data in Panels A and B were collected using surveys of heads of household and cattle managers, and data in Panel C were collected as described in the Methods. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. Regressions include corrections for differences in probability of treatment assignment within stratification blocks using inverse probability weighting, and RI p-values were calculated using randomization inference; see Materials and Methods for explanations of these methods. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRML-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Indices are the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of standardized components. Monetary variables have been scaled to weekly Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. At the time of data collection (2017) the exchange rate was 13.3 NAD to 1 USD. Rangeland outcomes have been transformed (but not standardized as in Extended Data Table 2) as noted in parentheses to better meet assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance, but treatment and control means are sample means computed from data on untransformed scales. Multiple hypothesis correction was not specified for rangeland outcomes in the pre-analysis plan. All p-values are two-tailed. * Aristida is a genus of grasses that are undesirable forage plants in this context.

Supplementary Table 5: Treatment effect heterogeneity by rainfall, social outcomes and cattle productivity

Panel A: Social and Behavioral Outcomes (0 - 1 years)											
<i>Dependent variable</i>	Treatment			Low rainfall indicator			Treatment x low rainfall indicator				<i>N</i>
	<i>coef.1</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.2</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.3</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	
Grazing planning	1.70	0.32	<0.001	0.07	0.32	0.826	-0.75	0.42	0.086	0.409	1,199
Grazing plan adherence	0.42	0.08	<0.001	0.18	0.13	0.174	-0.14	0.15	0.331	0.560	1,199
Herding practices	0.36	0.12	0.004	0.12	0.23	0.596	0.02	0.18	0.928	0.954	1,199
Herder management	0.17	0.09	0.067	-0.01	0.19	0.944	-0.04	0.13	0.772	0.869	1,199
Cattle husbandry	0.51	0.12	<0.001	0.14	0.16	0.396	-0.27	0.17	0.113	0.470	1,199
Herd restructuring	0.07	0.11	0.503	0.03	0.12	0.795	-0.11	0.13	0.401	0.579	1,199
Cattle marketing	-0.01	0.08	0.920	0.15	0.14	0.301	-0.09	0.11	0.439	0.551	1,199
Community governance	0.92	0.19	<0.001	-0.02	0.24	0.943	-0.32	0.25	0.207	0.536	1,199
Collective action	1.65	0.27	<0.001	0.41	0.31	0.190	-0.25	0.45	0.585	0.771	1,199
Community disputes	0.13	0.07	0.065	0.01	0.12	0.912	-0.10	0.12	0.406	0.656	1,140
Trust	0.04	0.07	0.595	-0.01	0.14	0.927	-0.11	0.11	0.337	0.548	1,198
Knowledge	0.51	0.13	<0.001	0.42	0.18	0.029	-0.39	0.17	0.026	0.226	1,199
Self & community efficacy	0.04	0.12	0.725	0.02	0.19	0.930	-0.01	0.15	0.960	0.981	1,196

Panel B: Social and Behavioral Outcomes (2 - 3 years)											
<i>Dependent variable</i>	Treatment			Low rainfall indicator			Treatment x low rainfall indicator				<i>N</i>
	<i>coef.1</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.2</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.3</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	
Grazing planning	1.53	0.26	<0.001	0.80	0.27	0.006	-1.02	0.30	0.002	0.181	1,218
Grazing plan adherence	0.53	0.09	<0.001	0.21	0.15	0.173	-0.40	0.10	<0.001	0.156	1,240
Herding practices	0.46	0.12	<0.001	0.32	0.13	0.017	-0.32	0.16	0.057	0.214	1,243
Herder management	0.47	0.14	0.002	0.33	0.15	0.035	-0.10	0.20	0.641	0.834	1,243
Cattle husbandry	0.06	0.10	0.536	0.04	0.11	0.745	0.11	0.15	0.461	0.695	1,249
Herd restructuring	-0.01	0.06	0.822	0.21	0.08	0.014	-0.02	0.08	0.847	0.915	1,243
Cattle marketing	0.01	0.08	0.861	-0.17	0.10	0.096	0.12	0.12	0.343	0.606	1,245
Community governance	0.63	0.14	<0.001	0.16	0.18	0.385	-0.17	0.20	0.407	0.683	1,245
Collective action	1.07	0.20	<0.001	0.37	0.29	0.198	-0.37	0.40	0.353	0.602	1,245
Community disputes	-0.39	0.11	0.001	0.18	0.24	0.462	0.19	0.13	0.149	0.437	1,243
Knowledge	0.43	0.10	<0.001	-0.09	0.14	0.548	-0.16	0.15	0.297	0.538	1,248
Self & community efficacy	0.09	0.11	0.430	0.23	0.21	0.272	-0.20	0.18	0.298	0.473	1,009

Panel C: Physical outcomes (2 - 3 years)											
<i>Dependent variable</i>	Treatment			Low rainfall indicator			Treatment x low rainfall indicator				<i>N</i>
	<i>coef.1</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.2</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>coef.3</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-val.</i>	<i>RI p-val.</i>	
Herd value	0.12	0.11	0.271	-0.18	0.18	0.318	-0.17	0.16	0.314	0.521	653
Herd productivity	-0.15	0.13	0.274	-0.22	0.21	0.308	0.35	0.21	0.097	0.291	1,285
Weekly household income	58.22	38.66	0.141	40.78	52.69	0.444	-37.12	63.03	0.560	0.755	1,210
Weekly household expenditure	-33.96	74.49	0.651	-23.77	113.83	0.836	118.46	127.50	0.359	0.549	1,210
Household livestock wealth	-0.03	0.06	0.624	-0.03	0.16	0.841	-0.05	0.09	0.565	0.749	1,210
Herd structure	-0.12	0.09	0.212	-0.31	0.15	0.044	0.20	0.16	0.224	0.477	653
Time use	0.27	0.16	0.089	0.62	0.29	0.037	-0.48	0.26	0.068	0.168	1,210
Resilience	-0.17	0.09	0.076	0.00	0.13	0.969	0.28	0.12	0.028	0.177	1,210
Female empowerment	0.06	0.13	0.666	0.08	0.14	0.591	-0.14	0.14	0.347	0.521	1,210
Food consumption	0.03	0.07	0.662	-0.17	0.12	0.144	-0.05	0.07	0.505	0.659	1,210

Notes: Each row displays results from a separate regression in which the dependent variable is an index of behavioral, household, or cattle outcomes, and the independent variables are treatment status and an indicator variable for low rainfall. Coef. 1 indicates the coefficient on treatment, which is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate relative to control. Coef. 2 indicates the coefficient on an indicator variable for low rainfall, which is equal to 1 if a grazing area was below the median of all grazing areas in terms of percent difference in the grazing area's rainfall during the project period relative to the mean of the grazing area's rainfall over the 10 years prior to the program. Coef. 3 shows the interaction of the low-rainfall indicator with treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the RIA level, i.e., the unit of randomization. RI p-values are calculated using randomization inference. Each regression includes as controls a categorical variable for traditional authority (an administrative unit) that was used for block stratification and the RIA-level variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance, which are: vegetation type, number of livestock, livestock density, the log of the number of CBRLM-eligible households, and binary indicators for whether the RIA overlaps with prior intervention areas, has a quality water source, and has a community based organization. Indices are the standardized (mean = 0 and sd = 1), unweighted average of standardized components. Monetary variables are in Namibian dollar (NAD) amounts. 0 -1 years after program end (2014) the exchange rate was 10.8 NAD to 1 USD, and 2 - 3 years after program end was 14.7 NAD to 1 USD. See Materials and Methods and the Supplementary Materials for additional details. All p-values are two-tailed.